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FOREWORD  
 
 
 
 
I decided to write my thesis on legal matters in Afghanistan following my experience 
of working there. On 23 February 2008, I landed at the Bagram Air Field, sixty kilometres 
from Kabul. Bearing in mind popular films with scenes of planes spectacularly shot down 
from surrounding hills, I was looking around with more than just curiosity. My job in 
Afghanistan was a once in a lifetime experience.  
Afghanistan is unique place in many respects. The beauty of this landlocked country 
has been faced with protracted armed conflict for more than thirty years. The terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Centre made Afghan soil a world superpower playground yet again. This 
country, located at the crossroads of Asia neighbours “difficult” partners. China and Pakistan 
are nuclear powers as well as Russia and India. All these countries have their own particular 
interest in Afghanistan and have supported different factions of the conflict for years. The 
USA, UK and France are other nuclear states which were located there and still influence the 
situation there. It creates a puzzle situation with nearly all the nuclear powers engaged in the 
conflict on the dusty plains and mountains of Afghanistan. This complex, political 
environment is one aspect of the challenge. The second one is the character of the conflict. 
Asymmetric in nature, the conflict locates the civilian population as the centre of gravity. This 
conflict featured the largest NATO military involvement in history. Massive illegal substance 
production, smuggling drugs and weapon etc., fuel the insurgents’ struggle. Furthermore, 
created by the insurgents’ war economy, this seems to be a modus operandi of modern and 
future conflicts.  
Last year’s conflict in Afghanistan was commonly referred to as a “task or test” for 
NATO and the international community. This is because NATO countries could not fail the 
task of bringing stabilization to Afghanistan. It was also the biggest test of NATO as a 
military alliance. However, the ongoing war in Afghanistan was a challenge for contemporary 
lawyers as well. Many contemporary lawyers believed if a reasonable compromise between 
military necessity and human rights could be found, then there would be a future for 
stabilization missions. On the other hand, if Afghanistan turned out to present a scene of 
extreme violation of humanitarian law committed by NATO allied forces, no one would then 
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vote for politicians who support any military engagement. As a result, there would be no 
future military operation on the scale of that in Afghanistan. The same situation would occur 
if NATO allied troops suffer excessive casualties due to, for example, unreasonable legal 
constraints and national caveats. 
The main discussion of my thesis addresses legal issues arising out of military 
operations in Afghanistan. The reason being that there is no existing comprehensive analysis 
of the mission in Afghanistan. However, it is an extremely broad issue. Since much has been 
written on ius ad bello aspects of foreign engagement in Afghanistan and there are a lot of 
publications on the political dimension of NATO presence there, I decided to limit my thesis 
to ius bello practical aspects of NATO’s operation. This thesis will present not one or two 
issues, but provide an overall portrait of the legal challenges. To be more precise, I 
comparatively examine the case of Polish and British engagement. Such a comparative 
approach helps to reach a de lege ferenda conclusion. This is possible as I can draw on both 
practical knowledge based on my engagement in the Polish Military Forces and theoretical 
knowledge based on my affiliation to  academic institutions in both Great Britain and Poland. 
It is especially interesting because both countries operate within a similar legal regime and 
under similar US influence. A comparative approach also enables me to reach a general 
conclusion based on detailed analysis of the two countries’ legal systems.  
My development of my thesis was influenced by several factors. The main factor is 
simple; when I was writing it, the situation in Afghanistan changed many times, as did my 
initial plan of the direction of this thesis. To explain why this is, I would like to state the 
reasons why I decided to write such a thesis.  
In Afghanistan I was working on behalf of the Polish Military Contingent located in 
Eastern Provinces of Afghanistan, i.e., Paktika and Ghazni Provinces. I completed nearly two 
full tours working as a civilian legal adviser. My job was to provide not only regular day by 
day legal counsel on contracts, torts and public auctions but I was also responsible for 
implementation of humanitarian law amongst Polish troops. Very soon I realized that the 
Polish contingent suffered a lot from legal uncertainty. When I returned, I was offered a 
scholarship at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth. I decided to write a thesis for my PhD 
having formed a structured plan and having some good academic questions to address. 
However, since I started writing things have changed. Before I finished this thesis the 
operation of NATO ISAF in Afghanistan was coming to an end. My initial presumptions 
changed and, not surprisingly, the presumptions of the world changed. This actually made me 
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uncertain about direction of my thesis as most of the processes I analysed were under constant 
change.   
This greatly affected my thesis. To make it more comprehensible, I tried to structure 
the first chapter by providing a basic legal and political framework of the situation in 
Afghanistan. This reasoning is clear. It is nearly impossible to understand the nuanced world 
of modern counterinsurgency operation without basic knowledge of who is who in 
Afghanistan. Such presentation also gave me a chance to provide basic legal concepts 
regulating non-international armed conflicts. Qualification of the conflict significantly affects 
the type of legal rules applicable in the conflict. It also affects the status of participants which, 
in more detail, I discuss in the second chapter. Clarity at this stage not only helps to 
understand further discussions but also allows deriving de lege ferenda conclusions.  
The second chapter is dedicated to the overall legal situation of detainees in modern 
conflicts. During my stay in Bagram, I was accommodated in the proximity of the infamous 
Bagram Prison. It is a notorious place. Several reports had confirmed that unacceptable 
practices took place there. My living container was less than 300 meters from that place. 
Despite the fact that I was allied troop legal adviser, in practice, it was impossible to visit. A 
similar situation occurred in the Afghan-owned detention centres. It raised serious issues for 
European members of NATO troops in Afghanistan – should we or should we not transfer 
detainees. It occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan when soldiers from different European 
countries were obliged to transfer captured belligerents to the local or American-owned 
detaining facilities. It happened often without any prior written agreement or Memorandum of 
Understanding. There is no doubt that such an activity may be in breach of European legal 
obligations such as the European Convention on Human Rights. I decided to address issues 
related to the transfer and treatment of detainees which is an important question arising out of 
contemporary non-international armed conflicts in multinational military operations.  
The uncertainty mentioned above also applied to Polish soldiers during operation in 
Afghanistan. Often, some very basic questions were asked such as when and how they can 
legally use their weapons. These issues are regulated by Rules of Engagement which I address 
in the third chapter. The legal nature of ROE is debatable. In that chapter, I address the legal 
challenges related to Rules of Engagement. To gain a broader perspective, I evaluated the 
British law system as well. It is useful to compare these two systems. Although governed by 
similar international treaties, they have a completely different legal background. The Polish 
legal system is highly influenced by French and German law, whereas the British system gave 
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birth to Common Law. Additionally, British Forces were engaged in military operations far 
more often than Polish forces. In this chapter, I also address how they affect the practical 
application of humanitarian law and what is ROE status in domestic and international law.  
The concept of Rules of Engagement has nowadays become very important. In a 
multinational military operation they constitute a compass to participants from different 
countries and legal regimes. However, difficulty lies in the lack of access to, for example, 
NATO ROE in Afghanistan. For many reasons they are classified. So, a full analysis is 
impeded and, in some respect, limited. What affects my discussion, i.e. the lack of published 
ROE analysis in English or Polish, has made this thesis interesting yet complicated. The lack 
of access to ROE makes it difficult for other authors to write about them. As a result, I was 
lacking in an intellectual discussion with other academics on my understanding of ROE which 
has made my conclusion far from comprehensive. 
 In the fourth chapter I address another issue of great interest – the relation between 
counterinsurgency and humanitarian law. A new approach toward insurgents was fully 
operational during my service. During that year, chief ISAF commanders were changed 
several times. At the beginning of 2008, General Dan K. McNeill replaced British General 
David Richards. Later on in June 2008, General David D. McKiernan then replaced him. This 
commander was replaced in 2009 with General Stanley McChrystal and finally he was 
replaced with General David H. Petraeus. This brought changes not only with the leadership 
but foremost with a new vision of counterinsurgency and a new strategy to fight the enemy. 
As counterinsurgency is the most commonly applied doctrine of modern warfare, I have asked 
myself how such changes affect the applicability of International Humanitarian Law. This has 
particular importance in NATO countries. In 2006, General Petraeus issued a new Manual on 
Counterinsurgency. His ideas were followed not only by General McChrystal but also other 
top US military commanders. Taking into consideration how influential the US doctrine is on 
other NATO states, it must be carefully scrutinized. Especially since this Manual will affect 
compliance with humanitarian law more than any recently published document or treaty. This 
is simply because most conflicts nowadays, being non-international, have an asymmetric, 
counterinsurgency component.  
In this section I will try to analyse the legal questions related to modern 
counterinsurgency operations and their observance to humanitarian law. It is particularly 
interesting as I will try to prove that general principles of international humanitarian law are 
not always fully applicable to modern military operations. 
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What greatly affected my writing, as mentioned above, was the nature of the changes 
during my research and the process of writing this thesis. NATO’s New Strategic Concept 
adopted in Lisbon in November 2010 introduced a significant change to contemporary 
military operations. With a new motto, active engagement modern defence, it clearly indicated 
the role of foreign military operations. The strategy has been commonly taken from Article 5 
area operations. Those operations are/were meant to be conducted beyond NATO countries 
territories. Their aim is/was to prevent a future crisis, stabilize post-conflict situations and 
support reconstruction. This strategy was the most powerful military alliance and statement of 
will. It clearly shows that NATO will be actively engaged in preventive measures and 
responsible to protect these types of missions. This Concept was made on some reasonable 
assumptions. The character of an armed conflict has changed over the years. Contemporary 
conflicts are fought mostly in distant countries and have made western countries vulnerable to 
side effects such as terrorist threats.
1
 The nature of modern conflicts has evolved in recent 
years. First, the end of the Cold War era erupted with a number of local conflicts. Fuelled 
with cheap weapons from abandoned military depots of the USSR, Europe and the United 
States had a destructive effect on failed or collapsing states. During the Cold War there were 
constraints for armed conflicts due to the balance of power of policy of both superpowers. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, such constraints ceased to exist. This brought about new 
types of armed conflicts. Nowadays, not independence nor ideas are important during armed 
conflicts. The lack of state authority ensures conflicts only have to be based on money. Drugs, 
diamonds and gold are good reasons to fight. It creates a new kind of war economy. These 
new types of low-intensity conflict bring a new kind of responsibility. Local conflicts cannot 
be left alone nor can the societies affected by them. The tragedy of the people of Srebrenica or 
Rwanda clearly shows this. It is disturbing to think that the lack of a pro-active, preventive 
stand may lead to a local or worldwide crisis. Such a preventive approach is accepted by 
NATO countries in its new strategy concept. The same approach, but on a tactical level, can 
be derived from the new approach to counterinsurgency. This was also my assumption, but 
when writing this thesis, many things changed.  
The NATO New Strategic Concept was optimistic. I thought that since 2010 NATO 
and European Union would take a more robust approach toward warlords, rouge states and 
grey area of lawlessness. Libya was a prime example. The international community quickly 
                                                          
1
 Apart from the fact whether terrorist threat really exist in Europe. 
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and efficiently reacted and supported democratic opposition against the notorious dictator, 
Gaddafi. But it turned out that the results of the Libya bombing were very questionable. The 
opposition proved to be, diplomatically speaking, less democratic than anticipated. The lack 
of engagement of Western ground troops left Libya torn to pieces with two governments 
responsible for acts considered to be war crimes. The direct effect of West intervention was 
devastation and failure of the Libyan state and an unprecedented mass influx of migrants to 
Europe from its soil. In the case of Syria, no one even dared to react. The same applies to 
other prolonged contemporary armed conflicts. My optimism was unfounded. The Western 
world attitude was considered pro-active to new conflicts with their compliance with IHL 
through a nuanced tailored counterinsurgency strategy. 
The above-mentioned counterinsurgency became a very popular phrase under General 
Petraeus when US forces forged a new approach to insurgency. The COIN manual brought a 
new understanding of several military, political and legal concepts. That is why I decided to 
devote a whole chapter to this phenomenon. Since both COIN and IHL place the civilian 
population as the centre of gravity, I found it tempting to compare both of them. This 
comparative approach to COIN, which is method of warfare and humanitarian law, is based 
on the presumption that both systems place emphasis to the limitation of collateral damages 
by constrains of the use of aerial bombardment, as an example. What is a true challenge for 
both IHL and COIN is that fighters often merge with the local population. This is why in this 
thesis I refer to the use of modern counterinsurgency warfare means such as non-lethal 
weapons. During modern operations, so-called non-kinetic methods may affect basic 
International Humanitarian Law principles. NATO’s countries’ Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams provide humanitarian assistance on a large scale. They are responsible for building 
schools, hospitals, roads and mentoring local public servicemen. This often happens at the 
expense of NGOs present. PRT activities may affect the basic principle of distinction. These 
actions blur the line between military and civilian objectives and that is why I analyse this 
phenomenon thoroughly in chapter four.  
From my perspective, the new COIN strategy was similar to the New NATO Concept 
signed in Lisbon in that it is a very interesting concept which makes my PhD universal and 
applicable in the future. Yet again, I found myself during the writing of this thesis too 
optimistic or at least not realistic enough. My initial approach was that the Western world 
would again and again conduct Afghan-type operations with a strong COIN element. The 
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situation in Libya, the rise of Islamic State with no Western feet on the ground and the 
presence in Iraq and Syria is a prime example of how wrong I was. 
So, the more I was writing the more I realized that my thesis is not an analysis of the 
Afghanistan case study as a model of new wars because it simply would not be repeated. I 
have lost my faith in the large-scale operation run by the West to improve or stabilize some 
far-away lands. I think that is partially because of an obvious reason; the modern world is not 
prepared to send fifty-seventy thousand troops to save people in distant countries.  
So what is my thesis about now? I think that most of all it constitutes an element of a 
very broad discussion on interoperability. Interoperability of human rights and humanitarian 
law. Interoperability of European and US forces. Interoperability of domestic and 
international law. Interoperability of western forces and their local counterparts. I think that 
this element constitutes legal challenges resulting from contemporary military operations. It is 
true to say that, in some respects, this rather chaotic thesis illustrates how difficult modern 
military operations are. I am saying this as this is a thesis which only barely approaches other 
challenging issues such as international politics and ius ad bello issues related to modern 
conflicts.  
In writing my paper I decided to use comparative approach methodology. Applying 
this method has some particular value to a legal researcher. I have access to both Polish and 
English language sources. Additionally, I am engaged in several humanitarian law initiatives 
in Poland. I am a visiting lecturer at the National Defence Academy and Deblin Air Force 
Academy. While being constantly verified by the military audience, I am able to provide 
some general observations. So it is beyond doubt that it may have a practical outcome. But 
this would be of limited value if I were to approach the subject only from a Polish 
perspective. In writing about the subject from a Polish and British perspective, I have the 
chance to address the issue in question in more advanced way.  
I also used methodology which is related to different disciplines such as participation 
observation. My stay in Afghanistan, aside from my regular duties, was in fact observatory in 
nature. I think that most questions and issues I found challenging in my thesis are a result of 
my job as a legal adviser on behalf of Polish Military Forces. 
Since my thesis is legal in nature, I also used a doctrinal approach as well as relevant 
data analysis.   
Most of the work was carried out at the University of Aberystwyth and the Welsh 
National Library in Aberystwyth. However, my work would not be possible without research 
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carried out in Poland at the National Defence Academy, Jagiellonian University Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights Centre, Jagiellonian University Library, the support of the Polish 
Military Prosecution Office in Warsaw and the Polish Red Cross. Last but not least, I received 
a lot of support and hospitality form the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in 
Sanremo in Italy when I was granted the opportunity to conduct research there. Additionally, I 
still receive access to unclassified, but not public, documents from Afghanistan. 
It is hoped that this thesis presents due analysis of the issue in question. It is also 
hoped that it might be useful in the future, for both civilian and military lawyers to clarify 
their position on legal issues related to military presence abroad.  
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CHAPTER 1. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AFGHAN 
CONFLICT 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter I will attempt to present the political, legal and historical background of 
my thesis. As it is devoted to the legal challenges resulting from the NATO operation in 
Afghanistan, a thorough analysis of background information will help to better understand 
some of the issues presented in my work.  
 The chapter is divided into two major parts. In the first section I am going to present 
the historical and political environment of the current situation in Afghanistan. This section is 
particularly important for the later analysis of the complexity of the status of participants in 
the conflict.  
 In the second part of the chapter I will attempt to provide a detailed analysis of law 
applicable to the conflict in Afghanistan. This will help not only to provide an accurate legal 
qualification of the conflict in Afghanistan but also to analyse the legal status of the 
participants. I will present the rights and obligations applicable to participants of a non-
international armed conflict. This will provide grounds for further consideration regarding the 
possible violation of the international humanitarian law applicable in Afghanistan. 
 
1.1. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IN AFGHANISTAN  
Afghanistan is often referred to as “the crossroads of Asia”. It is a unique place with a 
complex history. Territories belonging to modern Afghanistan were conquered several times 
in its history. First by the Persian ruler Darius I in 500 BC, then by Alexander the Great in 
329-327 BC. Later, in 1220, by the Mongolian Emperor Genghis Khan and then by Turko- 
Mongol Timure Lung called Tameralne in the 14th century. The “Great Game” between 
imperial European powers took place from 1826 to 1919 when Britain and Russia tried to 
control Afghanistan as part of their efforts to gain control over India.
2
 As a result, the First 
Anglo–Afghan War broke out in 1838 and lasted until 1842. The occupation of Kabul by the 
                                                          
2
 R. Skaine, The Women of Afghanistan under the Taliban, McFarland & Company, North Carolina, 2002, p. 3. 
 14 
 
British forces ended bitterly. In January 1842, the British army was forced to retreat to India 
through Jalalabad. As they returned, the British contingent was annihilated through constant 
attacks. From the garrison contingent, totalling approximately 16,000 people, only Dr William 
Brydon reached Jalalabad to tell the tale.
3
  
The Second Anglo-Afghan War took place in 1878 – 1879. The successful war led to 
capturing Kabul and Kandahar and gaining control of the south of Afghanistan. The person 
responsible for the policy in Afghanistan was the Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton. As a result of 
British supremacy in the region, the Durand Line
4
 (named after Sir Mortimer Durand) was 
established between Afghanistan and what was then British India (now provinces of Pakistan, 
the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 
Balochistan). The existence of the Durand Line dividing Pashtu’s lands is still one of the most 
crucial, historical events affecting the current situation in Afghanistan.  
Under the rule of King Amir Habibulach Khan, Afghanistan won its independence from 
Britain. It was followed by the Third Anglo-Afghan War which took place between May and 
August of 1919. It may be seen as a paradox that during that war the British forces closed the 
Khyber Pass to block the Afghan forces
5
. The same tactic was repeated years later by several 
war-waging parties in the 1980s and more recently by the Taliban forces.
6
  
The Third War brought full independence to Afghanistan and the right to implement an 
independent foreign policy. For the British crown, it brought consolidation of the Durand Line 
as a boundary between the sides (Afghanistan and British India (currently Pakistan)) which 
was an issue of utmost importance. Afghanistan became a fully-independent state in 1919 and 
Amir Amanullah became its King in 1926 when he established a monarchy. The period from 
1919 to 1973 was the most peaceful in recent history of Afghanistan. Those peaceful years led 
to the adoption of the first liberal constitution under King Zahir in 1964, following which, 
King Zahir's cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud, with the support of the army, seized power in 
a military coup d’état in 1973. He was then killed in a subsequent coup by communists of the 
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on 27 April 1978. Communists were 
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attempting to impose reforms which contradicted deep-rooted Afghan traditions and Islam. 
The reforms initiated a revolt which began in eastern Afghanistan during the summer of 1978 
and spread across the country. Formally united, the PDPA, under the rule of General 
Secretary Taraki, was unable to face the increasing violence and requested assistance from the 
Soviet military.
7
 A factor which destabilized the political situation was the fact that the 
government was under the sole control of the Khalq
8
 party dominated by Hafizullah Amin. He 
was trying to execute a revolutionary transformation of the Afghan society, predominantly 
through the use of terror.
9
 The refusal of Amin to moderate his policy alienated his Soviet 
backers who considered this a threat to their security. The sponsored-Soviet plan to replace 
Amin with Taraki failed. Amin killed Taraki and directed his interest toward the USA and 
Pakistan. The Soviets made a final proposal to Amin to peacefully hand over power. When 
this plan failed, the KGB and GRU Special Forces, namely Alpha Group and the Spetznaz 
unit, executed Operation Storm 333 on 27 December 1979. During this operation, Amin was 
killed and the Soviets installed the more moderate Babrak Karmal from another communist 
party faction, Parcham, as President of the Revolutionary Council, General Secretary of the 
PDPA and the Prime Minister.
10
  
 
1.2 WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION 
In December 1979, Soviet presence evolved into a full-scale intervention. Soviet 
military forces invaded Afghanistan, generating a brutal, quasi-civil war that involved not 
only neighbouring countries i.e. Pakistan, Iran and China but also Saudi Arabia and primarily 
the United States. These countries backed the Afghan mujahidin movement by supporting it 
both financially and militarily through two major contraband channels located in Quetta and 
Spin Boldak in Pakistan. 
The Soviets were operating mostly through its 40th Army, the so-called Limited 
Contingent of Soviet Forces (OKSV – Ogranichennyi Kontingent Sovetskikh Voisk) in 
Afghanistan. According to highest-figured estimates, the overall number of Soviet troops 
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remained between 80,000 and 104,000.
11
 They were also operating the army of the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and the KGB was facilitated by the Afghan 
secret police, the KhAD.
12
 During their occupation, the Soviets were conducting operations 
against insurgents, both in rural and urban areas. They used tactical air assault mostly by 
using Mi - 24 gunships
13
 as well as certain forms of unconventional warfare.
14
 However, the 
war in Afghanistan conducted by the Soviets was mostly brutal, conventional, and based on 
scorched-earth tactics, indiscriminate air bombing, mining and chemical weapons with blood 
and nerve agents. Soviet tactics even led to armed clashes between Soviet troops and DRA 
soldiers who were, in general terms, unreliable as a result of mass desertions and clandestine 
collaboration with the insurgents.
15
 Although the insurgents did not pose a military or 
economic threat to the existence of the government, they were controlling rural areas and 
were able to almost completely, if not completely, cut off road communication.
16
 From an 
estimated pool, mujahidin had a few thousand active fighters in the field when the rest, 
approximately around 80,000-100,000 thousand fighters were resting or hiding in the 
mountains or at bases in Pakistan.
17
 Reforms in the Soviet Union, especially those conducted 
by Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika led to a negative perception of the Afghan 
war in the USSR. Under the command of General Boris Gromov, the Soviets prepared and 
executed a withdrawal strategy, followed by peace with the Geneva Accords.
18
  
When the Soviets finally withdrew in February 1989
19
, the country was devastated. 
Approximately 1.5 million Afghans had been killed and more than five million fled abroad 
mostly to Pakistan and Iran. As many as three million people were internally displaced. 
Nearly 15,000 Soviet soldiers had died and 35,000 wounded.
20
 The Soviet invasion devastated 
Afghanistan's infrastructure and irrigation channel system which was significant to the 
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country’s existence. The country was ruled by an unpopular former KhAD director, 
Najibullach, and in the process of their withdrawal, the Soviets left thousands of dangerous 
remnants of war such as mines, weapons and tanks. This fuelled the subsequent civil war.  
 
1.3. DISSOLUTION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN  
After the Soviet occupation, the country was torn apart by a bloody internal conflict. 
Due to the fact that mujahidin factions were backed by different countries with a different 
agenda toward Afghanistan (for example Shia Harkat –e- Isalmi Afghanistan by Iran or 
Burhanadin Rabbani’s Jamait Isalmi and Gulabidn Hekamtyar Herzb – e –Isalmi by 
Pakistan
21
), it was difficult to establish an interim government within and outside the country. 
As a result of the lack of cooperation and coordination between mujahidin, the weak 
Najibullah government was able to continue its existence for another four years of the war.
22
 
Former communist ruling was also possible thanks to the military operations executed on 
behalf of Najibullah by the Uzbek General, Dostum. His Uzbek forces, known for their 
barbarity, were able to play against the divided mujahidin forces. Decreasing monetary 
support from Russia made Najibullah unable to conduct sustained and concerted military 
operations, especially in light of the fact that General Rashid Dostum betrayed them. He not 
only supported some of the communist factions in opposition to the Najibulach government 
but also collaborated with the famous mujahidin commander Ahmed Shah Massoud and 
helped him to seize Kabul on 26 April 1992.
23
 After the arrival of the rest of the opposition 
leaders to Kabul, the Islamic State of Afghanistan was established. With the commanders’ 
arrival, their armed militia groups entered the city. Each of these groups held an area of Kabul 
and established their checkpoints. After the failure to bring one of the influential commanders, 
Hakmatyar, to government, street fighting in Kabul erupted between Ahmad Shah Massod, 
with Rabbani representing the government, and Gulibudin Hekmatyar with General Dostum 
(who had also betrayed Massod), as the opposition forces. Hekmatyar savagely bombarded 
the city with rockets, mortars, and artillery and continues encirclement of Kabul for several 
months.  
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On 7 March 1993, the Saudi King Fahd sponsored a peace accord between the warring 
factions. All participants agreed with a new proposal that appointed Rabbani as President and 
Hekmatyar as Prime Minister. This agreement was never effectively implemented. Although 
being nominated as Prime Minister, Hekmatyar further continued fighting.
24
 The situation in 
the country was even more complicated due to the fact that the rest of the country was 
controlled by the local warlords. It turned into anarchy.  
In 1994, the Taliban movement emerged from the chaos of civil war in southern 
Afghanistan. The Taliban, under the command of Mullah Omar, maintains that it helped 
rescue village girls who were abducted by the local warlord. Mullah Omar caught the 
commander of these villains, hanged him and took control over his soldiers. Initially the 
Taliban modus operandi was to help resolve local disputes and carry out military operations 
against the brutalities of the local armed groups. The Taliban movement was comprised 
mostly of former Afghan refugees; many of whom were indoctrinated with extremely 
conservative values in the religious school madrassas in Pakistan. Bringing such values and 
virtues and representing them as decency and religion, they easily gained an advantage over 
the corrupt local warlords. It made Talibs popular amongst local villagers and businesses not 
only because they promised to establish order and justice, but because they were able to 
deliver it as well. Within the first few months of their existence, they seized the massive 
military depot in Spin Boldak belonging to Gulbudin Hekamtyar and took control over 
Qandahar city. Very soon the Taliban were supported by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence 
Agency (ISI) playing its own role in establishing a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. The 
Taliban movement was also welcomed by the majority of the Afghan population who 
believed in strict but righteous clerical movements. During the Afghan-type blitzkrieg, Talibs, 
who initially in 1994, were estimated to number around 200 men, took control over Kabul and 
most of the country on 27 September 1996. However, an armed opposition, namely the 
Northern Alliance, still existed in the country. The legendary Ahmed Shah Massod maintain 
control over Panjshir valley, whereas General Dostum, after his initial alliance with the 
Taliban, betrayed them as well and forged an alliance with Massod, exercising control over 
the Northern provinces.
25
 
The Taliban’s close ties with the ISI and the terrorists of Al Qaeda, as well as their strict 
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interpretation of Sharia law, adversely affected the civilian population and has made their 
international recognition complex.
26
 Their lack of international recognition led them into 
increasing production of opium as opium had become the most stable cash crop for farmers 
and a source of income for the state.
27
  
The Taliban also committed serious atrocities against minority populations, particularly 
the Shi'a Hazara ethnic group, and killed non-combatants in several well-documented 
instances.
28
 The coexistence of the Taliban movement and Al Qaeda was based on the general 
permission that was granted to Al Qaeda to have a fully-operational sanctuary in which they 
trained and indoctrinated fighters and terrorists, imported weapons, forged ties with other 
jihadist groups and leaders, and plotted and staffed terrorist schemes. As a result, between 
10,000 and 20,000 fighters were trained there.
29
  
 
1.4 US INTERVENTION AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 
After the September 11 attacks, the US forces launched a military operation, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, against Taliban military targets and suspected Al Qaeda camps in 
Afghanistan. The United States and Great Britain notified the UN Security Council that the 
mission was an exercise of individual and collective self-defence in compliance with the 
terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
30
  
At 9:00 p.m. local time on 7 October 2001, US warships and submarines fired 
approximately fifty cruise missiles at targets near Kabul and Taliban facilities, and forces in 
Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul.
31
 Soon after, the Northern Alliance (NA)
32
, 
heavily supported by the US Special Operation Forces (SOF), led a campaign against Taliban 
and Al Qaeda fighters. With an overwhelming air force superiority, the NA quickly took 
control over main cities such as Jalalabad, Herat, Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif. With the fall of 
Kandahar, US forces shifted to tracking Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora cave complex 
where many Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were believed to have fled. Despite the successes 
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of US forces, hundreds of Taliban and Al Qaeda fugitives managed to escape across the 
border into Pakistan.
33
 Soon after, the NA excessively exploited its dominance by committing 
crimes of war by executing hundreds of foreign volunteers and Al Qaeda members serving 
with the Taliban after the fall of Kunduz.
34
  
With the fall of the Taliban in 2001, an opportunity to sign a peace agreement emerged. 
The Bonn talks helped to define a road to peace. However, since the very beginning of the 
Bonn talks, there was one significant flaw: the Taliban movement was not a party to talk and 
abide by agreements. The exclusion of the Taliban who could have become involved in the 
process
35
 is now considered a crucial mistake of that time. Instead, the Bonn Agreement was a 
multilateral agreement between factions in Afghanistan mostly revolving around the non-
Pashtun Northern Alliance and several powerful warlords.
36
 Many participants of the Bonn 
negotiations had little commitment to democracy and conformity to the law. Some of them, 
instead of cooperating, were simply attempting to monopolize their power.
37
 In reality, the 
loyalty of the signatories of the agreement was not to be trusted and the Taliban quickly re-
emerged as an armed resistance.
38
 It is possible to say that, since the warlords did not share 
their power with the government, turning Afghanistan into a kind of narco-state with private 
armies and corrupted administration was a very similar situation to the one before the rise of 
Taliban.  
At the same time, US ground troops faced their fiercest test of Enduring Freedom, what 
is known as Operation Anaconda. It was the first large-scale conventional operation of US 
troops in Afghanistan. In March 2002, US forces and local militias started the operation in the 
Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains of Zormat near Gardez. It was originally planned as a 
three day operation. It took much longer due to several factors: an unexpected, fierce fight 
that broke out at the beginning of the operation, lack of intelligence, lack of close air strike 
support and an inaccurate estimation of the number of the enemy troops.
39
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The US operation in Afghanistan is to be divided into two stages. The first stage was 
unconventional where only Special Operation Forces were deployed (prior to Operation 
Anaconda) and the second stage was when conventional forces commenced operations on the 
ground. Since there was little action of US forces providing troops on the ground, soon after, 
in September 2002, Taliban forces began recruiting in the Pashtunland area to launch a 
renewed holy war against unbelievers and the Afghan government.
40
 Very soon, mobile 
training camps were established in areas along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
i.e. in Wazaristan and Beluchistan. Most recruits were drawn from the madrassas, as had 
taken place in the 90s. Crossing the Afghan border was easy as the efforts of Pakistani forces 
stationed at border crossings to prevent such infiltration was questionable. Additionally, the 
Pakistani military proved to be of little support at the beginning of military operations in 
Afghanistan.
41
 The Taliban reorganized and replenished their forces over winter, preparing for 
a summer offensive. They established a new mode of insurgent activity. They were operating 
in groups of up to fifty men when launching attacks, and subsequently breaking up into 
smaller groups of five to ten men to evade counter-attacks, especially those with close air-
strike support. With this strategy, US forces were mostly indirectly attacked through rocket or 
mortar attacks on military bases and by planting improvised explosive devices (IED). In the 
summer of 2003, these attacks continued, especially in the eastern part of Afghanistan. As a 
result, coalition forces began preparing several offensives. Situations worsened when US 
forces became engaged in fighting in Iraq, paying most of their attention to that operation. 
Until 2006, most of the fighting occurred in southern Afghanistan against US forces. From 
January 2006, NATO started to replace the US troops with allied forces. For example, the 
British 16
th
 Air Assault Brigade formed the core of the force in southern Afghanistan
42
 along 
with troops and helicopters from Australia, Canada and the Netherlands. From 2006, the 
Taliban become a fully-operational insurgent force. In 2006, the south of Afghanistan faced 
the deadliest outbreak of violence in the country since 2001.  
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1.5 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) MISSION IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was not the sole military mission in Afghanistan. 
In fact, there are currently two major active operations in Afghanistan. The first, as already 
discussed, the USA-led OEF-A and the second is the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). These operations shared number of similarities in terms of their 
objectives: counterterrorism and enforcing stabilization. Apart from these similarities, OEF-A 
and ISAF were initiated under different legal bases, with different mission mandates and rules 
of engagement (ROE)
 
.
43
 
On 14 November 2001, the Security Council voted for Resolution 1378, calling upon 
NATO as a multinational peacekeeping force for the country. The 5500-member force, the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established in Afghanistan. After the 
initial period when ISAF was operating mostly in Kabul, the ISAF mission mandate was 
expanded. On 13 October 2003, the Security Council voted unanimously to expand the ISAF 
mission beyond Kabul (Resolution 1510). In February 2005, NATO decided to expand the 
ISAF to the west of Afghanistan, and subsequently on 1 July 2006, the ISAF expanded its 
area of operation to six additional provinces in the south of Afghanistan.
44
  
The main role of the ISAF was to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of 
a secure and stable environment.
45
 ISAF forces conducted security and stability operations 
throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and were directly 
involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and 
equipping.
46
 This does not imply that NATO only supported central authorities in the struggle 
with the opposition fighters, but it foremost supports the creation of state-orientated 
structures: intelligence and counterintelligence, and police and infrastructure focused on the 
civilian population (schools, hospitals and roads). ISAF countries were conducting 
humanitarian relief as well. One of the leading ISAF humanitarian projects in Afghanistan 
was Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which were then under the sole command of the 
ISAF. PRTs are joint, integrated military-civilian organizations, staffed and supported by 
ISAF member countries and operated at provincial level within Afghanistan. PRT’s in 
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Afghanistan were generally responsible for covering the needs of one province. Due to the 
fact that the Afghani government had limited outreach to the provinces, a PRT activity was 
focused on improving its capacity to govern the country on both a central and local level. The 
existence of PRTs occupied the vacuum caused by a weak government presence.
47
 PRTs seek 
to establish an environment that is stable enough for local NGOs and international 
governmental and non-governmental agencies, the local authorities and civil society to engage 
in reconstruction, political transition and social and economic development. PRTs act in 
accordance with the objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The 
role of PRTs was to ensure international and internal efforts following the development aims 
of Afghanistan and, in doing so, assess and act upon the constraints of economic 
development.
48
 According to NATO data, twenty-seven Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
from various NATO countries were operating in Afghanistan.
49
  
Despite many pro-nation development projects, the ISAF faced some of the heaviest 
combat in NATO history. Several military operations had to be conducted to gain a certain 
amount of control over the south of Afghanistan. Operations such as Operation Mountain 
Thrust (mostly in the Helmand area), Mountain Fury, Operation Medusa (mostly in the 
Kandahar area) and Operation Falcon Summit. Regardless of ISAF efforts, the Taliban and 
other armed organizations were difficult to defeat which made the ISAF very much alike to 
the Soviet forces. Frequently, despite tactical victories, the Soviets were not able to remove 
mujahedin from the area of operation nor obtain operational or strategic victories. The number 
of military operations rose in 2007. For example, British forces conducted Operation Volcano 
to clear insurgents from firing points in the village of Barikju, close to Kajaki in Helmand 
Province.
50
 This operation was followed by Operation Achilles and Operation Silicon.
51
 The 
next important operation in 2007 was Lastay Kulang. It was conducted in the Musa Qala 
region mostly by British and Afghan forces. In December 2007, more fighting took place in 
the Musa Qala region. Afghan forces, supported by the British, dislocated Taliban forces from 
                                                          
47
 ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 3, Kabul, February 2007, p. 3 
48
 ISAF PRT Handbook, Ibidem, p. 3 
49
 Available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/ (9/10/11) 
50
Available at www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/MarinesClearTalibanFromKey 
AfghanDamvideo.htm (9/10/11) 
51
 Available at www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBritis 
hForces.htm (9/10/11) 
 24 
 
Musa Qala.
52
 Fights continued throughout 2008 when American forces suffered their greatest 
loss in a single operation. In Kunar Province, one of their bases, Wanat, was directly attacked 
from the nearby village. Nine US soldiers lost their lives during a few hours of fire.
53
 Equally 
harsh loses were suffered by the French Paratroopers in the Surobi district, sixty kilometres 
from Kabul. During a Taliban ambush, ten French soldiers were killed and twenty-one others 
were wounded.
54
 Despite the surge operation and the increased numbers of ISAF and OEF 
soldiers (their numbers reached nearly 150,000 troops at the peak of the surge operation), 
heavy combat continued to the end of ISAF operations in 2014. 
What affected ISAF operations is the fact that both the ISAF and the OEF significantly 
adapted their activities since they were established. This led to an increasingly blurred 
distinction between the two missions, which were both predominantly focused on combating 
insurgents. The ISAF also absorbed several thousand soldiers from the former Operation 
Enduring Freedom, British and Canadian troops in particular, and during ISAF operations it 
was nearly impossible to differentiate between these two military operations.
55
 
ISAF opposition consisted of Taliban forces of approximately 10,000 fighters. Of that 
number, only up to 3,000 were considered to be highly motivated, full-time insurgents.
56
 The 
rest are so-called part-time insurgents fighting due to monetary incentives. In fact, throughout 
the whole ISAF-OEF operation, it was difficult, according to Brigadier General Carr, Chief 
Intelligence of the International Security Assistance Force, to estimate the number of 
insurgents.
57
 Especially taking into consideration other networks of military groups such as 
Haqqani and the Gulbudin Hekmatyar organization. The map below shows the area of 
operations of insurgent groups in 2010.
58
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1.6 CURRENT SITUATION  
Despite the optimism expressed by Hamid Karzai in January 2002, “(…) Interim 
Administration has been in place for only one month (…). Our vision is of a prosperous, 
secure Afghanistan”59, it was not that his hopes were unfounded. Due to the political and 
military mistakes of US forces at the beginning of the operation, the country erupted yet again 
in violence. Mass implementation of Special Operations Forces without ground troops and an 
Al Qaida/Taliban hunting agenda instead of country development quickly took its toll. In 
addition to criminal activity, more than a half of the country is surrounded by insurgency. The 
Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, Jalaluddin Haqqani’s network, Al Qaida, and 
other groups mostly from Pakistan were involved in a sustained effort to overthrow the 
government and coerce ISAF and OEF troops to leave the country. The current feeling of 
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security of the average Afghani citizen was low and the country suffered food shortages 
which left Afghanistan as one of the poorest countries in the world.  
The situation in Afghanistan is defined mostly by the security of the following 
provinces of Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, Nangahar, Helmand, Kunar, Pakitka, Kabul, Uruzgun 
and Kandahar. The fiercest fights took place in these provinces and security there has a great 
impact on the rest of the country. These provinces are located in the eastern and southern parts 
of Afghanistan. How difficult was it to introduce stability to these provinces? Let’s take the 
Polish case as an example. In 2008, Poland took responsibility for the safety and security of 
Ghazni Province.
60
 Despite the strengthening of Polish, American and Afghan forces, the 
security of Ghazni Province under Polish command declined from medium security to the 
third less-secure province in Afghanistan.
61
 This occurred despite the deployment of 
additional US forces (3,500 soldiers) to the neighbouring strategic provinces of Logar and 
Wardak.
62
  
From the beginning of the surge operation run by General Petraeus in 2009, the 
situation was similar to the situation of the Soviet-Afghan war i.e. the significant number of 
foreign troops (up to 150,000 foreign troops), a lack of properly functioning land-road 
communication and a lack of sufficient numbers of local military and security forces. What 
could have changed the situation in Afghanistan was prolonged engagement of NATO and 
western countries for the development of Afghan police and military forces for another 
decade. However, the lack of such engagement in Afghanistan may lead to a similar situation 
as in Iraq after US withdrawal. 
Currently, NATO runs a non-combat operation in Afghanistan called Resolute Support 
with a limited number of personnel on the ground. The withdrawal of ISAF forces led to the 
escalation of insurgent violence. More than 5,000 Afghan soldiers and policemen have lost 
their lives from insurgent attacks in the first eight months of 2015.
63
 Additionally, more than 
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5,000 civilians were killed or wounded in the first 6 months of 2015, making 2015 the 
deadliest year of the Afghan conflict from the beginning of the NATO operation in 2001.
64
 
Furthermore, Islamic State is becoming increasingly more influential in Afghanistan. 
This new phenomenon, fuelled by the traditional conflict between angry young commanders 
and elders, may have consequences which are difficult to predict.  
The map below shows the number of Islamic State incidents in Afghanistan.
 65
 
 
 
 
 
1.7 LEGAL SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN 
The lack of a properly functioning legal system affects military efforts and fuels 
insurgency. The matter of justice in Afghanistan also affects issues related to the obligations 
laid upon international forces operating in Afghanistan. Referring to the idea of the ill-
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functioning legal system in Afghanistan, I will attempt to provide background for further 
discussion on counterinsurgency in the chapter, particularly within the parameters of the 
concept of ius post bellum. The results of the ISAF mission are debatable. The government 
does not receive a vote of confidence from public institutions.  The perception of widespread 
corruption is good example of this.
66
 
 
  
 
.  
 
 
 
 
Such a result has strong implications for the Afghan situation. People turn to informal 
structures when they have little trust in state entities. For example, they most decisively 
identified the local jirga or shura as an institution for dispute resolution. The map below 
clearly indicates this.
67
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This destabilizes the already fragile situation and leads to a general feeling of a lack of 
confidence in public institutions which were, and still are, strongly supported by western 
governments.  
As previously discussed, the result of the Bonn agreement for international forces was 
to provide security, governance and participation as well as humanitarian assistance, social 
well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.
68
 All this 
cannot be achieved without a functioning legal system.  
An important factor is that justice in non-urban areas is controlled by local warlords and 
politicians as well as by the local informal justice system. As a result, justice or delivering 
justice is a part of insurgency. The organizations which control justice simply control all other 
aspects of life. Consequently, even in greater cities, the local population does not put much 
trust in the governmental system of justice. In many parts of rural Afghanistan, the situation is 
sliding back into general lawlessness, which resulted in the increased production of poppies 
and drug-related criminality.
69
 
One of the fundamental elements of a properly functioning state is the monopoly over 
the legitimate use of force to ensure security of its citizens. In order to do so, the state needs to 
be able to disarm and neutralize those who use violence illegally and commit crime. This is 
the main task for law enforcement and security forces (Afghan National Police and National 
Directorate of Security). Once captured by state agents, they must be held responsible for 
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their actions. In Afghanistan, however, unlike in other countries which generally have one 
dominant system of justice, two systems exist – the formal state system and the informal 
traditional system, both allowing people to escape from justice. This dual system affects the 
implementation of rule of law traditionally understood and creates additional challenges for 
international forces. 
Traditional, non-governmental mechanisms of justice in Afghanistan operate through 
two key informal institutions: jirga and shura. The jirga is an institution unique to the Pashto 
community. It is a tribe, village-based process for collective decision making and is often 
used as a mechanism of settling disputes, including imposing agreed sanctions and using 
tribal forces to enforce its decisions. The term shura refers to a group of elders or recognized 
local leaders who make decisions on behalf of the community they represent.  
One of the many results of prolonged war in Afghanistan is that the formal justice 
system has been weakened. This has pushed people to rely more on the informal justice 
system to resolve their disputes. A kind of local “customary law” has been created which 
embraces historical traditions, local understandings of Islam and Sharia and the spiritual role 
of the Sufi leaders.
70
 It has led to the creation of several local or tribal sets of rules such as 
Pashtunwali for Pasthun. An informal system may be considered as an option, however it is 
often under pressure from local warlords and those with great influence. Despite that, with 
regards to the perception of the coexisting legal systems, both are recognized by the Afghan 
population, the informal system seems to be more popular and effective.  
The ISAF task was to improve the quality of the legal system in Afghanistan. It is a sine 
qua non condition for development of the country. As a starting point, a local system of 
justice may be introduced into the governmental system. Gacaca in Rwanda could be viewed 
as an example. Gacaca constitutes a local justice system which has been designed to 
adjudicate more than 100,000 Genocidaires. It serves as a judicial body and as a part of the 
process of reconciliation. Trials are held in public where survivors and victims may confront 
the accused person. Each village court has nine judges (with basic legal training) and the total 
number of judges is approximately 250,000. It shows reach of gacaca and possible impact it 
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can have on post-war society, especially taking into consideration that gacaca is strongly 
rooted in local traditions of adjudicating disputes.  
Adopting a local justice system may help to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan 
people and constitute the foundation of a well-operating system of justice which can promote 
security and national reconciliation. A system based on local Jirgas/Shuras may significantly 
improve reconciliation between ‘willing’ insurgents and the local population. The system 
should cover basic legal training and be a creative element at the core of Afghan citizenship. 
It should not contradict the existing Afghan legal system but be compatible with values shared 
by the local population and reflect local tribal structures.
71
 Such a system, when incorporated 
into the official state judicial system, may, in the future, lead to the creation of an 
internationalized
72
 institution in Kabul which could be responsible for training local judges or 
become a source of support for the appellate
73
 court in Kabul. 
The problem for the ISAF was that the law which is acceptable in Afghanistan is not 
always compatible with European-centric understanding of fundamental rights and 
guarantees. Imposing Euro-centric laws on Afghans is risky and may fuel insurgency. On the 
other hand, accepting laws which are not tolerated from the European perspective contradicts 
the aim of the ISAF operation. Additionally, it is difficult under the law of occupation to 
understand what is and what is not allowed when it comes to the transformation of a country. 
I will discuss this issue in the section devoted to the concept of ius post bellum in the chapter 
on counterinsurgency. 
 
1.8 PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES  
Military contractors and their corporate employers, private military firms (PMFs), play 
an essential role in military efforts of NATO in countries such as Afghanistan. According to 
Zmarai Bashiri, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry, there were 60 local private security 
companies in Afghanistan employing between 18,000 and 25,000 men in 2008.
74
 It is difficult 
to estimate, however, the total number of private military contractors in Afghanistan now. It is 
enough to say that the USA Department of Defence alone had more contractor personnel 
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working both in Iraq and Afghanistan than troops deployed.
75
 The majority of these 
companies are based in Kabul. Through years of conflict, many of them started performing 
functions traditionally implemented by the government, whereas their precise legal status has 
yet to be determined.
76
  
PMFs also play key roles in western military operations. Those companies are 
comprised of three types of firms: military support firms, military consultant firms, and 
military provider firms. The first type, military support firms, offers a wide range of support 
services traditionally handled by military forces, from driving convoys to cooking meals and 
maintaining war planes or armoured vehicles such as the HUMMVEE or MRAP. The second 
type, military consultant firms, provides strategic advice and military training.
77
 The 
American military consultant firm, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), is known 
for training the Croat militia and enabling it to defeat the Serbian army in 1995.
78
 The third 
category, military provider firms, provides “security services” such Academi, previously 
known as XE (formerly Blackwater) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I essentially outlaw mercenary activities. However, the extent of the 
widespread use of private companies nowadays makes it impossible to obtain military goals 
without such firms. The United States even hired forty private gunmen from the American-
based DynCorp
79
 Company to protect President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan in 2002. It did 
in fact pay off, because despite several attacks on his life, he was the head of the Afghanistan 
Government until 2014.  
The use of private military companies as a reliable resource is undisputable. Such 
companies always provided the tools required, especially during an armed conflict, be it for a 
good cause or bad. It is one of the tasks of the ISAF to utilize such companies in a way which 
is not contradictory to international law.  
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1.9 OPIUM PRODUCTION  
Another problem related to the NATO operation in Afghanistan is the production of 
opium. Since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the production of opium has 
increased. Illicit opium trade became one of the main financial sources for fighting mujahidin. 
The situation did not change during the civil war in the 90s nor under the Taliban ruling. The 
production of opium has risen to an extremely high level, making Afghanistan the main global 
supplier of opium and heroin. The opium situation has been particularly bad in Afghanistan's 
southern provinces.  
In 2006, Afghanistan produced 92% of the global supply of illicit opium. It not only 
fuelled the Taliban insurgency but had a direct international effect too. Heroin produced in 
Afghanistan kills approximately 100,000 people worldwide each year. Significant changes 
have occurred within the production process. Previously, Afghanistan mainly produced raw 
opium or a morphine base, which was refined into heroin in Pakistan, South-East Turkey or 
the Balkans. Today, the overwhelming majority of heroin processing takes place inside 
Afghanistan.
80
 In 2006, 165,000 hectares of land in Afghanistan were used to cultivate the 
opium poppy. It had a direct impact on the fiercest fight of Taliban forces with the ISAF in 
the following years, especially in the south and east of Afghanistan. It is easy to earn a living 
through poppy cultivation: the average opium-producing family cultivated 0.37 hectares of 
opium poppy and generated approximately $4625 per hectare which is nine times greater a 
figure than what a family could have earned growing wheat.
81
  
Another negative side effect of the mass drug production is nationwide drug addiction 
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and former Soviet republics. Opium cultivation also has 
implications for regional security. Drug traffickers benefit from terrorists' military skills, 
weapons supply, and the access to clandestine organizations. Terrorists gain a source of 
income and expertise in illicit transfer and laundering of money for their operations. It creates 
a self-sufficient war economy independent from external sources of financing. Even more 
dangerous is that entities involved in the drug-trade economy are not interested in termination 
of the conflict as it is this situation of instability which allows them to operate. Additionally, 
traffickers often are not interested in any political goal except financial.
82
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Minimizing trafficking is one of the major challenges for Afghanistan and its 
international allies. Ideally, the state would have a monopoly on the use of force to eradicate 
poppy fields.
83
 But the issue is more complex: eradicating fields would leave families in 
economic distress, trigger humanitarian disaster and increase the temptation to join the 
insurgency. Therefore, eradication must be implemented alongside alternative livelihood 
programs in order to be effective.
84
 Creating legal alternatives to drug trafficking in 
Afghanistan will require continued domestic reform and international outreach efforts 
directed towards farmers. Without external assistance, namely provided by the ISAF, the OEF 
and neighbouring countries, results will be limited.  
Effective counter-narcotic activity is one of the basic tasks for international forces in 
Afghanistan. Without eliminating narcotics in Afghanistan, it is impossible to provide local 
people with the security needed for normal life activities. The obligation to provide 
substantial support in terms of manpower, training of local police and eventually combating 
the narcotic situation is placed upon NATO forces. Eradication also needs be executed within 
the internationally accepted legal framework.  
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1.10 THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN 
The position of women under the Taliban ruling was extremely difficult. They suffered 
targeted, often violent adversity, including denial of basic human rights, veiling, seclusion and 
segregation.
86
 Rights of women and girls were systematically marginalized.  
Women and girls had restricted access to education, health care facilities and 
employment. During the Taliban's rule, only around 3 percent of girls received some form of 
education. On the other hand, the ban on women's employment also affected education of 
males, as the majority of teachers were women. Poor health conditions and malnutrition made 
pregnancy and childbirth exceptionally dangerous for Afghan women. The Taliban also 
limited the freedom of movement of women. Women could travel only when accompanied by 
a male relative, wearing the traditional full-body burqa. It put single, female-headed 
households and widows in an extremely difficult position. In fact, these women were even 
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forbidden to beg on the streets. In May 2001, a decree was issued by the Taliban, banning 
women from driving cars, which further limited their activities. Women were harassed and 
beaten by the Taliban if their public appearance was perceived to contradict Taliban 
regulations.
87
 Women were literally removed from public space, becoming an invisible, 
ghost-like part of society.  
Changes implemented after the fall of the Taliban increased the influence of women in 
political decision-making, and helped them to be more influential in terms of political 
representation. In fact, 68 women sit in the lower house of the National Assembly, or Wolesi 
Jirga (Parliament of Afghanistan), which is 25 percent of the total of 249 members. It is the 
highest percentage in the Arab world. However, they still face restrictive social norms and 
violent intimidation along their path to equality.
88
 Contemporary Afghan legislation does not 
completely follow international standards. For example, President Karzai’s legislation 
introduced proposal. The law regulates marriage, divorce, and inheritance for the country's 
Shia population (mostly Hazara). It includes provisions that require a woman to ask 
permission to leave the house except on urgent business, a duty to "make herself up" or "dress 
up" for her husband upon demand, and a duty not to refuse sex when her husband wants it. 
This new law contradicts Article 22 of the Afghan Constitution which states that men and 
women "have equal rights and duties before the law."
89
 This new law also violates the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, of which 
Afghanistan is a state party. Although the provisions of the Shia Personal Status Law directly 
contradict the Afghan Constitution
90
, which bans any kind of discrimination and distinction 
between citizens of Afghanistan, it is seen as an element of the political campaign orientated 
to reserve a conservative side of society.  
 
1.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TYPES OF ARMED CONFLICTS  
Most articles of the Geneva Convention are applicable to an international armed 
conflict. NATO intervention in Afghanistan constitutes a non-international armed conflict. As 
a result, the law which is applicable differs from this type of law during a traditional war. In 
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an international conflict, war is a reciprocated, and thus is classified as an armed conflict 
between two or more state entities. It implies the relevance of the whole body of international 
humanitarian law to the warring parties. During a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), 
applicable humanitarian law is limited to general Article 3 of the Geneva Convention or the 
Additional Protocol II. The relevance of the above-mentioned regimes depends on the 
intensity of the conflict. Treaty law applied during a NIAC is supplemented by customary 
rules.  
An in-depth classification of the conflict is very important. Firstly it affects the status of 
participants. Secondly, it affects other aspects of international humanitarian law such as the 
principle of distinction and eventual targeting. With regard to an international armed conflict, 
at least in terms of legitimate human targets, the law is clear. Negative definition stipulates 
that civilians are protected while combatants are not. In a non-international armed conflict, the 
situation is more complex. Civilians may constitute a legitimate target under some 
circumstances. This criterion implies direct participation in hostilities.
91
  
Treaty law says little on the notion of a military objective during a conflict regulated by 
the Additional Protocol II. Furthermore, rules on targeting stipulated in articles 48-67 AP I are 
not followed by the AP II. Classification of the conflict also affects the issue of the cultural 
property protection.
92
 
In this section of the opening chapter, I will explore legal characteristics of a NIAC. 
Furthermore, I will analyse the legal status of the military operation in Afghanistan from the 
point of the US military reaction of the 9/11 attacks until present. The above-mentioned 
analysis will contribute further to my discussion. Establishing a legal framework within an 
armed conflict allows to properly and appropriately consider the legal status of the 
participants of the conflict. It also brings a legal framework of possible violations of law 
within an armed conflict. Discussions and conclusions from this chapter will constitute a basis 
for further consideration developed in the chapter which is dedicated to the legal framework 
of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. You will see this in the chapter dealing with the legal 
status of participants and the chapter dedicated to the Rules of Engagement.  
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1.3. COMMON ARTICLE 3 - SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Four Geneva Conventions adopted in 1949 deal mostly with international armed 
conflicts. However, they contain Common Article 3 called “Treaty in Miniature”, which states 
a minimal set of rules protecting victims of an armed conflict that is not international in 
nature.
 93
 It is applicable “in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply”.94 It obliges all conflict participants, state and non-state agents to 
obey at least these minimal requirements. Article 3 is not based on reciprocity. 
The application of Common Article 3 depends on the notion of the armed conflict. If the 
situation is below the armed conflict threshold, then international humanitarian law does not 
apply.  
The contemporary definition of an armed conflict is based on the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia judgment delivered in the so-called Tadic case, “...an 
armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such 
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of 
peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until 
that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the 
warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a 
party, whether or not actual combat takes place there”.95  
Contrary to the AP II limitation, armed forces of the relevant state may not necessarily 
be involved in the conflict.
96
 Additionally, it is not necessary to prove that the insurgents or 
dissenting forces exercise some degree of territorial control.
97
 Rebel forces need not, similarly 
to AP II, exercise such control over part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations. 
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As to the definition or criteria indicating what an “organized group” means, Boothby 
refers to the Haradinaj case which provided a list of criteria. They are as follow: existence of a 
command structure, existence of headquarters, control of certain territory, access to weapons, 
recruits and military training, the ability to plan, coordinate and execute military operations, 
the ability to define a unified military strategy and use tactics, to speak one voice to negotiate 
agreements such as, for example, ceasefire or peace accords.
98
  
 
 
1.3.1 PERSONAL SCOPE –  RATIONE PERSONAE 
Common Article 3 protects following groups: 
- Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms,  
- and those placed ‘’hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
cause. 
Protection under Common Article 3 is limited. For example, there are no expressis 
verbis constraints of illegal actions toward active and not hors de combat hostile participants. 
A person captured during an international armed conflict is entitled to prisoner-of-war status. 
On the contrary, participants in a NIAC are not. When captured, they may be prosecuted for 
hostile activities even when such activities are conducted according to the rules of law of 
armed conflicts.
99
  
 
1.3.2 HUMANE TREATMENT  
Humane treatment is of universal character and is a cornerstone for all four Geneva 
Conventions. It obliges parties to treat all captured persons in a way which does not constitute 
a breach of their physical and mental needs. Article 3 states that humane treatment applies to 
“all persons in enemy hands, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion 
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria”.100The following acts contradict 
Article 3: murder, mutilation, torture, cruelty, humiliating and degrading treatment, taking 
hostages, unfair trial. The list above does not, in all sense of the word, have a closed 
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enumeration character. It would be dangerous to try to enumerate things with which a human 
being must be provided so that they are distinguished from an animal, or to lay down in detail 
the manner in which one must behave towards them in order to show that one is treating them 
"humanely", that is to say as a fellow human being and not as a beast or an item.
101
 
We must further consider that under Article 3, all participants of the conflict, including Talibs 
and members of other insurgent organizations, are entitled to fair trail, and torture, cruelty, and 
humiliating and degrading treatment is forbidden.  
 
1.3.3. THE SICK AND WOUNDED  
The sick and wounded, according to Article 3.2, must be retrieved and cared for. To fulfil 
these obligations, Article 3 states that “an impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Red Cross Committee, may offer its services to the Parties of the conflict”. 
It constitutes the activity of the Red Cross, in the midst of internal conflict, as a treaty based 
humanitarian activity rather than purely charitable service, often considered previously as an 
unfriendly or hostile act.
102
  
In Afghanistan, the International Red Cross Committee also provided first aid training 
and kits to the Taliban
103
  
 
1.3.4 MEDICAL PERSONNEL  
Under Article 3, medical personnel should be respected and protected in all circumstances. 
However, when engaged in hostile activities they lose their protected status.
104
  
 
1.4 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II 
 The division between Common Article 3 and the AP II is of particular importance for 
the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. This is because most European NATO members and 
Afghanistan are parties of the AP II whereas the most influential country, the USA, is not. 
This also affects the situation where European states are under the US command.
105
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1.4.1 SCOPE OF APPLICATION  
Additional Protocol II shall not be applied during international armed conflicts and 
those conflicts covered by Article 1(4) of AP I.
106
 It is also not applicable during 
disturbances
107
 and tensions – such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature, which are not classed as armed conflicts.
108
  
The concept of a non-international armed conflict contained in Additional  
Protocol II, sets a higher threshold of application than Common Article 3. While Article 3 
applies to all situations of a non-international armed conflict, Article 1(1) of Additional 
Protocol II states that it applies only to the armed conflicts:  
- which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party (HCP) between its 
armed forces (AF) and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups.
109
 This 
means that there must be national armed forces on one side and either dissident armed forces 
or an organized armed group on the other. As to the term, armed forces; not only armed forces 
should be considered but also law enforcement and similar agencies. Such an agency needs to 
be armed.
110
 AP II importantly limits the international dimension of non-international 
conflicts. Since it is applied to an armed conflict in the territory of a HCP between its AF and 
dissident AF, it excludes non-international armed conflict abroad,
111
 
- which is under responsible command,  
- and exercises such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol (Art.1 AP II)- for 
example by taking care of the wounded and sick and providing decent treatment to 
prisoners.
112
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As auxiliary conditions, those proposed by Professor Dietrich Schindler may be listed:  
- the hostilities have to be conducted by force of arms and exhibit such intensity that, as a 
rule, the government is compelled to employ its armed forces against insurgents instead of 
mere police forces.  
- the hostilities are meant to be of a collective character, that is, they must be carried 
out not only by single groups. In addition, the insurgents have to exhibit a minimum amount 
of organisation.  
Their (the insurgents’) armed forces should be under responsible command and be 
capable of meeting humanitarian requirements. According to Dietrich Schindler, the conflict 
must show certain similarities to a war without fulfilling all conditions necessary for the 
recognition of belligerency.
113
  
In fact, the definition of a non-international armed conflict under AP II has such a high 
threshold that it would only be applicable in rare circumstances, usually only when rebels are 
well established and have set up some form of de facto government.
114
 As such, the AP II 
could be, under some circumstances, applicable to the current conflict in Ukraine i.e. pro-
Russian separatist forces .  
 
1.4.2 PERSONAL SCOPE 
Additional Protocol II, differently to Common Article 3, states that it is “applicable 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any 
other similar criteria (hereinafter referred to as "adverse distinction") to all persons affected 
by an armed conflict as defined in Article 1”.115  
Additional Protocol II does not change the status of the armed conflict participants. 
They still may be considered as criminals, responsible before the court of law for conducting 
military operations. The only change in the legal situation of the participants of the armed 
conflict was introduced by Article 6.5 stating that “at the end of hostilities, the authorities in 
power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
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participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the 
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained”. 116 
 
1.4.3 HUMANE TREATMENT  
Additional Protocol II, similarly to Article 3, “obliges states to provide basic humane 
treatment. Being continuation of, forbade following acts: violence to the life, health and 
physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such 
as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c) 
taking of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent 
assault; (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any 
or the foregoing acts.
117
 This list is particularly important since it forbids torture and acts of 
terrorism. Both types of activities were conducted by parties of the conflict in Afghanistan.  
Additional Protocol II consists of special protection towards children. According to 
Article 4.3 “children shall be provided with the care and aid they require …:”. This part is of 
particular importance from the perspective of the later analysis of PRT’s activities in the 
chapter dedicated to counterinsurgency.  
 
1.4.5 MEDICAL PERSONNEL  
Protection of medical and religious personnel is guaranteed by Article 9 of AP II. 
“Medical and religious personnel shall be respected and protected and shall be granted all 
available help for the performance of their duties. They shall not be compelled to carry out 
tasks which are not compatible with their humanitarian mission. In the performance of their 
duties, medical personnel may not be required to give priority to any person except on 
medical grounds”. Protection provided by Additional Protocol II to medical personnel is 
similar to the protection provided to medical personnel during an international armed conflict. 
The activities of medical personnel are protected equally. According to the literal 
meaning of Article 10, “the professional obligations of persons engaged in medical activities 
regarding information which they may acquire concerning the wounded and sick under their 
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care shall, subject to national law, be respected”. No one should be penalized for the care they 
provide to the sick and wounded.  
The protection provided to medical personnel in Afghanistan faces two obstacles. From 
the perspective of insurgents, medical personnel and regular troops are very difficult to 
differentiate. They usually use the same type of armoured vehicles and helicopters as regular 
troops. From a NATO perspective, it is even more complicated. In rural areas, medical care is 
administered by local healers rather than medical staff whom we would understand to be part 
of a medical team. The obvious question is: do they deserve equal protection as educated, 
licensed medical personnel?  
 
1.4.6 PROTECTION OF MEDICAL UNITS AND TRANSPORTS 
To accomplish the principle of humane treatment, Article 11 states the protection of 
medical units and transport. As mentioned above, often in the midst of the battlefield, the 
distinction of what is and what is not a medical unit creates a problem.  
 
1.4.7 RELIEF SOCIETIES AND RELIEF ACTIONS 
Additional Protocol confirms that “relief societies (…), such as Red Cross (Red 
Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations may offer their services for the performance of 
their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict”. 
 This principle, upon first glance, is not debatable. It is a fact that in Afghanistan, the 
Red Cross and other organizations provide relief to the victims of the conflict. However, there 
has been a fierce debate related to the concept of relief or humanitarian actions since 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams appeared on the modern battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The differences and legal qualification of actions conducted by PRTs will be discussed in the 
chapter dedicated to counterinsurgency.  
 
1.4.8 CUSTOMARY LAW  
Nowadays, not only the rules of treaty law are applicable during armed conflicts. The 
whole body of customary law developed inter alia by the judgment of tribunals are equally 
valid. These rules are applicable in both types of non-international armed conflicts; those 
regulated by Common Article 3 and those regulated by Additional Protocol II. 
 45 
 
Customary regulations have been introduced to military manuals and rules of 
engagement. They govern the conduct of NATO military personnel in Afghanistan. The most 
important principles are:  
1. Principle of distinction – by the parties of the conflict in order to distinguish the 
civilian population from military targets. It forbids the civilian population being a target
118
. 
The same principle is applied toward civilian objects and installations;
119
  
2. Indiscriminate attack120- this principle obliges warring parties to conduct military 
operations only against military objectives. The use of means and methods of warfare which 
may inflict suffering upon the civilian population is prohibited; 
3.  Protection of medical personnel - this principle, included in Additional Protocol II, 
also covers the situation of a non-international armed conflict governed solely by Common 
Article 3. It says “that medical personnel exclusively assigned to medical duties must be 
respected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection if they commit, 
outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy”; 121  
4. Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission – both Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II do not state any protection toward peacekeeping forces. Under 
customary regulations, “directing an attack against personnel and objects involved in a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they 
are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under international 
humanitarian law, is prohibited”.122  
The same situation applies to protected zones; directing an attack against a zone 
established to shelter the wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is 
prohibited.
123
 
5. Individual responsibility for war crimes – this is a new concept developed following 
the judgments of international criminal tribunals.
124
 This approach was confirmed by the 
statues of international bodies such as the Sierra Leone Special Court or the Rome Statue. It 
                                                          
118
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louis Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2005, rule nr 1-6, p. 3-24. 
119
 Ibidem, rule 7-10, p. 25-36. 
120
 Ibidem, rule 11-13, p. 37-46. 
121
,Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louis Doswald-Beck, op. cit., rules 25-30, p. 79 – 104. 
122
 Ibidem,. rule 33, p. 112.  
123
 Ibidem, rule 35-37, p. 119. 
124
 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case. No. IT-
94-1-AR72). 
 46 
 
makes individuals equally responsible for war crimes committed during a NIAC as in an IAC. 
Customary principles often are incorporated into Rules of Engagement or national caveats 
what directly affects actions or omissions of the troops on the ground.  
 
1.5.  LEGAL STATUS OF THE MILITARY OPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER 9/11 
ATTACKS.  
  In this section, I will provide a legal framework for the international operation in 
Afghanistan. It has a particular meaning in terms of the status of participants of the conflict, 
an analysis of which, I will discuss in the next part of my thesis.  
 Nowadays, the doctrine, even only within boundaries of Common Article 3 (not AP 
II), provides several scenarios which are included within the typology of a non-international 
armed conflict. They are as follows: government forces fighting organized armed groups, 
organized groups fighting each other within a state, a situation where the government forces 
are fighting organized armed groups and the conflict spills over into neighbouring countries, 
multinational armed forces fighting alongside the host state armed forces in its territory 
against organized armed groups, UN or regional organization forces fighting alongside the 
host state armed forces in its territory against organized armed groups, a non-international 
armed conflict which exists alongside an international armed conflict, and conflicts between 
terrorist organizations such as al Qaida and the United states.
125
 Most of these doctrinal 
criteria were met in Afghanistan. To closer examine the relationship between the parties, I 
will attempt to analyse the conflicts which took place on the territory of Afghanistan from 
2001 when Operation Enduring Freedom was conducted by the US forces: 
 What is the legal qualification of the conflict between the US forces and the Taliban? 
 What is the legal qualification of the conflict between the US forces and al Qaida ? 
 What is the legal qualification of the conflict between the Northern Alliance and the 
Taliban? 
 What is the legal qualification of the conflict between the Northern Alliance and al 
Qaida? 
 
 
                                                          
125
 Typology proposed by Jelena Pejic (In:) W. Boothby, op. cit. p. 34 
 47 
 
1.5.1 WHAT IS THE LEGAL QUALIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE US 
FORCES AND THE TALIBAN? 
An armed conflict may be conducted between states or non-state entities. The fact that a 
conflict is conducted between states implies it is international in character. During such 
conflicts, persons affected by them are protected by relevant regulations of international 
humanitarian law and, in particular, the Geneva Convention III. Since the United States is a 
legitimate state, there is no problem with the identification of one party of the conflict. 
However, the problem arises with the second participant of the conflict i.e. Afghanistan under 
the Taliban ruling. There was even a problem with giving a name to the country. After the fall 
of the communist regime of Najibulah, the country was named the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan with Burhanuddin Rabbani as the head of state.
126
 However, since 1996, under 
the Taliban ruling, it was named the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Both names were used 
by both parties of the internal conflict until 2001 when an interim administration was 
established during the Bonn peace talks and the name of country was changed to the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan.  
In the case of the Taliban, the question here is whether Afghanistan under Taliban 
ruling was a party of the international conflict and whether Taliban forces could be considered 
agents of the state. Or if rather Afghanistan was a failed state with no de facto or de jure 
authority which would indicate that the conflict between US forces and the Taliban was not 
governed by the GC III. 
 To address this question, a basic issue needs to be questioned: what was the status of 
the Taliban before US intervention? Was the Taliban a de jure or de facto government? 
The Taliban came to power in the mid 90’s when they took control over Kabul in 
1996.
127
 From that moment, they exercised control over more than 90 percent of the 
country.
128
 During their ruling, they established an effective system of authority of governing 
provinces through Shuras and governors. They also established a system of law based on strict 
interpretation of Sharia law. Human rights violations did not gain international public-opinion 
support and the Taliban government was only officially recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
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the United Arab Emirates and the unrecognized state of Chechnya.
129
 The lack of official 
recognition was confirmed by Security Council resolutions.
130
 As a result, before the 
beginning of the Enduring Freedom Operation, the Taliban government was not considered de 
jure. Interestingly, the same resolution does not state that the Taliban was not in de facto 
control over Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Security Council Resolution S/RES/1214 (1998) 
of 8 December 1998 acknowledged de facto control of Afghanistan by Taliban forces.
131
 This 
may be taken from the literal meaning of the Council resolution which stated that the Taliban 
should enforce measures against terrorism and not provide safe havens for terrorist 
activities.
132
 This enables us to conclude that the Taliban government was able to or, in other 
words, was, in fact, controlling Afghanistan to the extent that they were able to suppress 
terrorism.
133
 Similarly, an interpretation of S/RES/1267
134
 indicates that it would be pointless 
to expect the Taliban to take action against terrorists operating on their territory if they were 
not, in fact, exercising control over a significant part of Afghanistan.
135
 To summarize, before 
Operation Enduring Freedom there were two governments. One run by former mujahedins 
with President Rabbani which had very limited control over the country but had a United 
Nations representative, Dr. Ravan Farhadi,
136
 and a second government, run by the Taliban 
which had de facto control over Afghanistan with an armed wing but without any 
international recognition.
137
 Of course the lack of international recognition of the government 
is important but it is not crucial in terms of the capability of the state. According to the 
doctrine of international public law, the lack of international recognition of the government 
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does not eradicate the international personality of the state.
138
 Especially that, post factum, 
some official sources confirm that the Taliban constituted some form of government. For 
example, the message from the British House of Commons, which explains the legal basis for 
the invasion of Afghanistan (SN/IA/5340), refers to the Taliban as the government of 
Afghanistan.
139
 The importance of recognition of the de jure or de facto character of the 
Taliban government, is directly related to the status of the Taliban fighters before the Bonn 
agreement.  
When the terrorist attacks of 2001 occurred, the US government claimed that they had 
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.
140
 The United States government 
referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter which says “nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations”. The principle of self-defence was reiterated by 
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373.
141
 Importantly, there was no UN SC 
authorisation to conduct the military invasion of Afghanistan.
142
  
The above mentioned facts had the following impact on the legal status of the armed 
conflict which broke out. US forces attacked the Afghan state ruled by an unrecognized 
government, the Taliban. The armed conflict before the Bonn Agreement was international in 
nature.
143
 The conflict in question, was governed by humanitarian law applicable during 
international armed conflicts especially by the GC I-IV. Lack of an internationally recognized 
government does not affect the status of the Taliban fighters, particularly under Article 4 A. 
Paragraph 2 or 3 of Geneva Convention III.
144
 This position was not supported by the United 
States which refused to grant the captured Taliban members POW status in 2001 on the basis 
that, amongst others, they did not fulfil the four conditions of Article 4 A(2) of GC III.
145
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After establishing the Karzai’s government, the initially international conflict turned 
non-international.  
 
1.5.2 WHAT IS THE LEGAL QUALIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN US FORCES 
AND THE AL QAIDA ORGANIZATION? 
Initially, the main reason behind the US intervention in Afghanistan was to hunt down 
Al Qaida operatives responsible for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. 
The organization took refuge in Afghanistan due to the prolonged cooperation between the 
Taliban and Al Qaida. 
Al Qaida al – Sulbah (the solid base) was conceptualized and established around 1987 
by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden.
146
 It was a continuation of the Maktab Khadamat 
al-Mujahidin al-Arab organization which was primarily orientated to help to finance, recruit 
and train fighters, usually from Islamic countries, to be part of the Afghan resistance 
movement against the Soviet Union.
147
 Later, it became orientated against the Western World, 
mostly the USA and Israel.
148
 In the beginning, the Al Qaida headquarters was located in 
Pakistan (Peshawar), then in Sudan and finally, since 1996, in Afghanistan.
149
 Due to Taliban 
policy, Al Qaida established an advanced infrastructure in Afghanistan such as bunkers, 
military units and organizational features.
150
 At the same time, bin Laden created the 
International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, (Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-
'Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin). It led to the formation of an independent 
organization well-rooted within Taliban controlled areas. As a result of these activities, the 
attacks on the World Trade Centre were planned and executed. 
151
 
Al Qaida did not exercise any de facto or de jure control over any part of Afghan 
territory and nor was it controlled by the Taliban. For a better understanding of the nature of 
the conflict between Al Qaida and the USA, the Tadic provides interpretative information. In 
the event Al Qaida activity was attributed to the Taliban, then the conflict before the Bonn 
Agreement would have had a similar character as the one between the Taliban and the USA. 
If it did not, it should not then be considered non-international.  
The primary issue which should be dealt with is whether al Qaida activity can be 
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attributed to the Taliban. Or if Al Qaida should be considered as an agent of the Taliban state. 
In Tadic, the court on the case said that the control required by international law may be 
deemed to exist when a State plays a role in “organizing, coordinating or planning military 
actions of the military group. … (then) acts performed by the group or members of the group 
may be regarded as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the 
controlling State concerning of each of those acts”.152 The Taliban, as a de facto government, 
was not in a position to effectively control Al Qaida activity.
153
 Its actions were loosely 
affiliated with the Taliban, mostly in providing save havens, for financial support in return. In 
conclusion, Al Qaida’s activity is difficult to consider as a state-related activity and therefore 
it constitutes purely non-state, but criminal, activity.  
To conclude the above argumentations, the conflict between US forces and Al Qaida on 
the territory of Afghanistan was non-international in nature. To that conflict, Common Article 
3 and customary law was applicable due to the fact that the US had not ratified Additional 
Protocol II. 
 
1.5.3 WHAT IS THE LEGAL QUALIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND THE TALIBAN? 
The Northern Alliance was one the factions struggling over control in Afghanistan. The 
movement consisted of mujahedeen fighters who had previously defeated the communist 
government. After the victory over the Soviets, the movement was unable to create a stable 
government. It was despite the fact that the leading mujahedeen commander, Ahmed Shah 
Massoud, seized Kabul on 26 April 1992.
154
 After the arrival to Kabul of the rest of the 
leaders, the Islamic State of Afghanistan was established. Each commander held an area of 
Kabul and established their checkpoints. After failure to bring one of the influential 
commanders, Gulibudin Hakmatyar, to government, street fighting in Kabul erupted between 
Ahmad Shah Massod with the newly-appointed President Burhanuddin Rabbani, representing 
the government and Gulibudin Hekmatyar with Tajik General Dostum, as the opposition 
forces. Hekmatyar savagely bombarded the city with rockets, mortars, and artillery, 
continuing encirclement of Kabul for several months. On 7 March 1993, Saudi King Fahd 
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sponsored a peace accord between warring factions.
155
 All the participants agreed with a new 
proposal that appointed Rabbani as President and Hekmatyar as Prime Minister. This 
agreement never entered into force. Although nominated as Prime Minister, Hekmatyar 
further continued fighting.
156
 The situation in the country was even more complicated due to 
the fact that the rest of the country was controlled by local warlords and turned into 
anarchy
157
. After the full-scale civil war of 1996, the Taliban took Kabul.  
Although recognised by most foreign nations as a legal government, the Northern 
Alliance only controlled approximately 10 - 30% of the country.
158
  
The above-mentioned situation may be summarized as an armed conflict between the 
recognized NA government controlling some territory of Afghanistan and an unrecognized 
Taliban government controlling the rest of the country.  
There is no doubt that the scale of the conflict reached the level of an armed conflict as 
outlined by Common Article 3.
159
 The question is whether the situation can be classified as an 
armed conflict before and during US operations under Additional Protocol II.  
Despite the fact that both warring parties were fulfilling the conditions of AP II,
160
 AP II 
cannot apply to the relations between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. This is due to the 
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very beginning, Mullah Omar was controlling Taliban military operations. On behalf of the Northern Alliance, 
that same attribute may be attached to General Dostum and Ahmed Shah Massod. 
The fourth condition, which is control over a part of its territory so as to enable the parties to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations, is also fulfilled. Taliban seizure of Herat, Kandahar, Mazaar i Sharif and 
Kabul in 1996 is an example of it. The same applies to Northern Alliance operations especially within the 
undefeatable Panjshir Valley was ruled by the Ahmad Shah Massod until his death two days before the 9/11 
attacks. 
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fact that Afghanistan became an AP II state party only in 2009.
161
 Therefore, the conflict 
between the NA and the Taliban before and after the Boon Agreement was governed only by 
Common Article 3.  
 
1.5.4 WHAT IS THE LEGAL QUALIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND AL QAIDA  
Taking the above discussions into consideration, the conflict between the NA and Al 
Qaida may only be considered to be governed by Common Article 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
When discussing assignments of International Security and Assistance Forces in 
Afghanistan, we cannot forget the aforementioned facts. On the other hand, we need to 
remember that the ISAF – NATO mission in Afghanistan was the most important combat 
mission. Is it not only an attempt to settle the situation in this part of Asia, but also an ultimate 
test of military and organizational skills of the most powerful military pact in the world. The 
NATO/ ISAF and Resolute Support failure in Afghanistan will undermine the raison d’etre of 
NATO, and also will contribute to the further destabilisation of the region, where two 
rivalling nuclear-weapon states are located dangerously close, namely India and Pakistan. 
NATO is responsible for Afghanistan and must make all efforts to bring safety and security to 
this country. This is an extremely complex task. State institutions such as police forces, the 
army and administration needs to be improved. Both the legal system and the legislation 
process must be developed and stabilised. On the other hand, activities such as opium 
cultivation and insurgency must be eradicated. All these issues of the country’s development 
are placed unto NATO. In many respects, it is a new form of humanitarian intervention.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The last condition, observance of humanitarian law, is always debatable, especially that it wasn’t verified by 
independent and impartial findings.  
161
 http://www.cicr.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/afganistan-news-240609.htm 
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CHAPTER 2. THE LEGAL SITUATION OF COMBATANTS AND DETAINEES IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important aspects of modern conflict, as well a legal challenge, is the 
status of combatants and the treatment of detained participants.  
The US response to the World Trade Centre attacks lead to an unprecedented global 
struggle with terrorism. The common denominator of the US response was the military 
character of its operations, particularly in Afghanistan, and the lack of clearly identified 
combatants or persons considered to be legitimate targets. 
The Bush administration has often referred to the so-called global war on terror, which 
is a politically-motivated concept and has no legal meaning. Modern conflicts, however, 
particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, are highly influenced by such ideas. The Bush 
administration created a military and political infrastructure that allowed for the conduct of 
war (on terror) which had no legal meaning, against opponents who were not clearly defined. 
This politicized approach leads to further complication in understanding the already vague 
concept of a ‘combatant’ in modern conflicts. This lack of clarity has particularly affected the 
treatment of persons captured during non-international armed conflicts.  
One must not forget that Bush’s ‘bull in a china shop’ approach was an attempt to 
address current challenges. The World Trade Centre attacks gave the international community 
new aspects of terrorism to combat and the very nature of this conflict became transnational 
on an unprecedented scale. Terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s was deep-rooted in particular 
countries or territories. By this, I mean that organizations such as the IRA or RAF were, 
despite their international dimension and cooperation with other terrorist organizations, very 
much local. As a result, most anti-terrorism operations conducted against them were more 
internal-law enforcement in nature, conducted by governments within their own territories.  
In contrast, the response to the threat of Al Qaida was, and ought to be, an 
international one. Nowadays, a number of antiterrorist campaigns are being conducted 
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through military means and across various borders.
162
 This brings its own new challenges in 
terms of proper handling and detention of persons engaged in worldwide terrorism or related 
armed conflicts.  
In the midst of the so-called war on terror, the status of participants in armed conflicts 
has become a focal point. Only those who are combatants, are immune to prosecution for war-
like acts that comply with the laws and customs of war.
163
 Additionally, when in captivity, 
combatants are treated as prisoners of war.
164
  
Historically, the protection of prisoners of war dates back to the 19
th
 century, with the 
issue in 1863 of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field, General Order No. 100, the so-called Lieber Code. Article 56 of the Code introduced 
protection of prisoners of war, stating that “a prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for 
being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of 
any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any 
other barbarity”.165 But the Lieber Code did not provide a definition of ‘combatant’. This was 
developed over the decades to follow, resulting in the definition being provided by the 
Geneva Conventions.
166
 Combatant status is fully regulated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 1977 Additional Protocols.
167
  
Humanitarian law identifies only two categories of participant in an international 
armed conflict: civilians and combatants
168
, whereas in a non-international armed conflict, 
there is only a civilian population category. This leaves no room for defining civilians or 
combatants as currently provided for by the concepts of the Bush administration, such as the 
unlawful combatant, the unprivileged belligerent, or illegal combatants (i.e. persons 
considered by the US administration to be legitimate targets ineligible for protection). This 
                                                          
162
 S. Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the “War on 
Terror”, International Review of the Red Cross , vol. 87 (2005), no. 857, p. 40 
163
 M. Maxwel, M. Watts, Unlawful Enemy Combatant’: Status, Theory of Culpability, or Neither? “Journal of 
International Criminal Justice”, Oxford, vol. 5 (2007), p. 21. 
164
 Art. 5 Geneva ConventioN relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1950 (GC III) 
165
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code). 24 April 1863, 
available at .http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument also available at the Yale Avalon project 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp where it says “A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment 
for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or 
disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity”. 
166
 Art. 4 GC III 
167
 M. Flemming, Jeńcy wojenni. Studium prawno-historyczne, Prisoners of war. Historic and Legal Study, 
Warszawa 2000, p. 25. 
168
 M. Maxwel, M. Watts, op. cit., p. 20. 
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chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the legal status of participants in the Afghanistan 
conflict. It is a point of departure on the discussion of the status of combatants in modern 
armed conflicts, leading to de lege ferenda conclusions.  
 One of the issues analysed is inevitably linked to combatant status – the treatment of 
those granted and those not granted prisoner-of-war status, as well as related issues such as 
the transfer of detainees. I shall refer to places known as “black sites”, such as the American-
run Bagram Prison in Afghanistan, where alleged violations of detainees’ rights have 
occurred.
169
 Unfortunately, similar violations have also taken place at Afghan-operated 
detention centres. These examples raise the issue of compliance with the legal obligation of 
NATO’s European members, resulting from their cooperation with US and Afghan troops. 
The question of the treatment and transfer of detainees is particularly important, taking into 
consideration the nature and aim of modern military operations, such as country stabilization 
and implementation of the rules of law and good governance, etc. Situations that contradict 
this took place in both Iraq and Afghanistan, where soldiers from European countries have 
been formally and informally obliged to transfer captured belligerents to local or American-
run detention facilities.
170
 In these situations, Europeans not only violated the European 
Convention of Human Rights, but also became accomplices to torture, cruelty and degrading 
treatment. In many cases, such transfers remain in violation of the law, based not only on the 
Soering case
171
, but also taking into consideration the fact that both the US and Afghan forces 
provide lower legal protection standards than their European counterparts. For example, the 
US is not a party of Additional Protocol I and II. 
The ‘war on terror’ and ‘Guantanamo Bay’ issues brought the question of detention 
into the contemporary legal dispute. The unclear situation of detainees may also affect 
soldiers’ performance during military operations, with the possible violation of humanitarian 
law and the question of state responsibility (under both humanitarian law and international 
human rights law). It may also adversely affect the results of the overall mission (country 
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 For example ICRC report available at http://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf 
(10/05/2011)  
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 There were several such cases. My knowledge is based on practical experience and is supported by the press 
information. For example D. Casciani, UK 'must help release detainee' in Afghanistan, High Court told, available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13893181 
171
 Case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, (Application no. 14038/88), 07 July 1998, available at 
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stabilization and implementation of the rule of law, etc). The issue of detention brings a new 
challenge for stabilization and peace-enforcement operations. 
 
2. TREATMENT OF COMBATANT AND DETAINEES IN AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT  
 
2.1.1 DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS 
At the beginning of this analysis, the current legal regime applicable to combatants 
will be discussed. This descriptive section will help to clarify the concept of a combatant and 
lead to further considerations.  
In general, combatants are persons who may directly participate in hostilities.
172
 
International law makes a fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians. This 
distinction determines their international legal status. The distinction between a civilian and a 
combatant, being of primary character, also indicates who acquires secondary status i.e. a 
prisoner of war during a conflict which is regulated by law applicable during international 
armed conflicts. Obtaining secondary prisoner-of-war status is connected to the situation 
when a combatant falls into the power of an enemy. Primary combatant status determines the 
protection afforded to a person under international humanitarian law. As a result, it is crucial 
to establish a combatant status (primary status) what allows us to determine the secondary 
status, i.e. prisoner-of-war status.
173
  
Combatant authorization to conduct hostilities is not a personal right afforded by an 
individual or a group of individuals, but it results from affiliation of the combatant to a state 
body of a party of conflict, which is a subject of international law.
174
 The only exception of 
this principle is the situation covered by Article 1 paragraph 4 of AP I “in which peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination”. 175  In such a situation, a combatant may 
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 Art. 3 Hague regulation, art. 43 par. AP I 
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 D. Fleck, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford Press 1999, p. 66. 
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 D. Fleck, Ibidem p. 67. 
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 Art. 1 par 4. - Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of. 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
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represent a government which is not a recognized subject of international law, but merely a 
non-state body exercising its right of self-determination.  
Humanitarian law states that combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from 
the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or during preparation of a military 
operation to attack.
176
 To do this, a member of regular armed forces, for example, should wear 
a uniform. The ratio legis of this principle is to protect the civilian population from being a 
target by maintaining a clear distinction between military and civilian targets. Article 48 of 
AP I says “in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives”. 177  This principle also features a 
customary character. As presented in a customary law study prepared by the ICRC, (...) 
parties of the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants (…).178 
Wearing a uniform is one of the most simple and effective ways of distinguishing civilians 
from combatants. However, there are situations where combatants are not obliged to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population at all times. Such a situation is envisaged, 
for example, by AP I which says that “during armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination”179, “they keep their combatant status when they carry arms 
openly being engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack”.180 
Similar situations occur during occupation when an organized-resistant movement struggles 
with occupiers. This principle should be narrowly interpreted. It is applicable only during the 
above-mentioned situation and it should not affect the general principle of wearing uniforms 
by the member of military forces.
181
  
 If a combatant, who is a member of regular armed forces, is captured whilst 
participating directly in hostilities and is not wearing the appropriate uniform, or if such a 
person is a member of a militia, voluntary corps, or an organized-resistance movement and 
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 Art. 44 par. 3 AP I 
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 Art. 48 AP I. 
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 ICRC Customary law study, rule 1, State practice regarding principle of distinction may be discovered in 
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does not wear a distinctive sign, then this person should be liable of a general breach of the 
duty of distinction. Such a person should be charged with the crime of perfidy and his or her 
combatant status may be forfeit
182
 unless an exception under Article 44 paragraph 3 (a) and 
(b) is applicable. 
To define combatant status in an international armed conflict, it is necessary to refer to 
Article 4 of the III Geneva Convention. It says that persons belonging to one of the following 
categories, combatants and non-combatants, who have fallen into the power of the enemy, are 
entitled to prisoner-of-war status or they should be treated as prisoners of war:  
(1) Members of the armed forces.  
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,  
 (a) who are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
 (b) who have a fixed, distinctive sign recognisable from a distance; 
 (c) who openly carry weapons; 
 (d) who conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority 
not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany armed forces without actually being members thereof. 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices of a merchant marine.  
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, levée en masse. 
  
2.1. 2 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF A PARTY O THE CONFLICT, AS WELL AS 
MEMBERS OF MILITIAS OR VOLUNTEER CORPS FORMING PART OF SUCH ARMED 
FORCES 
 According to AP I, Article 43 Paragraph 1, “the armed forces of a Party to a conflict 
consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented 
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall 
be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict”.  
 According to Article 4 of the III Geneva Convention, the concept of armed forces 
encompasses all kinds of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. They 
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should be subject to an internal disciplinary system.
183
 What distinguishes them from regular 
armed forces is the necessity of notification of their existence. Some states have militias or 
armed law enforcement agencies.
184
 For example, the Federal Border Guard Commands of the 
Federal Republic of Germany is an independent institution from the Ministry of Defence. In 
the event of an armed conflict, they shall become a part of the armed forces.
185
 In Poland, a 
special unit called the Nadwislan Military Unit (Nadwiślańskie Jednostki Wojskowe (NJW)) 
was established. Similar to the situation of the FBG in Germany, the NJW was not 
subordinated to the MoD but it was under the command of the Minister of Internal and 
Administration Affairs.
186
 Such a unit (despite the fact that the NJW no longer exists) may 
effectively obtain a combatant status only through notification to other parties of the 
conflict.
187
 
  
2.1.3 MEMBERS OF OTHER MILITIAS AND MEMBERS OF OTHER VOLUNTEER CORPS 
The concept of a combatant also encompasses, according to Article 4 Paragraph 2 of 
GC III, “members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or 
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or 
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements”. 188  This concept was 
created after the Second World War. During Nazi occupation, German forces often did not 
grant any protection toward captured members of the resistance movement. The Geneva 
Conventions, in order to fill this legal gap, provided protection of this category of combatants. 
To gain protection under GC III, members of the resistance movement must fulfil the 
following conditions: 
(a) “that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
                                                          
183
 Art. 43 AP I 
184
 J.S. Pictet, Commentary, III Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, first reprint, 
ICRC, Geneva 1994, p. 52. 
185
 J.S. Pictet, Ibidem, p. 74  
186
 More on this issue – E. Wejner: Army and politicians without retouch, Wojsko i politycy bez retuszu. Toruń: 
Adam Marszałek, 2006. 
187
 Art. 43 AP I par 3 
188
 Art. 4 par 2 GC III 
 61 
 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war”.189 
Some aspects of the above-mentioned definition need to be addressed. The first one is 
the issue of “a fixed distinctive sign”. The need to wear a distinctive sign results from the 
fundamental obligation of combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. 
They do not have to wear uniform, but they need to wear a distinctive sign recognizable from 
a distance. In the case of a resistance movement, a distinctive sign may be, for example, an 
element deeply rooted in the cultural background such as a long beard, Pakol hat, and military 
jacket, as it was the case for the Afghan Mujahadins.
190
 
 The second element constituting a combatant according to Article 4.2 of the GC III 
definition, is the requirement to “carry arms openly”. Taking into consideration the nature of 
guerrilla warfare, it is difficult to permanently fulfil this condition. According to Additional 
Protocol, this condition needs to be fulfilled: 
a) during each military engagement, 
b) during such a time as he or she is visible to the adversary while he or she is engaged in 
a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he or she is to 
participate.
191
  
The term military deployment refers to any movement towards the point from which an attack 
is launched.
192
 The difference between militias mentioned in this paragraph is such that 
members of regular militias are to be considered combatants by other parties of a conflict only 
by the fact of notification, whereas members of other militias need to fulfil the above 
mentioned conditions.  
 
2.1.4. MEMBERS OF REGULAR ARMED FORCES WHO PROFESS ALLEGIANCE TO AN 
AUTHORITY NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE DETAINING POWER 
During the Second World War, some countries refused to recognize combatant units 
as belligerents that professed allegiance to a government or an authority which these states did 
not recognize. This was the case of the Free French - General de Gaulle followers. The 
Franco-German armistice of 1940 stipulated that French nationals who continued to bear arms 
against Germany would not enjoy the protection of the laws of war.
193
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To prevent this, GC III introduced protection provided to members of regular armed 
forces who profess allegiance to an authority not recognized by the detaining power. In such a 
situation, the expression "members of regular armed forces" denotes armed forces which 
differ from those referred to in sub-paragraph (1) in one respect only: the authority to which 
they profess allegiance is not recognized by the adversary as a Party of the conflict. These 
"regular armed forces" have all the material characteristics and all the attributes of armed 
forces in the sense of sub-paragraph (1), for example: they wear uniform, they have an 
organized hierarchy and they understand and respect the laws and customs of war
194
.  
 The distinguishing feature of such armed forces is the fact that, in the view of their 
adversary, they are not operating or are no longer operating under the direct authority of a 
Party of the conflict in accordance with Article 2 of the Geneva Convention.
195
 
 
2. 1.5. PERSONS WHO ACCOMPANY ARMED FORCES WITHOUT ACTUALLY BEING 
MEMBERS THEREOF  
 According to GC III, Article 4, “persons who accompany armed forces such as 
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members 
of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that 
they have received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall 
provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model”196 are not 
combatants, however they are granted protection when captured. Military forces authorize 
some groups to serve a supplementary role toward armed forces. Usually authorization is 
given through a system of identity cards issued following established procedure.
197
 These 
persons ought to be granted prisoners of war status. 
The presence of persons who accompany the armed forces has become an important 
aspect of modern conflicts. Currently, a large number of people support army efforts on the 
battlefield, from civilian personnel of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to maintenance 
personnel. All of them are authorized by the military forces.  
An important issue is the question of military contractors. Private military contractors 
are often loosely aligned to the governments i.e. they are paid by them but are not authorized 
through a system of identity cards envisaged by GC III.  
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2. 1.6. MEMBERS OF CREWS, INCLUDING MASTERS, PILOTS AND APPRENTICES OF 
THE MERCHANT MARINE 
Persons such as crews of civil aircrafts of the Parties of the conflict, who do not 
benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law
198
, are 
not combatants. However they are still protected under the Geneva Law. This historical 
regulation reflects the problems related to naval warfare. Merchant ship crews were so 
valuable that warring parties decided to treat them equally to members of the armed forces 
and to grant them prisoner-of-war status.  
To summarize, in an armed conflict regulated by the law applicable to international 
armed conflicts, crews of civil aircrafts and merchant marines are not combatants but they are 
protected under the Geneva Law in the same way as members of armed forces party to the 
conflict.  
This particular category is interesting from another perspective. The modern battlefield 
is fuelled by advanced electronics. Many flight support personnel or drone operators are not 
only far away from the battlefield but also are not members of armed forces. In this situation, 
despite fulfilling this category, they also fulfil the criteria of the previous category, i.e. 
persons accompanying armed forces. 
 
2. 1.7. LEVÉE EN MASSE  
According to Article 4 A 6 of GC III, “Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on 
the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without 
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly 
and respect the laws and customs of war”.199  
The notion of levée en masse was created during the French Revolution. The first levée 
en masse of modern times was the announcement by the French government in August 1793 
of the conscription of the entire male population (of military age) to resist counter-
revolutionary European kingdom forces.
 200
 
In general, as stated above, combatant status depends on the states’ authorization. Armed 
forces, as the state agents, may act in a way recognized only through states. In the case of 
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levée en masse, the situation is different. Authorization is not given by the state and the status 
of combatants is granted to levée en masse participants by international law. Since levée en 
masse  participants are not authorized by the state to be combatants, they need to fulfil several 
conditions provided by the III Geneva Convention: 
a) Spontaneous armed resistance is permitted by international law only in territory which 
is not occupied. 
b) The population of this territory must take up arms spontaneously on the approach of 
the enemy. 
c) The civilian involved in armed resistance may not have had the time to organize 
themselves as militia or volunteer corps. 
d) They must respect the laws and customs of war.201 
If levée en masse participants fulfil these conditions, they have the primary status of 
combatants and in the event of being captured by the enemy, they are granted secondary 
status of prisoner of war.
202
 
 
2. 1.8 WOMEN AND CHILDREN AS COMBATANTS  
The position of women on the modern battlefield is still considered a debatable issue. 
As a result, despite international humanitarian law lacking the division between the combatant 
ability of men and women, many countries introduced regulations limiting their direct 
participation in hostilities. For example in the UK, there are limitations in this regards and 
women are excluded from service which involves face-to-face enemy killing.
203
  
In terms of children, there are several restrictions regarding their participation in 
hostilities. According to the Geneva Law, warring parties should undertake all feasible 
measures to exclude children under the age of 15 to participate in hostilities.
204
 Article 77 of 
AP I states that “(...) Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that 
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities 
and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the 
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age of eighteen years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who 
are the oldest”.  
This age limitation is confirmed by Article 38, 2, of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child
205
 which states that State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
Article 38, paragraph 3 says that State Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has 
not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons 
who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, 
State Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest. Article 2 of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict, says that State Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 
eighteen years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces. 
 
2. 1.9. NON-COMBATANT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES  
Armed forces may be staffed by non-combatants. Such situations are regulated not 
only by Article 3 of the Hague Regulation but even by the 1874 Brussels Declaration.
206
 
Under the legislation of several countries, there is a particular group of people who are 
considered non-combatant members of the armed forces.
207
 Governmental officials, judges or 
police officers are a good example of such groups.
208
 Should they fall into the power of the 
adversary, they will be considered under some conditions as prisoners of war.  
 Members of armed forces are, in a situation of an armed conflict, entitled to harm 
opponents. There is, however, a particular group of so called non-combatants, members of the 
armed forces. This group of members of armed forces is not legitimized to inflict any, based 
on direct participation in combat, harm to the enemy. On the other hand, they may be 
considered as a legitimate target of military operation. As a consequence, these non-
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combatants are not as equally protected as the civilian population.
209
 These persons are 
excluded from collateral-damage risk assessment during a military operation.
210
 
Members of non-combatant armed forces are obliged to wear (...) the uniform (…) of 
the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party of the conflict.
211
 
Medical personnel and chaplains are treated differently. Although they may be considered as 
non-combatant members of the armed forces, they may not be subject of military 
operations.
212
 
Particularly interesting is the position of military chaplains on the modern battlefield. 
In the 19th century, persons serving as chaplains often worked not only as priests but also as 
persons providing other services such as administrating field hospitals, serving as unit 
postmasters, organizing shipboard libraries or fighting parsons.
213
 Their status changed 
significantly in 1864 when the first Geneva Convention was signed. Article 2 states that, 
"Persons employed in hospitals and ambulances, comprising (...) chaplains, shall participate in 
the benefit of neutrality, whilst so employed, and so long as there remain any wounded to 
bring in or assisted”. 214  This convention was the first international document which 
introduced the neutrality of military chaplains.  
Nowadays, the role of military chaplains has changed. Chaplains on the modern 
battlefield not only provide a spiritual service but also provide expert knowledge on issues 
related to culture and religion.
 215
 It means something in practice when NATO forces, who are 
predominantly Christian, need to operate in an Islamic environment often without basic 
knowledge on how to behave in a way which does not offend the local population. They also 
may serve in providing their good service to those in internment or detention belonging to 
Taliban or other opposing forces. 
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2. 1.10 CONDUCT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 
All the aforementioned categories of military personnel are obliged to conduct military 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict.
216
 
Violation of the laws and customs of war shall not deprive a combatant of his or her right to 
be considered a combatant or, if he or she falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his or 
her right to be a prisoner of war.
217
 The only exception to this principle is provided by Article 
44, paragraph 4 of AP I when a combatant forfeits his or her right to be a prisoner of war. 
218
 
According to Article 45 of AP I, “when (...) any doubt arise as to whether any such 
person is entitled to the status of prisoner of war, he shall continue to have such status and, 
therefore, to be protected by the Third Convention and this Protocol until such time as his 
status has been determined by a competent tribunal”219. This provision follows the principle 
stated by Article 5 of GC III, which says that “if any doubt arises as to whether persons, 
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to 
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the 
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal.” Although the clear meaning of both articles should not raise any doubts, in practice, 
this might be the contrary. More detailed discussions on the concept of a competent tribunal 
are given in the section devoted to the situation of detainees during a non-international armed 
conflict. 
 
2. 1.11 THE CONCEPT OF UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS 
The concept of an “unlawful combatant” was coined by the US Supreme Court during 
the ex-parte Quirin case of 1942. This case was related to eight Nazi saboteurs who entered  
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the United States during the World War II. During their trial, they challenged their detention 
and denial of prisoners-of-war protection. The Court held that: “by universal agreement and 
practice, the law of war draws a distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful 
combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military 
forces. Unlawful combatants are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts 
which render their belligerency unlawful”. 220  Although Quirin relied on the notion of 
‘unlawful combatant[cy]’ as the basis of criminal liability, the meaning of the term is not clear 
enough both in the positive law of war existing at the time of the case, as well as in the 
current, treaty-based law of war.
221
  
Nowadays, the situation by no mean clearer. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, humanitarian law foresees only two categories of participants in an armed conflict: 
civilians and combatants. As a result, killing an opponent in an international armed conflict by 
a combatant is not a crime or violation of the law of war. Such a killing may be an unjustified 
violation of applicable domestic law during non-international armed conflict, but certainly is 
not a war crime.
222
 Consequently, the concept of an unlawful combatant blurs the line 
between a concept of status and culpability. The lack of lawful combatant in non-international 
armed conflict is not a crime. It only may expose the individual to domestic criminal sanction 
for the acts or omissions in which he or she was engaged during the armed conflict.
223
 
This consideration indicates that, under current positive and treaty law, it is difficult to 
establish the existence of any other category of participants in an armed conflict, both 
international and non-international, other than civilians and combatants. As such, Taliban 
fighters or other organized groups are to be considered within the scope of only these two 
notions, combatant or civilian. Consequently, in both case scenarios, they deserve the 
protection envisaged under International Humanitarian Law. The term of an unlawful 
combatant, enemy combatant
224
, unprivileged combatant, although used in some military 
manuals or handbooks, do not constitute any legal definition.
225
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2. 1.12 AL QAIDA AND TALIBAN FIGHTER STATUS  
This evaluation raises the question regarding legal regime applicable toward Al Qaida 
detainees. As discussed above, only Article 3 and customary law are applicable toward Al 
Qaida operatives. In such a situation, it is well founded to exclude applicability of III Geneva 
Convention with respect to the status of both POW and combatants.
226
  
The Taliban fighters captured prior to the Bohn Agreement belonged to the category 
outlined in GC III Article 4(A) 3 which says “members of regular armed forces who profess 
allegiance to a government or an authority [are] not recognised by the Detaining Power”. As a 
result, Taliban fighters were fully entitled to be considered as combatants and, consequently, 
to prisoner-of-war status during the period before the Bonn Agreement. In case of any doubt, 
their status should be determined by the competent tribunal. After the establishment of 
Karzai’s government, they were protected by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. 
In terms of the US (before and after Bonn agreement), it clearly shows practices 
contrary to that distinguished by the legal situation. On 7 February 2002, the US declared that 
members of the Taliban taken prisoner in Afghanistan would not be considered prisoners of 
war under the Third Geneva Convention as they were “unlawful combatants” and they did not 
satisfy the requirements under GC III Article 4.
227
  
 
2. 1.13. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) TREATMENT –  FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES  
When in captivity, combatants-prisoners of war should receive protection guaranteed 
by the Geneva Conventions which provide a minimal standard of personal security. This 
discussion is of particular importance from the perspective of the policy regarding treatment 
of detainees in a modern conflict such as in Afghanistan. Such a conflict is a good example of 
how it is complicated to apply a certain legal regime towards participants. At the beginning, 
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the conflict in Afghanistan was international and later it evolved into a non-international 
armed conflict. Such evolution clearly affects the status of participants and their treatment. 
This discussion on fundamental guarantees will constitute a point of departure before 
engaging in discussion regarding the treatment of captives in both types of conflicts. A clear 
stipulation of prisoners-of-war rights also enables us to compare these rights to the legal 
framework governing the treatment of detainees in non-international armed conflicts. It also 
allows, in some cases, to point out examples violations of humanitarian law by parties of the 
conflict. 
 
2. 1.14. EVACUATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD  
Every combatant during an international armed conflict when captured becomes a 
prisoner of war. It means that combatants from the time they fall into the power of the 
enemy
228
 should be treated humanely in accordance to regulations envisaged in GC III. This 
convention shall apply to such persons “from the time they fall into the power of the enemy 
and until their final release and repatriation”.229 
According to Article 19 of the GC III, “prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as 
possible, after their capture to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for 
them to be out of danger”.230 It is one of the basic principles securing rights of the prisoners of 
war. Without efficient hors de combat evacuation from the battlefield, it is difficult to ensure 
due treatment of the prisoners of war. 
In the event the POW is sick or wounded, which may affect the mobility of the unit 
operating in the enemy rear area, general principles of humane treatment are applicable.
 231
 
The principle stating that prisoners of war should be evacuated as soon as possible does not 
apply to those prisoners “who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being 
evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger 
zone”.232 While awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone POW “shall not be unnecessarily 
exposed to danger”.233 
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2. 1.15. INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 
When combatants fall into the hands of the Detaining Power, the “Detaining Power 
may subject prisoners of war to internment”234, and prisoners of war “may be interned only in 
premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness”. With 
the exception, in particular cases, which are justified by the interest of the prisoners 
themselves, that they shall not be interned in penitentiaries. Prisoners of war interned in 
unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as 
possible to a more favourable climate. The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war 
in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality, language and customs, provided 
that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces 
with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with their consent.”235 
The location of the prisoners of war shall be indicated by the letters PW or PG, placed so as to 
be clearly visible from the sky.
236
 Additionally, prisoners of war “shall have shelters against 
air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the same extent as the local civilian population 
(...).
237
 
 
2. 1.17 INTERROGATION 
Prisoners of war, when in captivity, may be questioned. In such a situation, they are 
“bound to give only their surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, 
personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information”.238 The prisoner of war may 
be questioned on other issues, however under no circumstances “physical or mental torture, 
nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them 
information”.239 Additionally, “prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, 
insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind”.240  
The protection of prisoners of war against forceful extraction of information is not a 
recent development. The Lieber Code of 1863 forbade the “use of any violence against 
prisoners in order to extort the desired information”.241 Surprisingly, similar protection was 
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not provided by the Regulations as an appendix to the Second Hague Convention of 1899 as 
well as the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. Both were imposing obligations to give name 
and rank only of prisoners of war, but none of these regulations obliged the detaining power 
to follow this principle
242
. This omission was rectified by the 1929 Geneva Convention. 
Protection of prisoners of war in this respect was confirmed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
It must be borne in mind that the Geneva Conventions do not prohibit interrogation of 
prisoners of war. Every attempt to obtain information of a military value is not contrary to the 
III Geneva Convention. States always try to obtain military information from prisoners and 
such efforts are not forbidden.
243
 This is also true for using trickery or similar methods.
244
 
However, there is a thin line between the situation where prisoners of war may “be threatened, 
insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind”245 and non-
violent multiple interrogation techniques.  
Currently, there are many widely available books, manuals and demonstration videos 
which provide guidance on interrogation techniques. What is particularly concerning is the 
fact of continuity in disregarding the letter of the Geneva Conventions by some governments. 
It is not difficult to find materials from the 50’s and the 60’s of the XX century which are 
disputable under IHL methods. For example, a Interrogation Techniques training film 
provided by the US Army TF 30/3986 refers not only to trickery but also to threat and rescue 
or monotony and repetition methods.
246
 This system was developed into the so-called 
enhanced interrogation techniques such as water boarding, sleep deprivation, isolation and 
exposure to extreme temperatures, enclosure in tiny spaces, bombardment with agonizing 
sounds at extremely damaging decibel levels, and religious and sexual humiliation so 
commonly used against several individuals.
247
 These enhanced methods were primarily 
intended to interrogate participants of non-international armed conflict, terrorist or persons 
whom the United States government did not consider as protected under the regulations of 
POW status. What constitutes a legal and moral dilemma is the issue of acceptance of an 
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unlawful, under international law, approach by the government of the one of the most 
recognized democracies. It is rather unlikely that such methods of interrogation, so commonly 
used against non-prisoners of war, were not being used against lawful POWs in international 
armed conflicts.  
 
2. 1.18 LIFE CONDITIONS  
The obligation to provide decent living conditions has been considered a customary 
principle since the beginning of the twentieth century. During the Boer War, the actions of the 
British Government in transporting Boer prisoners to unhealthy climate locations were highly 
criticized both in Britain and by the international community.
248
 Lack of acceptance of such 
unfavourable treatment was confirmed in 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions. As a result, 
Article 25 of GC III states expressis verbis that prisoners of war shall be quartered under 
conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the detaining power stationed in the same 
area.
249
 It means that prisoners should be located in suitable hygienic conditions that are 
heated and lighted. Of course, it may raise the question of assimilation to the diverse living 
conditions to which armed forces are accustomed. According to Pictet commentary, 
“allowance must be made for the habits and customs of the prisoners”.250 However, it is 
unreasonable to expect that soldiers from a country located in a moderate climate and 
transported by their government to fight on the territory of an equatorial nation may require 
the detaining power to remove them from that area so that they are interned in climate to 
which they are accustomed.
251
  
The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep 
prisoners of war in good health.
252
 What is important is that the habitual diet of the prisoners 
should be taken into account.
253
 It would contradict the Geneva Law regulations to feed 
prisoners in a way which is offensive to them. Providing pork to a Muslim or Jewish prisoners 
may be given as an example. Interestingly, “the use of tobacco shall be permitted”.254  
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2. 1.19 HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION  
During internment, prisoners are entitled to stay in clean and sanitary facilities. According to 
Article 29 of GC III, all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and 
healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics should be imposed. Among these measures, 
which the Detaining Power should take in regard to prisoners of war, are examination upon 
entry into the camp thorough disinfection and inoculation with all necessary vaccinations.
255
  
Prisoners in detention should receive medical treatment during internment. Every camp 
should be facilitated with an adequate infirmary where prisoners may receive the attention 
they require.
256
 If necessary, isolation wards shall be set aside for cases of contagious disease 
or mental illness.
257
  
The situation of Taliban prisoners after their fall into hands of General Dostum in late 
2001 is an example of a brutal violation of the above-mentioned principles. More than 2000 
prisoners were killed inside closed metal shipping containers after surrendering to Dostum's 
militia. Prisoners were kept in containers and were reportedly not given any food or water for 
up to three days. Witnesses say that many of the men suffocated and that others were killed 
when guards fired shots into the containers.
258
 
 
2. 1.20 OBSERVANCE OF RELIGION   
Observance of religion by prisoners of war is secured by two factors. The first one is 
the right to enjoy religion in prisoner-of-war camps. During interment, according to Article 34 
of III GC, prisoners shall “enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, 
including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the 
disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities”.259 The principle of liberty in the 
exercise of religion was provided by Article 18 of the 1907 Hague Regulation for the first 
time. The same principle was again proclaimed by Article 16 of the 1929 Convention. 
The second factor is by chaplains who may provide a spiritual service for prisoners. 
According to Article 35, “chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy Power and who 
remain or are retained with a view to assisting prisoners of war, shall be allowed to minister to 
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them and to exercise freely their ministry amongst prisoners of war of the same religion”.260 A 
question may be raised with regard to the status of the Taliban mullah captured during an 
international phase of the armed conflict during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
in 2001 and 2002.
261
 Particularly when taking into consideration the political and military 
nature of their activity. 
 
 
2. 1.21. DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS  
Prisoners are obliged to follow disciplinary regulations. For example, “prisoners of 
war, with the exception of officers, must salute and show all officers of the Detaining Power 
external marks of respect provided by regulations relevant to their own forces”.262 
The use of weapons against prisoners who are escaping or attempting to escape “shall 
constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the 
circumstances”.263 
 
2. 1.21. MEDICAL PERSONNEL STATUS  
The status of medical personnel is different to that of combatant-prisoners of war. 
While combatants who fall into the hands of adverse party are considered captured, medical 
personnel and chaplains are considered retained.
264
 Medical personnel, who fall into the hands 
of the adverse Party, shall be retained only in so far as the state of health, the spiritual needs 
and the number of prisoners of war require.
265
 If the detaining state provides appropriate 
medical care and enough medical personnel then, according to Article 30 GC I and 37 of GC 
II, such medical staff “shall be returned to the Party to the conflict to whom they belong, as 
soon as a road is open for their return and military requirements permit”.266 
 
2. 1.22 RELATIONS OF PRISONERS OF WAR WITH THE EXTERIOR 
 Prisoners are entitled to contact with the outside world. They shall be allowed to 
inform and contact their relatives. According to Article 70 of GC III, “within not more than 
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one week after arrival at a camp, or detention location, every prisoner of war shall be enabled 
to write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency on 
the other hand (...) The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be 
delayed in any manner. On the other hand prisoners are allowed to receive cards”.267 The 
possibility of sending and receiving messages from relatives in custody is a matter of utmost 
importance, especially during non-international armed conflicts.
268
  
 
2. 1.23 RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AT THE CLOSE OF 
HOSTILITIES 
 When the war is over, prisoners shall be released and repatriated. According to Article 
118 of GC, it should take place without delay after cessation of active hostilities.
269
 Strict 
adherence to this principle may lead to some difficulties. For example, masses of prisoners of 
war, as so happened after the First World War, were logistically difficult to transport. After 
some conflicts, prisoners of war were unwilling to go back to their country of origin. Such a 
situation took place after the Second World War when pro-German, Ukrainian Units were 
forced to return to USSR where most soldiers were killed or sent to Gulag camps.
270
 
This situation is more complex when the conflict evolves from an international to a 
non-international one. For example, Taliban fighters were kept in custody long after cessation 
of major hostilities in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these hostilities, after a period of several 
years of relative peace, broke out with double the force in 2005 when some of them were still 
in custody. A similar, unclear situation took place in Iraq. On 1 May 2003, President Bush 
delivered a televised address where he stated that it was the end of major combat operations in 
Iraq. Shortly after this speech, fierce insurgency broke out across Iraq and lasted until 2009.
 The treatment of prisoners of war constitutes a point of departure for the discussion 
regarding the treatment of persons engaged in an international and non-international armed 
conflict who do not possess combatant status. Additionally, the lack of equality of treatment 
between combatants and belligerents without combatant status raises a question regarding the 
observance of IHL by the latter category.  
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2.2. TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT  
The manner in which participants of the armed conflict in Afghanistan are detained by 
NATO armed forces presents a significant legal challenge for political decision-makers and 
military commanders on the ground. Detention policy constitutes not only a legal but also a 
practical challenge during non-international armed conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan. In 
non-international armed conflicts, protection of those who fall into the hands of opponents is 
even more difficult than in an international conflict due to the domestic and emotionalized 
nature of the conflict.
271
 
The aim of modern military operations, as presented in Chapter 4 on the relations 
between counterinsurgency and humanitarian law, is not to kill as many insurgents as possible 
but to create a secure environment where a governmental structure may become functional. 
So, the paradigm of modern military operations has switched from killing to capturing. 
Detention became one of the key elements of counterinsurgency and of a stabilization 
operation. In Afghanistan, detention operations are conducted by a multi-national coalition.
272
 
European NATO members are bound by a different set of legal norms than their US 
counterparts. Additionally, the local, Afghan forces do not guarantee observance of 
fundamental rights towards detainees. This raises the question of interoperability with the 
local justice system, which often is far from perfection. 
In this section, the legal framework applicable to detention operations will be 
examined and the relation between human rights and humanitarian law applicable to the 
conflict in Afghanistan will also be discussed. Practical issues related to the detention 
operation will also be addressed, such as collecting intelligence data as an important element 
of military operations and as a source of possible violations of IHL. Furthermore, I shall 
consider the existing case law related to detention operations. In the summary of this section, 
some suggestions will be provided how NATO member countries should handle detainees as 
well the conclusions of de lege ferenda character in terms of existing humanitarian law.
273
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2.2.1 APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW –  DETENTION UNDER 
COMMON ARTICLE 3 AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II 
During a non-international armed conflict, parties are particularly tempted not to grant 
any protected status toward detainees. The detained individuals recognized as POWs in an 
international armed conflict should not be compelled to provide any other information than 
their rank, date of birth and ID number. They also should be released and repatriated without 
delay after cessation of hostilities. During a non-international armed conflict, detainees have 
no similar protection. For some participants in the conflict, it creates a situation for possible 
violation of extracting information from detainees.
274
 Additionally, there is no obligation to 
release and repatriate them after cessation of hostilities. This is not only related to the nature 
of the conflict, often one with low intensity, without a clear beginning and indication of the 
end of the conflict, but also to the geographical aspect of the conflict.  
Under Common Article 3, a status of neither prisoner of war nor combatant is granted 
to participants of a non-international armed conflict. According to Common Article 3, only 
two groups of participants exist, i.e. protected civilians and civilians who lose their protection 
if they directly participate in hostilities.
275
 Under Common Article 3, “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their 
arms and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”.276 
Article 3 is silent not only on a legal basis for detention, but also provides little on the 
minimum treatment of detainees. It provides only an open category which says that all those 
who do not take part in hostilities should be treated humanely. There are no regulations on the 
right to challenge or review detention.
277
 Common Article 3 is also silent on question of the 
transfer of detainees. 
278
 Some scholars claim that requirements for humane treatment no 
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longer satisfy humanitarian needs emerging from practice of IHL during a NIAC. They 
conclude the need to draw upon human rights law when devising procedural principles and 
safeguards to regulate interment during a NIAC or the need to refer to the applicable law 
during international armed conflicts.
279
 
Additional Protocol II, which expands upon Common Article 3, in Article 4 states that, 
“all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, 
whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour 
and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction”.280  
  Additional Protocol II, as stipulated by Common Article 3, ensures neither the status 
of the combatant nor the prisoner of war. However, unlike Article 3, AP II provides several 
fundamental guarantees particularly related toward detainees and internees. According to AP 
II Article 5, “Persons whose liberty has been restricted (...) interned or detained; (a) (...) shall 
be treated in accordance with Article 7 i.e. humanely (b) (...) shall, to the same extent as the 
local civilian population, be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded 
safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and 
the dangers of the armed conflict; (c) (...) shall be allowed to receive individual or collective 
relief; 
(d) (...) shall be allowed to practise their religion and, if requested and appropriate, to receive 
spiritual assistance from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious functions; 
(e) they shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions and safeguards similar 
to those enjoyed by the local civilian population”.  
 To summarize, a person when interned during a NIAC, must be at least informed in a 
language he or she understands of the reason for which measures were taken. He or she 
should be subject to effective control of an independent and impartial judicial body before 
which he or she may challenge such interment and obtain release.
281
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2.2. 2 LIFE CONDITIONS  
Article 5(2) of AP II also defines life conditions. It says that “those who are 
responsible for the internment or detention of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall also, 
within the limits of their capabilities, respect the following provisions relating to such 
persons: (a) except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women 
shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the immediate 
supervision of women; (b) they shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the 
number of which may be limited by competent authority if it deems necessary; (c) places of 
internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat zone. The persons referred 
to in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated when the places where they are interned or detained 
become particularly exposed to danger arising out of the armed conflict, if their evacuation 
can be carried out under adequate conditions of safety; (d) they shall have the benefit of 
medical examinations; (e) their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be 
endangered by any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the 
persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the state 
of health of the person concerned, and which is not consistent with the generally accepted 
medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical circumstances. 3. Persons 
who are not covered by paragraph 1 but whose liberty has been restricted in any way 
whatsoever for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be treated humanely in accordance 
with Article 4 and with paragraphs 1 (a), (c) and (d), and 2 (b) of this Article”. As such, AP II 
provides minimal standards regarding the safeguard of detained persons.  
 
 
 
2.2. 3. DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS AND THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DETENTION 
According to Article 6 of AP II, basic guarantees are provided toward detainees who 
may face criminal responsibility related to the armed conflict. It states that “no sentence shall 
be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except 
pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of 
independence and impartiality. In particular: (a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to 
be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall 
afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence; (b) no 
one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility; (c) 
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no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the 
criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by 
law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby; 
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law; (e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence; 
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.” This article 
duplicates some provisions of Article 75 of AP I. These guarantees are applicable to a conflict 
regulated by Common Article 3 and AP II as they are considered customary law.
282
  
Article 5 of AP II deals with persons whose liberty has been limited. According to Article 
5(3) of AP II, “a convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other 
remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised. 
4. The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen 
years at the time of the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers of 
young children. 5. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant 
the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or 
detained.” What is important is that Article 5 of AP II does not address the grounds on which 
a person may detained during a non-international armed conflict and does not address the 
issue of review of such interment. 
283
 
 
2.2. 4. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS APPLICATION DURING AN ARMED 
CONFLICT  
An interesting issue is how and to what extent these two branches of law interconnect 
with each other during armed conflicts. Particularly when we take into consideration the 
words of humanitarian law and human rights. Humanitarian law applies to all parties of the 
conflict, whereas human rights applies mostly to the relation between the state and citizens. 
Even when we adopt a horizontal approach to human rights, it is difficult to find armed 
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groups who address the whole system of human rights.
284
 This is so even when part of the 
organization allows them to exercise government authority regarding obligations under 
human rights. On the other hand, it does not exempt agents of the state following human 
rights even during times of armed conflict.  
Historically, these two branches of law share different backgrounds. Humanitarian law 
was developed within the sphere of international public law, often customary in nature, 
whereas human rights were more of a constitutional, domestic character.
285
 Human rights 
entered the field of public international law only after the Second World War. However, at 
this early stage, the relationship between IHL and IHRL was not examined. Gross violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law during armed conflicts in the 1960s led to more holistic 
approach. The 1968 Tehran Human Rights Convention raised the issue of how both legal 
regimes remain interrelated.
286
 According to Doswald-Beck and Vite, it was the turning point 
from which humanitarian law and human rights began to draw closer.
287
 The development of 
Additional Protocol also paid tribute to human rights.
288
 
The most general explanation of the relation between human rights and humanitarian 
law is resolved by the Latin maxim “lex specialis derogat legi generali”. This universal legal 
principle states that humanitarian law as lex specialis derogate human rights. As a result of 
this approach, human rights may, under some circumstances, apply both during a time of 
peace and a time of armed conflict. This position was confirmed in several opinions and 
judgments of international bodies. For example, the International Court of Justice in the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of 1996 said, “The Court observes that the protection of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except 
by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from 
in a time of national emergency”.289 The lex specialis character of humanitarian law was 
confirmed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of Coard vs. 
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United States
290
 and by the International Court of Justice in the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall Opinion, where the Court said, “the protection offered by human 
rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict”.291  
The primary issue related to the relationship between humanitarian law and human 
rights was, and is, to what extent these two systems supplement each other. Especially as 
some states, for example the United States and Israel, support the radical view that 
humanitarian law replaces human rights during armed conflict.
292
 The International Court of 
Justice addressed this saying that that these two systems may, under some conditions, 
influence and supplement each other. The Court also stated that in “the relationship between 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: 
some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be 
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of 
international law.”293 Marco Sassoli elaborated upon this with a proposal of following types 
of relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
namely in the situation where: IHL deals with questions not covered by IHRL, IHRL prevails 
over an applicable rule of IHRL, IHL more precisely specifies a rule of IHRL, IHRL specifies 
or interprets a rule of IHL, IHRL has revised a rule of IHL, IHRL deals, even in armed 
conflict, exclusively with questions not covered by IHL.
294
 As to the first situation, Sassoli 
suggests the issue of who has the right to directly participate in hostilities, and that what 
constitutes such participation is an exclusive matter for IHL.
295
 In the second situation, he 
rightly points out that application of POW detention without judicial supervision under GC 
III, based merely on the fact of being a member of enemy armed forces, does not contradict 
Article 5 of the ECHR. He also rightly indicates that detention which occurs during non-
international armed conflicts does not deprive a person fundamental rights secured by Article 
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5 of ECHR and Article 9 of ICCPR.
296
 The third case applies to the situation where IHL is 
more specific than IHRL. It occurs when, for example, both IHL and IHRL refers to the 
situation of arbitrary depravation of life, but only IHL specifies what is arbitrary.
297
 Another 
situation occurs when IHRL helps to specify or interpret a rule of IHL. For example, Common 
Article 3 requires a “judgment ... affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples”. Aside from the fact that the wording of civilized peoples 
is outdated, IHL says little on what constitute such guarantees. In this respect, human rights 
provide, as lex specilis established, an interpretation of the concept of fair trial.
298
 Similarly, it 
is human rights that provide a rich jurisprudence on what constitutes torture and inhumane 
treatment.
299
 In the fifth situation, Sassoli discusses the event of when human rights law 
revises IHL. For example, Article 118 of Convention III obliges states to repatriate POWs 
without delay at the end of active hostilities. Nowadays, the principle of non-refoulment as ius 
cogens prevails over IHL.
300
 In the sixth situation, Sassoli addresses the issue of human rights 
dealing exclusively with questions that are not covered by humanitarian law. For example, he 
refers to the situation of admissible degree of use of force against civilians who do not 
directly participate in hostilities. Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV and the law of NIAC 
prohibits attacks against such persons. The question is then how to react in the event of 
ordinary crimes or public disturbances. This is of particular importance since modern 
conflicts, such as the conflict in Afghanistan, have both a military and policing aspect. During 
police-type operations, a greater number of restrictions should be imposed, for example, 
regulating the use of firearms.
301
 This should apply despite the fact that, according to Tadic, 
the case of the principle of non-international armed conflict applies to the whole territory of a 
state. It is a matter of fact that within the realm of NIAC not only military, but also police 
means and methods, must be applied.  
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Melzer simplifies this detailed reasoning saying that human rights applicability during an 
armed conflict is justified when humanitarian law does not provide any rule at all, and where 
there is no sufficient guidance which can be derived from the general principles of IHL.
302
  
One must remember that human rights treaties contain provisions that allow states to derogate 
from some of the guarantees thereby contained.
303
 It may take place in situations which are 
strictly necessary to counter threats to the existence of the state during a national emergency 
or an armed conflict.
304
 For example, Article 15 of the ECHR says that “in time of war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take 
measures derogating from its obligation under the Convention to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law.” 305  Article 15 refers to two situations of war 
referring to an international armed conflict and an emergency which is wide enough to cover 
tensions, disturbance and armed conflict. However, there are several rights from which can 
never be derogated. Although it depends which treaty is in question, usually the group of non-
derivable rights are: the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, the right to respect for 
physical integrity and the right not to be subjected to torture or cruelty, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.
306
 Article 7 of the European Convention also prohibits punishment without law.  
International humanitarian law as lex specialis does not replace or otherwise supplant 
international human rights law and the obligations that come therefore, but rather only 
replaces certain derivable provisions of human rights law that may be inconsistent with 
international humanitarian law.
307
 During modern armed conflicts, human rights and 
humanitarian law often overlaps.
308
 However, as Sassoli rightly points out, reference to the 
human rights by implementing institutions should take into account the limitations resulting 
from military conflict and adapt their requirements to the situation. Simply for example, the 
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case law defining the maximum lengths of detention without being presented to the court in a 
non-conflict situation is difficult to apply during armed conflict.
309
  
 
2.2. 5. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
This important issue arises from duality of the law applied by the members of  
the NATO coalition. The USA, as a major player in Afghanistan, is not bound by the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence rendered by the European 
Tribunal of Human Rights, whereas, for example, the UK and Poland are. This leads to the 
situation where violation of the law during military operations can occur. For the sake of 
clarity, in this chapter I will attempt to address the concept of extraterritorial application of 
human rights. I will also address the issue of how the applicability of human rights affects the 
treatment of fighters and participants of a conflict such the one in Afghanistan.  
Many human rights documents, such as the American Convention on Human Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 1, state that the state parties must secure the 
rights to everyone within their jurisdiction. The question is, what does it mean to be within 
their jurisdiction? 
The European Court of Human Rights, over the years, developed its position on the 
concept of extraterritorial application of human rights. One of the first cases which referred to 
the concept of exterritorial applicability of the ECHR was brought by the Court in the 1992 
decision of W. v. Denmark.
310
 In this case, the Court stated that a State may be held 
accountable for a violation of rights guaranteed under the European Convention of Human 
Rights (European Convention) of individuals who are in the territory of another State but who 
are under the authority or control of a signatory.
311
 In this case, the applicant was trying to 
escape fromEast Germany (German Democratic Republic) and to move to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. He entered the premises of the Danish Embassy in (East) Berlin in 
1988. At the request of the Danish ambassador, the East German police not only entered the 
Embassy, but also took the applicant away. Ultimately, he was sentenced to conditional 
imprisonment after spending 33 days in detention. He complained that his right to liberty and 
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security was violated when he was handed over to the East German police.
312
 According to 
the European Commission of Human Rights, authorised agents of states activities affected the 
applicant who was under the jurisdiction of the Danish authorities.
313
 
This decision was followed by Loizidou v. Turkey
314
, where the applicant complained 
that her property rights had been breached as a result of the continued occupation and control 
of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkish armed forces which had prevented her from gaining 
access to her home and other properties there. The applicant claimed that it represented a 
continuing violation of her rights protected under the Convention, i.e. Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention, as well as Article 8. The Court said that the State’s responsibility 
might also arise when as a consequence of military action - whether lawful or unlawful - the 
state exercised an effective control over an area outside its national territory. The States’ 
obligation to secure in such areas the Convention rights and freedoms derive from the fact that 
the states exercise an effective control there, whether it is done directly, through the State’s 
armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.
315
 
Extraterritorial aspects of the European Convention on Human rights was considered 
in some other cases. In the Bankovic case, the European Court presented its strictest 
approach.
316
 It said that a state must exercise effective control over territory by being 
physically present there in order to have jurisdiction.
 317
 This strict approach has changed over 
the years and the court has provided different standard. In 2004, the Court rendered a 
judgment in the Issa and others v Turkey case, where, according to the applicants, Iraqi 
nationals, a group of their relatives, shepherds from an Iraqi province near the Turkish border, 
were killed and severely mutilated by Turkish soldiers.
318
 In this case, the ECHR recalled that 
the concept of “jurisdiction” under the Convention and said that it was not restricted to the 
national territory of the Contracting Parties. “In exceptional circumstances the acts of 
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Contracting States performed outside their territory, or which produce effects there, may 
amount to exercise by them, their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention”.319 This case confirmed that the ECHR was rather referring to the concept of so-
called effective territorial control
320
 than previous physical control. According to the Court, 
the following indicators of effective control were 1) the number of soldiers on the ground, 2) 
the size of the area controlled, 3) the degree of control exercised, and 4) duration of the 
exercise of control. 
Further development of this line of reasoning by the ECHR was provided in the 
judgment Pad v Turkey, where seven Iranians were killed by aTurkish gunship.
321
 According 
to the Court, the mere fact that victims were in the range of fire discharged from the 
helicopter means that they were within the jurisdiction of Turkey.
322
 The conclusion of the 
Pad Case contradicts the Bankovic Case where the court found that jurisdiction could not 
arise by the simple fact of dropping bombs on individuals.
323
 
The issue of effective control and exterritorial application of the Convention was also 
brought before the European Court of Human Rights in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and 
Russia. The Court observed that, although in Banković and Others, it emphasised the 
preponderance of the territorial principle in the application of the Convention and it also 
acknowledged that the concept of “jurisdiction”, within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention, is not necessarily restricted to the national territory of the High Contracting 
Parties”.324  
Finally, the issue of extraterritoriality of human rights was brought before the 
European Court in Al-Skeini. As the Court stated, “UK forces were operating in Iraq with the 
consent of the Iraqi government, and there was a presumption that a domestic (UK) statute 
connecting international human rights treaty obligations would be applicable to UK forces' 
operations in Iraq (...) What this decision implied was that members of the military forces 
were responsible for the protection of human rights of individuals under their control even 
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outside the domestic territory of these armed forces, and that this duty or obligation cannot be 
abrogated by the execution of any agreement as between the operating military forces and the 
State in which they operate”.325 
 The Al- Skeini judgment confirms the situation in which the level of control exercised 
by a State may be sufficient to render its human rights obligations, related to the treatment of 
detainees, extraterritorially.  
Accountability in such situations stemmed from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention 
could not be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention 
on the territory of another State which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.
326
 The 
Court found that as a result of the military incursion by Turkish military forces into Iraq, the 
Turkish military forces had established, albeit briefly, control over a portion of Iraq, and as a 
result, incurred obligations for the abuse of human rights that may have taken place during 
that timeframe.
327
  
 The provided case law clearly indicated two aspects of the applicability of the ECHR. 
Firstly, it is applicable during an armed conflict and, secondly, it is applicable 
extraterritorially. Under the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, it also applies to 
an occupied territory.
328
  
In this context, it is important to bear in mind that not only the European Convention 
of Human Rights may be applicable extraterritorially but also the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
329
, which applies both in times of peace and in times of 
armed conflict
330
. In its General Comment No. 31 of 29 March 2004, the Human Rights 
Committee says, “The Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules 
of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect to certain Covenant rights, 
more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be especially relevant for the 
purposes of the interpretation of the Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, 
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not mutually exclusive.”331 The Human Rights Committee on several other occasions called 
upon to apply the ICCPR to situations of military occupation, for example, it urged Israel 
toward Palestinian territory and Iraq toward Kuwait territory.
332
 This approach is confirmed in 
the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Palestinian Wall.
333
  
The application of human rights and the ICCPR may not be evaded by transferring 
detainees outside the national borders of the State concerned (for example, to Guantanamo 
naval base on leased Cuban territory).
334
 According to the General Comment on ICCPR “A 
State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the 
power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the 
State Party”. 335  And, also as said in the Committee’s General Comment No. 15, “the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be 
available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum-seekers, 
refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or 
subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.”336 
Another situation where a human rights regime is applicable is when a state deploys its 
armed forces in a foreign country in response to a “friendship invitation”, i.e. the Soviet’s 
invitation to Czechoslovakia in 1968 or to Afghanistan in 1979. This would appear to be an 
appropriate characterization of the situation of the Coalition forces in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq after the restoration of power to the local authorities. It results in their human rights 
obligations being fully applicable in relation to individuals detained by them (the invited 
country) in those States (host states).
337
  
The Inter-American Court and Commission for Human Rights have adopted a broad 
view of what gave ground for a state to execute exterritorial jurisdiction. By providing a 
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negative definition, it stated that it is not necessary to have troops on the ground or to exercise 
physical control to reach a required level of jurisdiction over the territory.
338
 
This is because most human rights treaties oblige the State Parties to guarantee to all 
persons under their jurisdiction that rights and freedoms provided by these treaties will be 
freely and fully exercised.
339
 This notion means that States are bound to secure rights and 
freedoms of all persons, not only within their own territory, but also abroad. It means that 
during proceedings against a presumed accused or a party, the nationality or the presence 
within some particular area is not as important as whether the State observes the rights of a 
person due to its authority and control over a particular individual.
340
  
To summarize, human rights are applicable during armed conflict. They are also 
applicable extraterritorially. This means that both European countries which are bound by the 
ECHR and ICCPR and non-European countries, such as the United States, which are bound 
by ICCPR and regional documents, have to follow it. There little doubt that law in Europe 
provides the highest standard in terms of observance of human rights. It is particularly 
important to be aware of these differences in a multinational military environment.  
 
2.2. 6 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLICABLE TO DETENTION  
The situation of persons who have been deprived of their liberty is not only regulated 
by humanitarian law but is also by human rights law. The right to liberty is the cornerstone of 
modern democracies. During an armed conflict, depravation of liberty is one of the most 
common violation of human rights. Detention during international armed conflict is fairly 
well-regulated. The issues arise from a detention situation during non-international armed 
conflicts. As we have discussed the application of extraterritorial human rights above, it is 
important to refer to how a detention situation is regulated under international and regional 
human rights instruments.  
The situation of detainees is regulated by both international human rights instruments 
and regional treaties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 9, stipu-
lates, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile”. Although the 
Universal Declaration has no legal binding force, many provisions have acquired the status of 
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customary rules.
341
 For example, the prohibition of torture has obtained universal, ius cogens 
character.
342
 Additionally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is 
Article 9, paragraph 1, which stipulates, “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established 
by law.” Article 9, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR stipulates, “Anyone arrested or detained on a 
criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It 
shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial.” Prolonged pre-trial detention without 
bail is thus incompatible with Article 9 and requires specific justification and periodic review.  
With regard to the regional documents from the perspective of Polish and British engagement, 
the CHR, Article 5, plays an important role. It provides basic guarantees such as, “Everyone 
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. It also provides 
guarantees which may apply during military non-international armed conflicts such as, “1)
 the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 2) the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 3) 
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.c of this article 
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release 
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty 
by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his 
detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not 
lawful. 5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” 
This basic reference clearly indicates the existence of legal norms regulating the 
situation of detainees during an international armed conflict. The problem is that modern 
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conflicts are fought in a non-international environment or in situations when armed forces of 
the detaining power are operating on foreign soil. 
 
2.2. 7. APPLICABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN –  PRACTICAL ISSUES  
The issue which became a focal point during multinational military operations lies in 
cooperation with states which do not follow European legal standards regarding human rights. 
In the case of Afghanistan, this is the cooperation of US forces within ISAF and the host 
nation forces i.e. Afghan military forces and police.  
General concerns regarding US forces lies with the declared approach of the US 
government. The Bush administration stated that so-called enemy combatants are not covered 
by human rights, but exclusively by the law of war. This means that only very limited 
protection for them is available since, as stated above, an unlawful combatant is not a legally-
binding concept and defies a person of protection of being a combatant or civilian under 
IHL.
343
  
The Afghanistan National Directorate of Security (NDS) is one of the intelligence 
institutions responsible for both civil and military intelligence. It operates in relative secrecy, 
often without adequate judicial supervision. With regard to NDS activities, there have been 
reports of prolonged detention without trial, extortion, torture and systematic due-process 
violations. Complaints of serious human rights violations committed by the NDS 
representatives, including arbitrary arrest, illegal detention and torture, are common.
344
 NDS 
activity is only one of many examples of violation of human rights in Afghanistan conducted 
by the local Afghan forces.  
Although this thesis is focused solely on legal challenges resulting from military 
operation in Afghanistan, I will refer in this part to the procedure and situation of detainees in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and the detainees in US custody. These examples will clearly show the 
practical challenges related to detention operations during modern armed conflicts.  
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2.2. 8. SITUATION OF DETAINEES IN US CUSTODY OUTSIDE IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN –  QUESTION OF COMPETENT TRIBUNAL UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF GCIII  
According to Article 5(2) of GC III, “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, 
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to 
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the 
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal”.  
The concept of a competent tribunal is not defined in Article 5(2) of the GC III or 
Article 45 of the API. A draft of Article 5 indicates that is should be a formal judicial tribunal-
like forum, though not necessarily a military forum, ideally composed of more than one 
person.
345
  
The status of Al Qaida operatives were rarely, particularly in places such as 
Guantanamo, determined by a competent tribunal. Often the reasoning behind the prolonged 
detention of Al Qaida members, without access to an impartial tribunal, would seem to be that 
the evidence collected against these individuals was not strong enough for criminal 
prosecutions.
346
 The lack of access toward an independent court was reviewed by the US 
Supreme Court in the Rasul v Bush case. According to the court, the detainees, held in 
Guantanamo bay, were entitled to impartial judicial review of their status. As a consequence, 
all held by the United States as “enemy combatants” whether they are or are not American 
citizens are entitled to challenge their detention in the US courts.
347
 To address this judgment, 
the US government established a quasi-court. Currently, the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal is in operation, which is supposed to serve as an impartial judicial body. However, 
some experts suggest that this tribunal operates on the basis of a presumption in favour of the 
evidence provided by the government.
348
 Moreover, there are other issues related to the 
quality of judgments or decisions rendered by the Combatant Status. Firstly, the Tribunal is 
composed of military personnel, i.e. of three military officers, one of whom must be a judge 
advocate. The detainees are not allowed to refer their case to a lawyer of their own choice but 
instead they may refer to an assigned military officer as personal representative.
349
 The 
tribunals in question, are not bound by the rules of procedure applicable in regular courts. 
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They deem to consider any relevant or helpful information including hearsay evidence.
350
 An 
important element which excludes the Review Tribunal from the scope of Article 5, exists in 
the Order which set up the Tribunal. Its aim was to establish whether the person falls within 
the category of the so-called “enemy combatant”, whereas Article 5 says that the aim of the 
Tribunal is to establish whether they fulfil the requirements of being considered as a 
combatant under Article 4 of GCIII.  As such, these tribunals are clearly not the equivalent of 
impartial and independent courts.  
Helpful in establishing whether the Combatant Status Review Tribunal fulfils the 
conditions envisaged by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, is Article 45 of 
Additional Protocol I which says that “a person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the 
power of an adverse Party shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war, (…) as his status has 
been determined by a competent tribunal”. Interestingly, the second paragraph of this Article 
says that “If a person who has fallen into the power of an adverse Party is not held as a 
prisoner of war and is to be tried by that Party for an offence arising out of the hostilities, he 
shall have the right to assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a judicial tribunal 
and to have that question adjudicated”. Therefore, in this situation two types of tribunals may 
be distinguished: one provided by Article 45(1), i.e. a competent tribunal, and the second 
provided in Article 45(2), i.e. a judicial tribunal. The latter must adjudicate the prisoner-of-
war status where the person is charged with an offence arising from hostilities and is not 
being held as a prisoner of war. The first one may be administrative in nature, including 
military commissions.
351
 
Important in determining doubtful POW status is a literal interpretation of Article 5(2) 
GC III, which states, “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons...”. In terms of Al Qaida 
operatives, there are two challenges: the first is of an objective character and the second of a 
procedural one. It is convincing that terrorist network participants, even during a military 
armed operation in Afghanistan, are not considered as doubtful POW. So, in their case, there 
is no “any doubt arises” premise fulfilled. The second observation of procedural character 
refers to the United Kingdom Privy Council consideration of Article 5 during the military 
                                                          
350
 D. Moeckli, op.cit., p. 95. 
351
 ICRC Commentary to Protocol I, p. 551, para. 1745. 
 96 
 
confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia. The Privy Council held that where the 
accused did not raise a doubt, no question of mistral arises.
352
  
 
2.2. 9 SITUATION OF DETAINEES IN US CUSTODY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
According to Greig, US policy regarding the treatment of detainees is to be divided 
into two different groups: one called a “security detainee” group and another called “criminal 
detainee.” The initial determination of the detainee category relays on Judge Advocates 
working at lower-level internment facilities.
353
 After this initial stage, if it is necessary to 
continue holding the individual and not release them, he or she is to be transferred to a major 
base such as Camp Cropper in Iraq, in order to be in-processed into one of the three 
internment facilities.
354
 Further, a so-called magistrate's cell
355
 (in the given case, in Camp 
Cropper) performs a second due-process review of the individual's case to again determine, if 
sufficient evidence exists, to hold the individual for security or criminal reasons.
356
 If no 
sufficient evidence exists, the magistrate's cell (MaiCell) could recommend the person be 
released.
357
 Upon the MaiCell decision, the individual would either be immediately released, 
forwarded to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq Liaison Office for prosecution (for a criminal 
detainee), or forwarded to the Combined Review and Release Board review section for 
continued internment for security reasons (for a security detainee).
358
 
This quite complex procedure poses a few challenges, particularly in terms of 
interoperability between the US forces and the European counterparts. European NATO 
members are part of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Convention for 
example: 
- forbids prolonged confinement359, 
- introduces a right to a speedy and fair trial, including the right to a public hearing 
before an independent and impartial tribunal within reasonable time
360
, 
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- prohibits torture.361  
Further complications arise when transferring detainees to host nation custody, i.e. 
when the detainee's rights under the ECHR might be violated by the receiving state. In such a 
situation, Convention members are prohibited from transferring the detainees.
362
 For instance, 
Iraq provides for and executes the death penalty. European countries, signatories to the ECHR 
which have ratified a protocol to the Convention prohibiting the death penalty in all 
circumstances, are prohibited by treaty from transferring detainees to Iraqi custody.
363
 Alleged 
violations of the ECHR can be brought to the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
Convention grants the right of compensation to anyone whose rights have been violated by a 
member state. 
364
 
Additionally, some European countries introduced law which affects their detention 
policy. For example, in 1998, the United Kingdom passed the Human Rights Act (HRA), 
which was intended “to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Essentially, it is domestic law 
reinforcement to the UK's obligations under the Convention.” The introduction of the HRA 
made it unlawful for any “public authority,” including the armed forces, to act in a way which 
is incompatible with the rights under the ECHR.
365
  
A possible defence presented by the public authority was based on the fact that the 
armed forces had acted in pursuit of a mandatory obligation imposed by parliament. In the 
case of Iraq, the UK House of Lords decided the HRA, in relation to the ECHR (an 
international obligation), was pre-empted by the UNSCR 1546 (another international 
obligation) through Article 103 of the UN Charter.
366
 As a result of such an approach, the 
UK's detention operations in Iraq did not fall under the jurisdiction of the ECHR nor the 
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HRA.
367
 The House of Lords' ruling does not seem to be the final word in this case. The 
European Court of Human Rights continues to issue rulings on British detainees and recently 
maintained that the transfer of British detainees to Iraqi custody was unlawful. 
368
 
In Afghanistan, Poland and the UK do not conduct long-term detention operations as 
part of the ISAF mission. To avoid accusations, UK forces do not transfer captured detainees 
to US detention facilities. In terms of relations with Afghanistan, the host nation security 
forces, they have agreed that UK forces will detain individuals only in limited circumstances 
and all detainees must be transferred to Afghan authorities “at the earliest opportunity.369 The 
safety of detainees is governed by the Memorandum of Understanding which allows visiting 
detention facilities not only by the ICRC but also by agents of UK forces.
370
  
 
2.2. 10 SITUATION OF DETAINEES HELD BY BRITISH AND POLISH FORCES - 
QUESTION OF MOU
371
 
To prevent such violations, the so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was 
concluded by several states such as the UK, Canada and Netherlands. On 23 April 2006, the 
MoU was entered into between the UK and the Government of Afghanistan. It concerned the 
transfer of persons detained in Afghanistan from UK armed forces to Afghan authorities
372
. 
There are three relevant NDS facilities, namely those in Kabul (a facility often referred to as 
“Department 17”, which is the investigating branch of the NDS in Kabul), in Kandahar (the 
capital of Kandahar province) and in Lashkar Gah
373
. In September 2007, an allegation was 
made by a UK transferee at NDS Lashkar Gah that he had been ill-treated while in detention 
there. The allegation was investigated by UK personnel, who reached the conclusion that it 
was unsubstantiated
374
. 
In November 2007, the UK rejected a call for a moratorium on transfers following the 
suspension of transfers by Canada (as a result of allegations of ill-treatment of Canadian 
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transferees) and the publication of a report by Amnesty International recording allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment of detainees by the NDS and recommending a moratorium.
375
 
  In March 2009 and subsequent months, in the course of visits by UK personnel to Pol­ 
i-Charki prison (carried out in order to check on UK transferees who had been transferred on 
by the NDS without prior notification to the UK), allegations were made by a number of 
transferees that they had been ill-treated while in detention at NDS facilities in the period of 
2007-2008. Most of the complaints were related to Kabul, but there were also complaints 
about Kandahar and Lashkar Gah. The circumstances in which these complaints were made, 
the investigation of them and the conclusions drawn are important features of the case. The 
allegations led to the imposition of an immediate moratorium on UK transfers to Kandahar (a 
moratorium on transfers to Kabul was already in place). Transfers to Lashkar Gah continued. 
The moratorium on transfers to Kandahar was lifted in February 2010 but no further transfers 
have, in fact, been made to that facility
376
. 
 Polish forces are operating within RC EAST area of responsibility as the Task Force 
White Eagle and they are accountable for safety and security of Ghazni province. Since the 
beginning of the Polish engagement into ISAF operation (Poland has been a part of ISAF 
since 2007 and before it was part of US Operation Enduring Freedom from 2002), the 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding treatment of detainees was not even discussed at 
any political or military level. In this legal environment, cooperation with Afghan and US 
forces may constitute a clear violation of the ECHR and lead to the possible international 
responsibility of Poland before the ECHR. 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
International Security and Assistance Forces in Afghanistan assignments were to secure peace 
and stability. Fundamental was to provide a proper treatment to detained insurgents. 
Continuous violations of IHL by some parties of NATO operation on one hand and disregard 
to IHL by some insurgent group on the other clearly illustrate how difficult is to comply with 
IHL in NIAC. As a result may be it is time to ask whether participants in NIAC should be 
granted similar protection as in IAC.  
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 CHAPTER 3 LAW APPLICABLE TO POLISH AND BRITISH MILITARY FORCES 
IN AFGHANISTAN –  THE QUESTION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern military operations are governed not only by humanitarian law of armed 
conflicts but also by human rights. The application of both systems of law on a battlefield 
gives a different perspective on the issue of soldier’s responsibility. During armed conflicts 
regulated by Common Article 2 of the Geneva Convention
377
 and Additional Protocol I, 
soldiers are protected by the doctrine of combatant immunity, which allows soldiers, when 
performing their duties, to kill the enemy without any sanction. The situation is more complex 
when it occurs during non-international armed conflicts. In internal conflicts, soldiers often 
need to apply a mix of legal regulations where the self-defence doctrine plays a primary role. 
The list of legal regimes applicable on the modern battlefield is extensive. For example, in 
Afghanistan, soldiers from NATO member states had to follow international humanitarian 
and human rights law, contributing state domestic regulations, host nation laws and NATO 
internal regulations. It often creates a situation of possible contradictions. Particularly, when 
in a multinational environment, soldiers need to follow not only directives or orders of NATO 
or other countries but also act in a way which does not contradict their internal, domestic 
laws. To clarify this legal chaos, soldiers are provided with special documents which simplify 
all the norms into an easy-to-use compilation. The norms which provide information on how 
and when to use lethal force are of particular importance. 
These simplified norms are called Rules of Engagement. They constitute a set of 
norms which are the result of combining all the above-mentioned legal systems.  
Rules of Engagement or ROE are based on three pillars: political, military and legal. 
The political pillar is to assure that military operations meet political objectives. The military 
element is essential to guarantee that ROE provide the possibility to ensure force protection 
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and accomplish a mission. The legal pillar covers domestic and international legal obligations 
of member states.
378
  
It is difficult to hold a discussion over the legal status of ROE for several reasons. One 
of the most vital is the fact that ROE are classified. Therefore, their localization in the British, 
Polish or any other legal system is like walking blindfold. The only known source of a 
formerly-valid, dependable in a public debate, full list of recent Rules of Engagement is 
Wikileaks. Other ROE elements need to be taken from legal documents, for example, court 
judgments, NATO or EU documents and some relevant articles.  
A second important aspect of the unclear legal character of ROE is that they constitute 
a final end; this is the final information which soldiers receive on the battlefield. ROE create a 
system of quasi-legal directives which may, and probably do, affect the soldiers’ situation on 
a battlefield. So, particularly in a situation of possible contradiction between domestic law and 
ROE, it may be important to address their legal character. 
ROE often overlaps with international humanitarian law (IHL), but there are also 
significant differences. Firstly, humanitarian law forms an international, legal regime accepted 
as binding by the majority in the international community as such norms of IHL are mutually 
applicable by signatories. Contrary to this, ROE are rules of a specific force, bilateral in 
nature, mixed with political-military concerns regarding how the mission is to be 
conducted.
379
 Secondly, IHL, despite the rapid development of customary law which is rather 
a consistent set of rules, ROE are different for each operation.
380
 Finally, with regard to 
observance of the law, the violation of humanitarian law is the violation of the state’s 
international obligations which eventually may lead to criminal prosecution. However, a 
breach in ROE does not necessarily constitute a violation of IHL. Often a violation of ROE 
may lead to disciplinary measures only as envisaged by the domestic legal system.  
In this chapter I will analyse the legal regimes which apply to soldiers on the 
battlefield. I will particularly address Rules of Engagement. They issue is important despite 
the end of ISAF NATO operation. They importance lays in their universality. Nowadays 
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average military operation, as mentioned above, are flooded with number of legal 
international and domestic documents. There is a need to provide some kind of a simple to use 
set of instructions which allows following the law in time of war. Modern conflicts are in fact 
a primary example of raising importance of ROE.  
In this chapter I will refer firstly to the Status of Forces agreement. This document set 
ground for norms applicable by soldiers. I will try to provide a legal analysis of law applicable 
to the Polish and British military forces in Afghanistan. In this part I will not only provide a 
legal ground for their presence but foremost the legal basis foreseen by national legislations. 
Finally I will try to address issues related to Rules of Engagement application. After providing 
definition of ROE I will refer to the normative character of the ROE. I will also try to locate 
ROE within the international and domestic law and address the character of relation between 
international and domestic regulations. Analysis of ROE status in Polish and British legal 
systems will be made. The important element of the following analysis is the question of the 
interoperability between law and ROE. Finally I will try to reach to other issues related to 
ROE such as Standard Operating Procedures. The last part of this chapter will refer to 
practical aspects of using ROE on the battlefield.  
 
3.1. LAW APPLICABLE TO POLISH AND BRITISH MILITARY FORCES IN 
AFGHANISTAN  
 
On 14 November 2001, the Security Council voted Resolution 1378 calling the 
international community for multinational support for Afghanistan.
381
 More detailed shape of 
this presence was established during the Bonn conference which was held in Germany in 
November of the same year. In the appendix to the Bonn Agreement, the participants of the 
UN talks requested that the UN Security Council consider authorising early deployment to 
Afghanistan of the UN mandated force. According to the Agreement, a light foot of the 
presence of international forces around Kabul was to be established. The Security Council 
consequently confirmed this settlement by Resolution 1386 which, acting under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations, established the International Security Assistance Force 
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in Afghanistan (ISAF).
382
 The Security Council extended the ISAF’s mandate in successive 
resolutions in recognition of the fact that the situation in Afghanistan continued to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security. Since August 2003, the ISAF has operated under the 
command of NATO.
383
  
On 13 October 2003, the Security Council voted unanimously to expand the ISAF 
mission beyond Kabul (Resolution 1510). In February of 2005, NATO decided to expand the 
ISAF to the west of Afghanistan, whereas, on 1 July 2006, ISAF had expanded its area of 
operation to six additional provinces in the south of Afghanistan.
384
 In Afghanistan, in its 
peak, soldiers from more than 50 countries were deployed, of which a major part was played 
by NATO countries. As a result, approximately 87,000 troops were on the ground.
385
 In 
Afghanistan, apart from ISAF operation which was NATO led, there was also the US-led 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF – A) which consisted of approximately 60,000 troops.  
In this section, I will present the legal framework of the presence of British and Polish 
troops within the ISAF operation. Not to disregard the matter entirely, the engagement of 
Polish and British troops within the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, although present, 
will not be discussed within this thesis for the purpose of my analysis. 
 
3.2. STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN  
Afghanistan is a recognised sovereign state and, as UN Security Council Resolutions 
clearly indicate, the international community has pledged to support Afghan sovereignty. As a 
principle, Afghanistan has jurisdiction over all persons within its territory. However, to the 
extent that it has been expressively agreed, the ISAF and supporting personnel is subject to 
exclusive national jurisdiction as stated in the Status of Force Agreement.
386
 This is due to the 
fact that most contributing states are unwilling to deliver its own forces before the local 
system of justice which has several flaws as mentioned in chapter one of this thesis. 
Additionally, the ISAF soldiers are obliged to conduct military operations under the law of 
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armed conflict applicable in the contributing states, and they are subject to compliance with 
NATO regulations and sources disciplinary measures for armed forces operating in 
Afghanistan. Under these regulations, they are authorised to take action against insurgents.
387
 
  
 
3.3.1 STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT  
The presence of foreign troops during an armed conflict which takes place on the 
territory of a third country usually constitutes a legal challenge. Their status is governed by 
international law and the law of the contributing state, and their actions should not contradict 
the laws of the host nation. Additionally, soldiers and armies need to adapt to a different kind 
of situation. They must adapt from a situation of peace, where armed forces are subject to 
domestic law, to a situation where they ought to act and fight on foreign soil.  
To regulate such situations, a special type of agreement is concluded: the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA). This document is a point of departure of many documents which 
affect the status of ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan. 
SOFAs are bilateral or multilateral treaties that define the legal position of military 
forces and civilian personnel by one or more states or by an international organization in the 
territory of another state with the latter’s consent.388 They deal with issues such as entry and 
departure of foreign personnel, settlement of claims, jurisdictional issues and similar such 
matters.
389
  
With regards to the status of forces agreement of NATO troops in Afghanistan, the 
basic document is the NATO SOFA. It was signed on 4 April 1949 and provides fundamental 
regulations related to the status of forces on the territory of other countries. It is a multilateral 
agreement that is applicable to all member countries of NATO.
390
 Some other states are 
subject to the NATO SOFA through the Partnership for Peace program.
391
  
Article II of the Agreement states that “it is the duty of a force and its civilian 
component and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the 
                                                          
387
 Maya Evans Par, Ibidem. par 17 
388
 A. Sari, Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: the EU's evolving practice, 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 19, 2008. p. 68 
389
 A. Sari, op. cit. p. 69 
390
 R. Chuck Mason, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? March 15, 
2012, Congressional Research Service, RL34531, p. 2 available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf 
391
 R. Chuck Mason, ibidem p. 2 
 105 
 
receiving State”.392 This article places obligation on members of forces of the contributing 
state. However, Article VII outlines that “the military authorities of the sending State shall 
have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdictions 
conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law 
of that State”.  
The issue most commonly addressed in a SOFA is legal protection from prosecution. 
Accordingly, it means that for military and civilian personnel in a foreign country such as 
Afghanistan, NATO will afford legal protection from prosecution while present in 
Afghanistan.
393
 Article VII (1)(a) states that “the military authorities of the sending State shall 
have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction 
conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law 
of that State”. 394  Additionally, Article VII (2)(a) also stipulates the kind of law that is 
applicable to troops. It says that “the military authorities of the sending State shall have the 
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State 
with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of 
the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State”.  
ISAF contributing states concluded a general agreement between NATO and the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. There are no bilateral agreements between, for example, 
Great Britain and Afghanistan. Currently, the legal situation for the NATO Resolute Support 
mission is provided by the SOFA, which was ratified by the Afghan Parliament on 27 
November 2014.
395
 
The SOFA, which was concluded between NATO and Afghanistan, took the form of a 
so-called Military Technical Agreement (MTA). It was signed on 2 January 2001 between 
International Security Assistance Forces and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan.
396
 It 
referred generally to the ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the 
                                                          
392
 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces,19 Jun,1951, 
available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm (10.12.2014) later NATO SOFA 
393
 R. Chuck Mason, op.cit, p. 3 
394
 NATO SOFA 
395
 More information available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm (10.10.2014) 
396
 Look at the letter from permanent representative of the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Ireland Mr. 
Jeremy Greenstock addressed to the President of Security Council S/2002/117 available 
athttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9B11C79DE13BB700C1256B5300381E4F-unsc-afg-
25jan.pdf (10.10.2014) 
 106 
 
Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’, signed in Bonn on 5 December 
2001 (the Bonn Agreement). 
The MTA regulated, inter alia, the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. It also 
stated the general privilege to use force. According to Article III (2), The Interim 
Administration “understands and agrees that the ISAF Commander will have the authority, 
without interference or permission, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, 
including the use of military force, to protect the ISAF and its Mission.”  
As an appendix to the MTA arrangements regarding the status of the International 
Security Assistance Force, section 1, entitled “Jurisdiction”, states that “the provisions of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 
concerning experts on mission will apply mutatis mutandis to the ISAF and supporting 
personnel, including associated liaison personnel”. Article 2 states that all personnel “will 
respect the laws of Afghanistan, insofar as it is compatible with the UNSCR (1386) and will 
refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of the Mission”.397 However, Article 3 
excluded them from local jurisdiction by saying that the ISAF and supporting personnel, 
including associated liaison personnel, will, under all circumstances and at all times, be 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements in respect of any 
criminal or disciplinary offences which may be committed by them on the territory of 
Afghanistan. Article 4 states that the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated 
liaison personnel, will be immune from personal arrest or detention. Additionally, the Interim 
Administration agree that ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison 
personnel, may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to the custody of, an 
international tribunal or any other entity.
398
 
 Taking into consideration the above-mentioned information, there is no doubt to the 
existence of a regime of law applicable to troops in this area. NATO forces are bound by their 
domestic systems of law as well as international law. Additionally, they are bound by norms 
outlined in the Rules of Engagement.  
 Remarkably, the MTA (or SOFA), which expresisis verbis allowed ISAF the use of 
force, applies only to ISAF forces. A similar agreement which would expressly authorize the 
United States forces to carry out military operations was not concluded between the second 
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stage of US engagement in Afghanistan i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom and the government 
of Afghanistan.
399
  
 The current situation of the NATO forces status is regulated by the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), which was signed in Kabul on 30 September 2014 by the newly 
inaugurated Afghan President and NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan.400  
 
3.3. 2 HIERARCHY OF POLISH LAW APPLICABLE TO POLISH TROOPS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
There are two concepts governing relations between international and domestic legal 
systems. The first one is referred to as dualistic. Presented by H. Triepl, between internal and 
international provisions there cannot exist any kind of conflicts since these provisions do not 
have the same object – internal provisions are applied exclusively between the state’s borders 
and cannot intervene in the international legal system.
401
 To be applied in a contracting state, 
it is necessary for that state to adopt legal measures from a treaty into a national provision or 
to introduce it through a legal plan that facilities the introduction of law.
402
 In this situation, 
international law provisions are introduced to internal law by an internal provision 
recognizing, naturalizing and introducing it through an internal measure and applied as 
such.
403
  
The second concept is referred to as monism. According to Hans Kelsen, international 
law applies directly upon the state’s legal order. Thus, international law applies directly 
without being admitted or transformed within the legal system of the member system. In the 
event of application of international public law to internal law, there is no need to nationalize 
the international stipulation.
404
 
The Polish Constitution provides for a monistic system. Article 91 states that “after 
promulgation thereof in the Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of the Republic of Poland, a 
ratified international agreement shall constitute part of the domestic legal order and shall be 
applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute. An international 
agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by statute shall have precedence over statutes if 
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such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes. If an agreement, 
ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the 
laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict 
of laws”.405 
This monistic approach has advantages and disadvantages. It is clearly easier to 
introduce a new law of international origin directly into the domestic legal system. However, 
it often creates incoherence with already existing laws. Such is the case not only with 
European Union law but also with purely international law such as the ICC statute.
 406
 The 
latter is critical, especially taking under consideration that the ICC statue, in some respect, 
may modify law which applies to Polish troops abroad, inter alia, in Afghanistan.  
As to documents which primarily regulate the situation of international troops in 
Afghanistan, there is the Military Technical Agreement (MTA). According to the MTA the 
foreign status is governed by the law of a contributing state. Consequently, there is no doubt 
that the body of domestic law must be applied to soldiers both at home and during foreign 
missions. 
 The question is whether it is possible to establish a set of rules which equally regulate 
the actions of military forces at home, usually during peace time, as well as on foreign soil, 
usually during an armed conflict. Or rather the question is how to create a system of military 
regulations which are applicable to both situations. It is a fact that soldiers act differently in 
time of peace and in time of war. Nowadays, the military forces of European countries face 
several constraints. They are based on one assumption: despite the war or armed conflict, 
inter arma non silent leges.  
Constraints applicable to Polish forces are based on codified law, international law and 
Rules of Engagement. Poland belongs to a group of countries governed by the continental 
system of law. It means that it is based on law which is codified and hierarchical in nature. 
Precedents and court judgment may only have legal meaning when it comes to interpretation 
of law.
407
 Accordingly, Polish sources of law are divided into two groups: universally-binding 
law and internally-binding law. The sources of universally-binding law constitute a closed 
                                                          
405
 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997 As published in Dziennik Ustaw No. 78, item 
483 available at the Polish Parliament website http://sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm (11.10.2014) 
later The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 2 April 1997 or CRP.  
406
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force July 1, 2002 As 
published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2003 no 78 item 708.  
407
 This principle doesn’t apply to the judgments of European Court of Justice. 
 109 
 
system. The Constitution names, such sources of law which, apart from the Constitution itself, 
comprise of statutes, international agreements and regulations.
408
 The Constitution provides, 
in Article 91 (3), the hierarchy of normative acts.
409
 It says, “An international agreement 
ratified upon prior consent granted by statute shall have precedence over statutes if such an 
agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes”.410 Under this Article, 
the relation between statutes and international agreement is established. Moreover, it defines 
the position of international agreements within the domestic legal system. Ratified 
international agreements, upon consent of the Parliament, should conform with the 
Constitution yet they have precedence over statutes, while international agreements, ratified 
without such consent, are ranked below statutes.  
An interesting modification of this principle took place during the period after the 
accession of Poland to the EU. Article 55 of the Constitution forbade extradition of a Polish 
citizen to another country. This constitutional principle was in breach of the Council 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
surrender procedures between Member States. As a result, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
issued a judgment of 5 April 2005 No. P1/05 in which was stated that Polish criminal 
procedure needs to be modified. As a result of this judgement, the Polish Constitution also 
had to be revised.
411
 It is a particularly interesting case as Polish law was affected, not by the 
supranational community method which is quite common, but was amended as a result of the 
decision brought within the former III Pillar which was intergovernmental in nature. This is 
an example where international law may, under particular circumstances, supersede all 
sources of law, even the constitution.  
Last in the hierarchy are regulations. According to Article 92 of the Constitution, 
“regulations shall be issued on the basis of specific authorization contained in, and for the 
purpose of implementation of, statutes by the organs specified in the Constitution. The 
authorization shall specify the organ appropriate to issue a regulation and the scope of matters 
to be regulated as well as guidelines concerning the provisions of such act”.412 To summarize, 
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there is the following hierarchy of universally-binding normative acts in Poland: the 
Constitution, international agreements, statutes and then regulations. 
The second group of source of law is internally-binding legal norms. This category of 
law is specific in nature. As Article 93 of the Constitution states: “resolutions of the Council 
of Ministers and orders/instructions of the Prime Minister and ministers shall be of an internal 
character and shall bind only those organizational units subordinate to the organ which issues 
such act. 2. Orders/instructions shall only be issued on the basis of a statute. They shall not 
serve as the basis for decisions taken in respect of citizens, legal persons and other subjects. 3. 
Resolutions and orders shall be subject to scrutiny regarding their compliance with 
universally binding law”. 413  In this respect, internal acts are namely resolutions and 
instructions. This, above all, means that internally-binding acts may not be addressed to 
citizens in their private capacity.
414
 To summarize, Polish soldiers are agents of the state and 
so their situation is regulated by both externally and internally-binding law.  
According to the Polish Constitution,
415
 Article 26 states, “the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the State, and 
shall ensure the security and inviolability of its borders”.416 Polish armed forces are under 
command of the President of the Republic of Poland. The President exercises command over 
the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defence (Article 134 (2) of the 
Constitution). When Polish Armed forces are to be sent abroad, the President issues a decision 
on the use of the armed forces abroad. For example, Polish troops may be deployed abroad to, 
inter alia, prevent acts of terror or to prevent their consequences.
417
 The decision is based on 
the motion of the Prime Minister.
418
 
There is no doubt that there are legal grounds for the presence of Polish troops in 
Afghanistan. On one hand, there is a Military Technical Agreement concluded between 
NATO ISAF and the Afghan government.
419
 On the other hand, there are relevant decisions 
issued by the President of the Republic of Poland. Decisions are issued every six month in 
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order to extend Polish presence in Afghanistan.
420
 Such a decision states that Polish Armed 
forces are acting within the ISAF structure in Afghanistan,
421
 and what is particularly 
important, from the perspective of further consideration, are under ISAF operational 
command in Afghanistan.
422
 
During their service, armed forces abroad are under the same body of law as during 
their service in Poland. Both soldier and civilian employees of military forces are obliged to 
conduct operations in accordance with Polish international obligations and the law of host 
country.
423
 
As the whole body of Polish law is applicable in Afghanistan to Polish Forces, few 
acts need to be brought accordingly.  
 
3.3.4 POLISH CRIMINAL CODE - BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC 
LAW  
Amongst the laws applicable to soldiers, particularly important is the Polish Criminal 
Code (PCC), adopted on 6 July 1997. It is an act of law which gathers all regulations relevant 
to the criminal responsibility of Polish citizens.
424
 Its importance lies in the fact that 
disobedience to PCC results in committing a crime punishable under Polish law. So as far as 
soldiers are concerned, it is a document of utmost importance.  
 The Polish Criminal Code is divided into two parts: the so-called General Part, which 
deals with issues common to all crimes such as the mental element of the crime, forms of 
committing a crime, rules regarding application of punishment and matters similar in nature. 
Importantly, Article 5 of the Criminal Code states that Polish Criminal Code is applicable to 
all crimes committed on the territory of Poland. However, the SOFA or in this case, the 
Military Technical Agreement, modified its ruling and make it applicable also within the 
territory of the foreign state i.e. Afghanistan.  
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The second part of the Code deals with particular crimes such as murder, burglary as 
well as military crimes. The Polish legal system has no separate law specific to military 
crimes or a military code despite having a separate military prosecution office
425
 and military 
courts.
426
 Military crimes were introduced to the 1997 Criminal Code under Chapter XVI. 
This chapter introduced relevant regulations applicable to persons who committed crimes 
during war or in a course of warfare. For example, Chapter XVI, “Crimes against peace, 
humanity and war crimes”, Article 121.§1 stipulates: “Whoever, in contrary to the 
international law or domestic law, manufactures, amasses, purchases, trades, stores, carries or 
dispatches the means of mass destruction or means of warfare, or undertakes research aimed 
at the production or usage of such means, shall be subject of the penalty of imprisonment 
between 1 to 10 years.
427
 
 Similarly, Article 122.§1 states, “Whoever, in the course of warfare, attacks an undefended 
locality or a facility, hospital zone or uses prohibited by the international law method of 
warfare, shall be subject of the penalty of imprisonment for a minimum period of 5 years, or 
shall be imprisoned for 25 years. § 2. The same punishment shall be imposed on person who, 
in the course of warfare, uses a means of warfare prohibited by international law”. 428 
Chapter XVI also provides for the punishment of persons convicted for crimes of 
aggression, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Acts covered by the provisions of this 
Chapter include the use of weapons of mass destruction, unlawful production, stockpiling, 
acquisition, transport or sale of weapons, the use of prohibited means of warfare, the killing of 
protected persons, the unlawful destruction of cultural property and the misuse of recognized 
emblems, neutral or enemy flags, and military emblems.  
The above quotations from the Criminal Code serve to illustrate some problematic 
issues, such as, for example, of the law applicable on the territory of Afghanistan according to 
SOFA and Polish law. Two problems can be identified. Rules of Engagement are not 
correlated to the Polish Criminal Code. This means that the application of ROE does not 
exclude soldiers from liability under the Criminal Code. The relation between these two 
systems will be analysed below.  
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The second issue is the implementation of international law within the Polish legal 
system. It is particularly important in terms of the relation between a ratified treaty such as the 
Statute of International Criminal Court
429
 and the Criminal Code. The latter introduced legal 
concepts which are not fully compatible with the Polish Criminal Code. For example, the ICC 
statue refers to the mental element of a wrongdoer in Article 30 as follows:  
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge. 
2 For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:  
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or 
a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be 
construed accordingly
430
.  
Article 9 of the Polish Criminal Code states this issue slightly differently. It says: “A 
prohibited act is committed with intent when the perpetrator has the will to commit it, that is 
when he/she is willing to commit or foreseeing the possibility of perpetrating it, he/she 
accepts it. § 2. A prohibited act is committed without intent when the perpetrator not having 
the intent to commit it, nevertheless does so because he is not careful in the manner required 
under the circumstances, although he should or could have foreseen the possibility of 
committing the prohibited act. And § 3 says “the perpetrator shall be liable to a more severe 
liability which the law makes contingent on a certain consequence of a prohibited act, if he 
has and could have foreseen such a consequence”.431  
In this respect, the Polish Criminal Code provides a broader basis for responsibility 
based on a mental element than the ICC Statue. This may cause possible confusion between 
applicable laws. This might particularly be the case when, for example, a prosecutor decides 
to apply a pick-and-choose policy: to use the concept regarding the mental element from the 
Polish Criminal Code whereas, in terms of other elements of crime, refer to the ICC statute. 
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This particular problem may not be resolved by traditional way of interpreting the law such as 
principle lex specialis derogat legi generali.  
Another important unresolved issue related to direct application of ICC regulations 
arises in the relation between Article 28 of the ICC Statue on “Responsibility of commanders 
and other superiors”432 and Article 318 of the Polish Criminal Code on the same issue. Article 
318 says, “…does not perpetrate a crime soldier who commits a prohibited act as a result of 
order execution unless he or she is executing the order knowingly that he commits a 
crime”.433 This norm is intended to affect the situation resulting from a military superior order 
whereas Aarticle 28 of the ICC introduces a concept of “effective command” which shall not 
be military but may be civilian in nature. Article 318 of the PCC is also inconsistent with 
Article 33 of the ICC which says that “The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, 
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: (a) 
The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in 
question; (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not 
manifestly unlawful”. Article 318 must be interpreted with Article 319 of the PCC which 
exempts from responsibility a soldier or officer who, in the case of disobedience or resistance, 
applies measures necessary to enforce obedience to orders. In fact, this follows a logical 
order: first the order of obedience, then the analysis as to whether the order was lawful or not.  
Another issue related to the implementation of the ICC statue arose during the 
ratification process of the amendments to the ICC statue signed in Kampala during the 
Review Conference from 31 May to 11 June 2010. The aim of the Conference was to provide 
a definition of the crime of aggression. Article 8 of the ICC says that a “crime of aggression” 
means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of 
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
434
 Article 117 §1 of the PCC provides a prohibition of waging 
aggressive war
435 
which is a term far less broad. For example, Article 8 (c) forbids “the 
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blockade of the ports” which is by all means difficult to qualify as waging aggressive war as 
envisaged by Article 117 §1 of the PCC. As such, the Polish Criminal Code should be 
modified according to reasoned opinion RM -10-116-13 notified by Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk to the Marshal of the Sejm on 17 December 2013.
436
 
The above examples give grounds to the following conclusions.  
Despite the introduction of international treaties such as the ICC statute into the Polish legal 
system, they are not fully compatible with each other. As a result, when it comes to the 
criminal responsibility of international humanitarian law, a crime, under Polish law, faces a 
certain amount of ambiguity. This is reinforced by the concept of Rules of Engagement whose 
binding character is debatable but their performance is a sine qua non condition of modern 
military operations, and as such, strictly affects the position of soldiers on the battlefield.  
 
3.3. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) 
3.3.1 ROE BASIS 
Rules of Engagement are based on three assumptions. Those assumptions are of a 
political, military and legal character. ROE are flexible and can be changed during the course 
of an operation.
437
 What is more, ROE can be different even during one operation. As a result, 
military forces may operate under two sets of ROE. For example, during the operation in 
Lebanon, US forces developed the so-called "Blue Card" and "White Card" systems. The blue 
card contained directives for personnel which allowed them to engage in combat and the 
white card contained ROE for non-lethal activity.
438
  
Likewise during military operations, forces may refer to different regimes of ROE. For 
example, different rules may be issued by an organization such as the UN and different ones 
by the country which provides its forces. American forces, being a part of NATO operations, 
are governed by “restrictive” NATO ROE, and “permissive” US SROE.439  
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3.3.2. ROE DEFINITION  
ROE are issued by competent authorities and assist in the delineation of the 
circumstances and limitations within which military forces may be employed to achieve their  
objectives
440
. According to the NATO document MC 362/1, a definition issued on 30 June 
2003 states that ROE are “Directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the 
circumstances, conditions, degree and manner in which force, or actions which might be 
construed as provocative, may be applied. ROE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical 
instructions. With the exception of self-defence during peacetime ad operations prior to 
commencement of an armed conflict, which may include declarations of counter surprise or 
counter aggression, ROE provide the sole authority to NATO/ NATO-led forces to use 
force”.441 
 According to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Handbook, ROE for a 
peacekeeping operation “clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various 
circumstances, how each level of force should be used and any authorizations that may need 
to be obtained from commanders”.442  
 ROE appear in a variety of forms in national military doctrines, including execute 
orders, deployment orders, operational plans, or standing directives. Whatever their form is, 
they provide authorisation for and/or limits on, among other things, the use of force, the 
positioning and posturing of forces, and the employment of certain specific capabilities. In 
some nations, ROE have the status of guidelines for military forces; in other nations, ROE are 
lawful commands.
443
 ROE in particular define:  
- when force may be used during the mission, 
- where force may be used during the mission, 
- against whom force may be used during the mission, 
- how force may be used to accomplish military targets. 
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ROE are divided into those which may be used with and without superior 
commander’s authorization. The first and foremost basic principle is the right to self-
defence.
444
 
 ROE are not used to assign missions or tasks nor are they used to give tactical 
instructions. Missions and tasks are assigned through operation orders and other similar 
instruments of command and control.
445
 
 
3.3. 3. SOURCES OF ROE  
3.3.3.1. NATO ROE 
 Rules of Engagement which are directives issued to military forces often derive from 
the decisions or resolutions of international organizations such as NATO, the European Union 
or the United Nations. The status of these decisions is vital in regard to the evaluation of the 
legal status of ROE within domestic systems of law. 
 In this section I will try to follow the procedure of issuing UN, UE and NATO ROE, 
which should help to better understand their legal meaning within a domestic system of law.  
Firstly, I would like to analyse how ROE are issued by NATO. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an alliance of 28 countries from North 
America and Europe.
446
 The role of NATO is to provide security of its member states by 
political and military means. Major NATO treaty principle lies in Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, which says that “Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual 
or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.447 This article was invoked for the first 
time in history the day after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
448
 In 
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NATO, unlike in the European Union, all decisions are taken jointly on the basis of 
consensus. NATO’s most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council 
which brings together ambassadors, ministers or even heads of states and governments 
representing the alliance.
449
 During the process of planning of a military operation, such as 
one in Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) consults its position with the UN and 
NATO members states. The NAC under Article 9 of the NATO treaty is a statutory organ 
responsible for the “implementation of the treaty”.450  The Council is the most important 
political body entitled to issuing decisions. The NAC authorises one of the NATO 
commanding bodies i.e. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), located in 
Mons, Belgium, or Allied Command Transformation (ACT) located in Norfolk, USA, to issue 
an operational plan, the so-called OPLAN. One of these two provides the operational plan, 
which is the basis for the preparation of ROE. At this stage, the works of a chosen 
commanding body are consulted with the member states and with the Defence Planning 
Committee.
451
 OPLAN and ROE proposals are consequently delivered for acceptance by the 
NATO Military Committee. Eventually, ROE becomes appendix E to the OPLAN and is 
transferred to the NAC.
452
 When a NAC OPLAN decision is issued with appendix E, the ROE 
become the so-called ROEAUTH (ROE authorization) which enable the transfer to the major 
NATO institutions such as SHAPE for implementation.
453
 If a ROE document is amended, the 
whole procedure is repeated.  
Once ROE are adopted, member states become individually responsible to ensure they 
are applied by their forces.
454
 However states may introduce some legal restrictions or 
national caveats to adjust the ROE to the domestic system of law. 
 NATO ROE are based on NATO MC 362/21. It is a general document that provides a 
list a possible ROE during NATO-led military operations. The status of the document is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Justice and Cooperation in Criminal Matters in International Military Interventions”, Toledo, Spain, September 
2007, p.114 
449
 S. Fournier, p. 114. 
450
 Art 9 of the NATO treaty 
451
 The Defence Planning Committee was dissolved in June 2010 and its responsibilities absorbed by the North 
Atlantic Council according to NATO official website http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49201.htm 
452
 M. Szuniewicz, Legal aspects of NATO RoE — MC 362/1 (with special regard to the maritime component), 
International Humanitarian Law vol. III rules of engagement, Polish Naval Academy Command & Naval 
Operations Faculty Gdynia 2012,  
453
 P.Dreist, Rules of engagement in NATO operations – application in Germany’s legal system, (in:) B. Janusz-
Pawletta Rules of Engagement – selected legal issues, Warsaw 2011, ISSN 0209-0031, p.119 
454
 S. Fournier, p. 116. 
 119 
 
unclear and due to this fact I will not analyse it in depth.
455
 In Europe, this is a NATO 
unclassified document though it should not be publicly released, whereas, for example, in the 
United States military college, students may not have access to it.
456
 NATO ROE are a series 
of prohibitions and permissions divided into separate groups, for example, detention and 
seizure, designation of targets, use of riot control agents and such similar concepts.  
The idea behind the NATO ROE is similar to the Sanremo ROE Manual. It provides a 
list of possible ROE. From this general list, ROE are extracted and adapted for the purpose of 
a particular mission. 
 
3.3.3.2 UN ROE 
The Charter of the United Nations introduces general prohibition of ius ad bello 
character on the use of force and the threat of the use of force (Article 2 (4) UNC). There are 
two exemptions from this prohibition. One is based on Article 51 which provides the right to 
self-defence. The second one is based on the actions of the Security Council authorization. 
The decisions of the Security Council are based on Article 42 and Article 48 of the Charter 
and their aim is to keep peace and stability. The Security Council may establish military 
operations to achieve the above-mentioned goals. Such resolutions, according to Article 25 of 
the Charter are binding to state members. Military operations run by the United Nations since 
its establishment are called “Peace Operations”. It is the umbrella term which applies to all 
UN missions involving military personnel, whether they are otherwise described as peace 
keeping, traditional peacekeeping, expanded peacekeeping, humanitarian missions or peace 
enforcement missions.
457
 In fact, there are two general types of United Nations operations. 
The first type is regulated by Chapter VI of the Charter. These operations are called 
peacekeeping operations. The second type of operations is regulated by Chapter VII of the 
Charter and is called peace enforcement. During such operations, the UN issues the relevant 
ROE. 
The role of the United Nations may differ depending on the nature of the operation. In 
general, the United Nations’ approach to military operations in terms of command and control 
is twofold. For large scale enforcement operations, the Security Council ‘contracts out’ the 
command and control of the operations either to a single member state or to a ‘coalition of the 
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willing’.458 For example, the operation in Korea in the early 1950s was conducted under the 
UN flag but was under US command. A similar peace enforcement operation in Somalia, 
“United Task Force” (UNITAF), was contracted out to an individual member state i.e. the 
United States. These operations were beyond UN organizational structure.
459
 Such missions 
are under general political influence of the Security Council, executive command belongs to 
the Secretary General and operational command to the mission chief commander
460
. During 
such missions “acts of the states or organizations will be attributed only to those countries or 
organizations itself”. So these actions cannot be implicated to the United Nations”. 461 
Contributing states issue ROE which may not be contrary to the UN resolutions which enable 
a particular mission. However, specific ROE are issued by the troops of sending state or 
sending organization. Both the state’s and the organization’s actions are to be approved by the 
UN Resolution. 
 The second type of UN operations is the UN peace operations per se. They began in 
1950s and have the UN Security Council organ subsidiary status. They are based on Article 
22 and 29 of the Charter of the UN.
 462
 Since they constitute a part of the UN structure, they 
are under direct UN command.
463
 Rules of Engagement are an element of the UN peace 
operation legal environment. A broad understanding of the UN ROE embraces not only 
military but also civilian and police personnel. The scope of the use of force follows a 
particular UN resolution and is crafted to each individual operation.  
During peace operations, the UN is responsible for the acts and omission of military 
contingents at their disposal.
464
 There are three conditions for these operations and they need 
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to be satisfied accumulatively. The conditions are: acceptance of the parties of the conflict, 
impartiality and use of force only in self-defence. The last condition affects the applicability 
of ROE. Each of UN operations issues their own ROE within their command structure. 
However those ROE are based on the UN resolution authorizing the use of force. The notion 
of the UN ROE was defined in the Project on UN ROE directives and says that “ROE provide 
the parameters within which armed military, gendarmerie/civilian police personnel assigned 
to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operations may use force.” 465 
The UN ROE for a particular mission result from joint effort of the Security Council, the UN 
Secretary General and a particular force commander. Before the UNSC definitively authorizes 
the deployment of a mission, the Secretary General issues a report which includes his 
proposal on the use of force.
466
 The guidelines for the use of force based on a broad concept 
contained in the Secretary-General’s proposal may be reiterated in a Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) or the so-called Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) concluded 
between the UN and the hosting state.
467
 These documents are often very general in nature.
468
  
There are situations where the UN ROE are modified. This takes a form of so-called 
Standard Operating Procedures. To provide more detailed guidelines on the use of force, 
standing (or standard) operating procedures (SOP) are issued to the UN force by the force 
commander. The SOP are meant to explain in detail the circumstances in which force may be 
used and establish the level of responsibility for taking the decision to use it. The SOP should 
also include instructions on the manner in which weapons are to be used, for example, in 
regard to the use of warning shots, the controlling of fire, prohibitions on the use of automatic 
weapons and/or high explosives, and the action to be taken after firing. According to Findlay, 
SOP and ROE are equivalent documents formulated by the force commander.
469
 This point is 
debatable since there is a different level of authorization needed for ROE compared to SOP. 
However, Findlay may have access to documents and materials not available to the author. 
To summarize, the UN ROE are derived from UNSC resolution’s authorization. They are 
issued and modified by the force commander of a particular mission.
470
 The UN ROE are 
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issued under general UNSC authorization under Chapter VII which entitles the UNSC to 
restore or maintain, international peace and security. The maintenance of international peace 
and security should be understood from both ius in bello and ius ad bellum perspective.
471
 
 
3.3.3.3 EUROPEAN UNION ROE  
The European Union civilian and military foreign missions are regulated under the 
Lisbon treaty. According to Article 42 of the Treaty, “The common security and defence 
policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the 
Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may 
use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the 
Member States”.472 
The European Union, similarly to the UN and NATO, has established an autonomous capacity 
to make decisions to launch and conduct EU-led military operations within the range of tasks 
defined in the Treaty of the European Union (EU) and in the European Security Strategy 
(ESS).
473
 Those operations shall be conducted to provide peace, to strength peace or prevent 
conflicts.  
 For the above-mentioned purposes, Rules of Engagement are issued. In general, EU 
military operations are decided by the Council. 
474
 Ultimately, it is also up to the Council to 
approve OPLAN and ROE. Initially, both are created by the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS). EUMS prepares recommendations for the Political Committee. When civilian 
operations are in question, then the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management – CIVCOM 
prepares recommendations. Similarly, as with the EUMS, the Political and Security 
Committee of the European Union receives recommendations. Then OPLAN and ROE, by the 
Political Committee acceptance documentation, are transferred to the Council. The European 
Council is a body responsible for the final decision and shape of ROE. 
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To summarize, three major international organizations may conduct operations of a 
military character. All of them have the capacity and capability to run both offensive and 
defensive actions. To clarify the use of force on the battlefield, ROE are issued by these 
organizations. Generally, as to the legal character of ROE, according to Fournier, ROE are 
neither the law nor a subset of the law.
475
 However, US and Canadian examples show that the 
issue is debatable. According to Stafford, “in the United States forces even though ROE may 
be based in the law they are still directives merely providing policy, authority, mission 
definition and responsibility”.476 According to Canadian Forces Manual, “In Canada ROE are 
defined as «orders» that are intended to ensure that commanders and their subordinates do not 
use force or other measures beyond that authorized by higher command. ROE also provide 
confirmation as to the level of force that commanders or individuals are legitimately 
authorized to employ in support of their mission”.477  
Despite the popularity of ROE during military operations, there is no clarity regarding 
to what extent they are binding within a domestic system of laws. To address this issue, I will 
attempt to uncover the exact location of ROE within a domestic system of law and then the 
relation between ROE and international law.  
 
3.3.4 IS A RESOLUTION A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW? 
Since the nature of ROE under Polish law is unclear and it seems that they are not 
binding under the law of England and Wales, I will turn my attention to the international 
aspect of ROE, or rather to examine the international dimension of Rules of Engagement. 
Since their origins are to be derived out of international law, it is worth considering their 
applicability at all? This issue has two practical aspects. The first is the possibility of applying 
ROE over domestic legislation as a part of international law. The second is the possibility to 
apply ROE to all parties of a conflict when ROE are published. 
In most cases, Rules of Engagement are issued by international organizations as 
resolutions. As such, they may under some circumstances affect domestic systems. To 
understand better the notion of Rules of Engagement within a domestic system of law it may 
be necessary to address a more general question: what is the international legal status of 
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resolutions creating the rules of engagement. Are there any? As I stated earlier, ROE are not 
clear sources of law but rather they are to be considered as military, political and legal 
directives. This, under some circumstances, may potentially make them a source of binding 
law. If so, they may create erga omnes obligations and overrule other laws such as criminal 
law. To clarify the legal status of ROE, some general questions need to be answered i.e. is a 
resolution a source of international public law? 
There is a disagreement as to whether acts of secondary nature adopted by 
international organizations constitute a source of law.
478
 In this doctrinal dispute regarding the 
competence of international organizations to issue acts which create legally binding 
obligations, it is important to make a distinction between primary and secondary law of 
international organizations.
479
 
Sources of international law can be derived from Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). According to this article, “a Court decides in accordance 
with international law i.e.; a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations (for example. lex specialis derogat legi generali, lex posteriori derogat legi 
priori);d . (…) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. Principles (…) 
ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto”. 480  International conventions are treaties. 
According to Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, “treaty means an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law.”481 While it is possible that non-state entities may conclude an international 
agreement, it is not envisaged by the Vienna Convention and is not considered to be 
international law. The effect of a treaty on international and domestic law depends upon the 
nature of the treaty. A distinction is sometimes made between treaty contracts and law-
making treaties. Despite the fact that often the same treaty may perform contractual and 
normative functions, there are some general differences. Law making treaties lay down rules 
of universal application and are intended for future and continuing observance. Whereas 
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treaty contracts are concluded to perform contractual functions, for example, selling goods. 
Such treaties expire once state parties perform their obligations.
482
 
Another source of internationally recognized legal norms foreseen by Article 38 of the 
Statue of ICJ is an international custom. A custom refers to objective and subjective elements. 
The notion of customary law was presented in several judgments provided by the ICJ. 
According to its judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case,
483
 ICJ stated that a custom 
needs to “(...)be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a subjective element of the rule of law requiring it. 
The need for such belief, i.e. the existence of subjective element is implicit in the very notion 
of the opinion juris sive necceistas. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation”.484  
Rules of engagement may be derived from both types of the above-mentioned sources 
of law. Some of them are treaty, positive-law based. Other ROE may refer to international 
custom or customary international humanitarian law. Based on court judgment development 
of customary international humanitarian law over the past two decades, several customary 
rules have been brought into Rules of Engagement. However, the fact that they are derived 
from international law does not automatically make them a source of international law. Rules 
of engagement of NATO, the UN and the EU are issued through resolutions and due to this it 
is important to answer the question of whether a ROE resolution is or isn’t a source of public 
international law.  
Traditional sources of law are based on Article 38 of the ICJ statute. Its literal 
interpretation does not recognize resolutions as a source of law. However, there is a backdoor 
to legitimization of resolutions. Contrary to the domestic systems of law, international law has 
no official hierarchy amongst international regulations. The UN Charter introduced a 
regulation on how to avoid clashes between UN resolutions and other sources of law.
485
 
According to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, “in the event of a conflict between 
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
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Charter shall prevail”.486 This means that when a conflict between an international treaty and 
an act of the UN occurs, the UN act will prevail. This legal construction allows us to conclude 
that UN resolutions, under some circumstances, might be considered as the source of 
universally-recognized law. There are no similar regulations regarding NATO and EU 
resolutions. This confirms that only UN resolutions, under some circumstances, might be 
considered as a source of international law. There are, however, strong arguments against 
resolutions being considered as an independent source of international law. They are simply 
derived from the founding treaties and they produce a legal effect only in respect to member 
states and the relevant international organizations. Positive law position is that secondary acts, 
resolutions, are not to be a source of international law due to a literal interpretation of the 
above-mentioned Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.  
The other point of view states the opposite. International organizations, within their 
competence, can efficiently deal with new challenges; it is quicker than using a traditional 
treaty.
487
 What is more, the acts of international organizations can have a direct effect on both 
state members and countries which are not members of a particular organization as well as on 
individuals. There are several cases when such a situation has occurred, for example, as 
Kaczorowska provides, the adoption by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), Part XI of 
the UN Convention on the Law of Sea
488
 and the agreement relating to the implementation of 
Part XI concerning resource exploitation of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. According to this, ISA acts on behalf of “mankind as a whole”. 
To consider a resolution as a source of law, another condition need to be fulfilled. This 
condition is proper structure of a resolution. It has inter alia to be considered as a so-called 
law-making resolution.
489
 Such a resolution can use already existing norms of international 
law or it may create a new one.
490
 As mentioned above, those acts should differentiate from 
internal acts of the organization. Binding resolutions should consist of norms of a general 
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character, as they define the subject of the norm, and they should consists of norms of abstract 
character, as they define how and when the subject of the norm should act.
491
 .  
It often happens that resolutions adopted, for example, by the United Nation’s Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, are binding to all member states. As a result, 
the resolutions create a legal obligation for them.
492
 This was the case when, after the terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Centre, UNSC adopted Resolution 1373 requiring its members 
states “to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of 
persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist act or participate in or facilitate the 
commission of terrorist acts”. 493  This resolution imposed on the states, not only clear 
obligations, but also established a committee known as the Counter Terrorism Committee 
which assesses whether the member states took appropriate steps to comply with the 
resolution and whether they adopted the required executive legislation on a national level to 
comply with Resolution 1373.
494
  
In fact, currently we are faced with a variety of types of resolutions. They may be or 
may not be of binding character. A resolution may also have a recommendatory character. It 
is also possible that a resolution may authorize an organization to issue a binding legal act on 
all member states. In such a situation, a resolution is needed to be referred to the statute of the 
particular organization. The lack of such referral to the alleged competence of the 
international organization would be a violation of both the state sovereignty and the statue of 
the organization. 
To summarize, resolutions, under some circumstances, may become a law applicable 
to states and as such affect the legal situation of states’ agents such as soldiers.   
 
3.4.  LEGAL CHARACTER OF ROE UNDER POLISH LAW  
Previous discussion focuses on the law applicable to ISAF forces in Afghanistan. This 
then leads onto the concept of ROE. In this part I will address the question of the status of 
ROE under Polish law and how they are compatible with the Polish Criminal Code.  
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3.4. 1. NEW LAW ON RULES OF USE OF MILITARY FORCES ABROAD –  IS ROE A 
STATUTE? 
An analysis of the nature of ROE within the Polish legal system has to begin from the 
top of the legal hierarchy i.e. a statute. On December 2010, the President of the Republic of 
Poland signed the “Law on the change of law on the rules of use of Polish armed forces 
abroad”, which modified the rules of use of military forces abroad. 495 According to Article 
7(c) of this Statue, the Minister of Defence issues a classified minister’s order which regulates 
the Rules of Engagement. Firstly, I will consider the nature of Article 7(a) and 7(b) and 
follow with an analysis. Article 7(a) states that “Soldiers serving (...) abroad496 may refer to 
coercion, use of weapons which is permissible under ratified international treaties and 
customary law, in a way and within the limits which are determined by the organs of 
international organizations which are superior toward the Polish soldiers during the operation. 
The aim of the mission and national caveats issued by the competent national authorities 
should be taken into account.” 497 
 Additionally, Article 7(b) says, “Soldiers which are mentioned in the above article, 
despite coercion measures, conditions of use of weapons derived from the rules established by 
the organs of international organizations (...) are entitled to apply coercive measures and use 
weapons: in self defence against any unlawful attack against life and freedom or to prevent 
activity which leads to such an attack., 2) against persons not complying with a disarmament 
call 3) against persons who, unlawfully, by force, takes a weapon from the soldier or other 
persons who are entitled to possess a weapon, 4) to prevent a violent, direct and unlawful 
attack against a Polish or allied military unit, 5) to prevent a violent, direct and unlawful 
attack against objects and facilities which are important to the Polish Military Forces, 6) to 
prevent a violent, direct and unlawful attack against a person’s life, health and freedom, to 
prevent a violent, direct and unlawful attack on the Polish or allied military base, 7) in direct 
pursuit against persons covered by sections 1-5, 8) to apprehend persons mentioned in 
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sections 1-6, when the person in question has found a refugee in a place which is not easily 
accessible and based on the circumstances he or she is a threat against a person’s life, health 
and freedom (...) 9) to apprehend or to prevent escape if; a) there is a well-founded suspicion 
that the person in question may use a weapon, explosive or dangerous object, b) (...)Weapon 
must not be used against a woman who is visibly pregnant, a person who looks younger than 
13 years old, elders, persons with a visible disability unless circumstances compel to do so. 
Soldiers described in Article 7(a), may preventively refer to the use coercive measures, the 
use of weapons or any other means of war accepted by international law to provide security 
for gear/ equipment and quarters”.  
This appears to constitute statutory Rules of Engagement; publicly available and 
introduced in a proper, envisaged by constitutional law, form. The idea of the law was to 
clarify the legal position of Polish soldiers serving abroad. However, a detailed analysis 
brings a few issues to the fore.  
Firstly, the new law lacks any reference to the Criminal Code. The Polish Criminal 
Code provides a list of so-called contra types. These are, in general, prohibited acts which in 
some circumstances may be not punishable, for example, self-defence or a vis maior concept. 
As a result, a person who commits a prohibited act, for example, kills a man due to special 
circumstances (contra type) may not be punished.
498
 ROE directives in descriptive way 
outline what should be done. However they do not state what is to be done in the event things 
go wrong. 
Secondly, the new law refers to customary law. In a continental system of law (except 
European Union law) it is a questionable idea to refer to sources of law which are not 
considered as sources of law by the Constitution.  
Thirdly, the notion of national caveats is problematic. Polish Armed Forces in 
Afghanistan, contrary to other European NATO members, did not provide any national 
caveats despite the fact that some aspects of Polish forces were under the direct command of 
the US.  
Despite this criticism, these simplified, publicly available ROE are a good example of 
law which should be applicable on the modern battlefield. They may constitute a point of 
departure of military forces training.  
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To summarize, the legal basis of ROE were issued in the form of a Statute. However, 
the ROE themselves do not constitute a Statute itself.  
 
3.4. 2 ARE ROE REGULATIONS? 
Since the Statute did not provide a proper method of implementing ROE into the legal 
system the question is whether this regulation shall be considered a proper vehicle to 
implement them. Regulations are the lowest acts in the hierarchy of universally-binding 
norms although regulations as international obligations may be implemented within the Polish 
legal system. According to Article 92 of the Constitution, “regulations shall be issued on the 
basis of specific authorization contained in, and for the purpose of implementation of, statutes 
by the organs specified in the Constitution. The authorization shall specify the organ 
appropriate to issue a regulation and the scope of matters to be regulated as well as guidelines 
concerning the provisions of such act”. Regulations may be used to implement resolutions and 
other acts of law issued by international organizations such as ROE. The question is however 
whether it is possible to consider ROE as regulations. 
The first condition regarding regulations is that they have to be based on specific 
authorization provided by a statute. This necessary element was introduced to the Statue on 
the use of Polish Military Forces abroad.
499
 
The most important point against the use regulations as a means to implement ROE 
lies in Article 88 of the Constitution which says, “the condition precedent for the coming into 
force of statutes, regulations and enactments of local law shall be the promulgation thereof”. 
Public promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland is a breach of the 
confidential nature of ROE. As such, regulations cannot be used to implement ROE. 
 
3.4. 3 ARE ROE AN INTERNAL ACT? 
Since Rules of Engagement may not be considered a regulation (because they should 
not be publicized), they do not belong to the universally-binding law category. The question is 
whether they belong to an internal category of law?  
As mentioned above, there are two types of acts in the Polish legal system: a) first 
group i.e. the constitution, international agreements, statutes and regulations are universally-
binding normative acts, b) the second group i.e. internally binding norms are orders (for 
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example a minister’s) and instructions. These acts shall bind only those organizational units or 
state agents which are subordinate to the organ which issues such an act. Amongst the 
authorised organs are the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the President, the Prime 
Minister and Ministers. The authority to issue orders and instructions may be transferred to 
other organs under statutory authorization. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned 
issues, the question needs to be raised of whether Rules of Engagement are internal acts, 
namely an order or instruction? 
Initially, ROE for a particular mission were issued by the Mission Commander. 
Currently under the new law, according to Article 7(c), ROE are issued by the Minister of 
Defence in the form of an internal act.
500
  
This internal act is based on a statute. This condition is fulfilled. However, according 
to the statutory definition, internal acts such as instruction or a minister’s orders may affect 
only subordinate organs and institutions. On the contrary, according to Article 93.2 of the 
Constitution, “[minister’s] ”orders shall only be issued on the basis of statute. They shall not 
serve as the basis for decisions taken in respect of citizens, legal persons and other 
subjects”.501 
As a result, a minister’s order outlined in Article 93.2 of the Constitution which 
provides instructions for subordinate organs and institutions shall not affect an unrelated 
group of people. In the case of ROE, this unrelated group of people may be the civilian 
population of Afghanistan as well as targeted insurgents.  
The implementation ROE through an internal act raises serious doubts. According to 
constitutional law, a ROE act does not satisfy all necessary conditions. Despite the fact that 
there is an act on a statute level which provides grounds for an internal act, it seems that such 
an order may affect the situation of an unrelated group of people. This goes beyond what an 
internal act may provide. 
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3.4. 5 ARE ROE A MILITARY ORDER? 
Since ROE do not qualify as a statute or a regulation and may not be considered an 
internal order of administrative nature issued by the Minister of Defence in the way envisaged 
by Article 92.3 of the Polish Constitution, the question is how to assess ROE at all. 
The last attempt to find a legal qualification of ROE is to consider whether they are 
military orders. According to Article 115 § 18 of the Polish Criminal Code, an “order is a 
command to undertake or refrain from taking a specified action issued officially to a soldier 
by the superior authority or authorized soldier of a superior rank”.502 An order is a particular 
unilateral act of will based on the legal relationship of superiority and subordination based on 
law. It creates an obligation to act for an addressee and the addressee needs to fulfil his or her 
obligations under penal sanction and/or coercive measures.
503
 An order is a legal structure 
which is commonly used to impose a will on other soldiers. According to Article 115 § 8 of 
the PCC, it is a concrete and individualised act.
504
 By this I mean that an order should be 
issued to an identifiable group of addressees. An order should be issued in regard to a 
particular activity. To fully analyse the concrete and individualised character of ROE, I need 
to refer to existing ones. For example, the following which are available due to the Wikileaks 
publications issued in regard to US forces in Iraq. Appendix E to OPROD (07-04), E 8 
provides in point (ii) S/Rel DTOs. “The following groups are terrorist organizations that have 
been designated by CDRUSCENTCOM as proper objects of attack and commanders may 
process members of these organizations as Deliberate Targets and Time Sensitive Targets. 
This is an additional authority and does not supersede the ability of US forces to use deadly 
force in self-defence.  
a(S/REL) Al qaida and related organizations  
b (S/REL) Ansar Islam 
c(S/REL) Taliban  
d(S/REL) Asbat al Ansat 
e(S/REL) Egyptian Islamic Group  
f(S/REL) Hamas  
g(S/REL) Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
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(...) 
n(S/REL) The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.”505 
 
Individualisation of an order makes it difficult to qualify ROE in this category. The 
above mentioned ROE are not individual in nature. It provides a group of targets without 
necessary details. For example, if a commander on the battlefield was required to detail when 
he faced a situation of the use of force against part-time Taliban members or when the Taliban 
was forced to provide munitions to a particular group of Taliban fighters. Additionally, ROE 
are not individualised because they are issued to an unidentifiable group of soldiers and 
commanders operating in the conflict area. As a result, the subject of ROE may be a 
commander of a logistic unit or a commander of Special Forces. 
The second issue which possibly excludes ROE from being categorised as an order is 
the concretization of the order. According to the decision of the Supreme Court, an order is a 
statement of will expressed by a superior in relation to a concrete task.
506
 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court stated “that violation by the soldier: staff regulation, instruction, ordinance or 
any other general rule is not to be considered as a punishable order of disobedience, even if 
implemented by order” 507 . In another judgment, the Supreme Military Court said that 
“training book and directives are merely instructions and not orders.”508 The Supreme Court 
also delivered a judgment where it said that “instructions which organize work time may not 
be equated with the order even if implemented by order”509. The Rules of Engagement quoted 
above leaves a significant gap in regard to its concrete character. A particular commander is 
left with several possibilities to address in a particular situation. Such an approach leaves to 
the commander the interpretation of law on the battlefield. These ROE contain only possible 
scenarios and the final decision is always left to a particular commander. Taking the above 
into consideration, a court interpretation and the fact that ROE definition says that they 
constitute directives are convincing arguments not to consider ROE as a military order. They 
are too descriptive in nature and too general to be found as a military order.  
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This analysis of the legal structure of ROE leads to the conclusion that they do not 
constitute a law. This would locate them within realm of political and disciplinary measures 
not related to the law. If ROE are not military orders or any other source of law then what is 
the relation between ROE and the law? What is the relation between obedience and 
disobedience to ROE from the perspective of criminal responsibility? These issues will be 
addressed below.  
 
3.4. 6 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VIOLATION OF ROE? - NANGAR KHEL 
CASE STUDY  
ROE are neither an order nor a law. However, under some circumstances they may 
become law. Let’s imagine the following situation: a battlefield commander receives ROE 
from HQ. It is a lengthy document which is intended to support the decision process. The 
commander issues a particular, individual order based on the ROE which becomes law. It is 
based on ROE and on the operational situation. As such, the elements of the ROE become an 
order and eventually a law. However, even when introduced in the form of an order, ROE do 
not became more coherent with Polish Criminal Law. It is still a document which is alien to 
the domestic legal system and therefore is of debatable character.  
In this section I would like to refer to the Nangar Khel case which is an example of a 
possible issue related to the violation of ROE. 
This case is pending before various military courts and is the first war crime trial since 
World War II aftermath in Poland. The incident took place on 16 August 2007. An insurgent-
improvised explosive device injured two Polish soldiers near the village of Nangar Khel, 
Paktika Province. Following the incident, the Polish patrol consisting of soldiers of the 18th 
Airborne Battalion carried out a mortar attack, firing 26 mortar grenades and rounds with 
heavy machine guns. Six persons were killed in the village where a wedding was taking place. 
Some other villagers were seriously injured.
510
 The soldiers were arrested and some of them 
are still on trial, of which most are charged with unlawful killing of civilians and attacking 
unprotected civilian property.
511 
The case is still pending.
512
 The prolonged imprisonment of 
the soldiers at the initial stage of the trial
513
, as well the mass media cry around the case, had a 
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negative impact on many soldiers. It resulted with, claimed by many soldiers, the existence of 
the so-called post-Nangar Khel syndrome – a lack of knowledge of what is and what is not 
allowed on the battlefield and the fear to use weapons in combat situation.  
This case, although not fully adjudicated yet, brings about an interesting legal question 
of how ROE may affect soldiers’ responsibility from the perspective of coexistence with 
Polish Criminal Law. This is also interesting to analyse from the perspective of the concept of 
a mistake outlined by Article 32 of ICC which says, “A mistake of fact shall be a ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime”. 
Is following ROE a mistake under some circumstances? 
As stated above, criminal law is applicable mostly during the time of peace. However, 
it is a ground for soldiers’ responsibility before a court in the time of peace and in the time of 
an armed conflict.
514
 During an armed conflict, soldiers do, what under peace circumstances, 
is not allowed, for example, killing people not in self-defence, bombarding insurgents instead 
arresting them and similar.  
The applicability of humanitarian law means that soldiers’ actions in conjunction with 
the Criminal Code are mostly affected by the principle of proportionality as stated in Article 
51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
515
 As such, the principle of 
proportionality helps to clarify whether the soldier’s deed was or was not a violation of 
Criminal Code. The logic is as follows: soldiers on the battlefield do what is generally 
prohibited by criminal law, however these actions are conducted under IHL. When they kill in 
combat and violate the principle of proportionality that automatically becomes a violation of 
the Criminal Code. 
However, another question may be raised of how to treat a soldier who follows ROE 
and may contradict the Criminal Code. An interesting opinion was delivered by the Appellate 
Court in Katowice which stated that “when a culprit who is not a lawyer, consults his actions 
with attributed to the particular organ body of legal advisers and then follows what he was 
told (although the opinion was wrongly crafted), his actions are considered a mistake of 
law”.516   
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A similar situation refers to soldiers on the battlefield. When they receive a ROE-
based order, they are in position to put their full trust in it. However, when ROE are poorly 
translated
517
, the government has not included national caveats, when ROE are incoherent 
with Polish legal system or international obligations than it may and should be considered a 
mistake of law. This interpretation follows Article 318 of the PCC presented above. However, 
as mentioned earlier, the Polish Criminal Code is strict about obeying orders. The norm 
provided by Article 319 of the PCC introduces the right to punish a soldier who does not 
follow orders. By the right to punish, the Polish Criminal Code is meant to impose all 
necessary measures to enforce obedience. In a combat situation it may take the form of using 
a firearm against opposing soldier.
518
 Of course the interpretation of Article 318 of the PCC 
does not support the interpretation that imposing unlawful order is protected by the law. Only 
lawful order gets this protection. However, one must remember that, particularly in an 
international environment, it is difficult to fully grasp what is and what is not legal.  
 Similar problems are related to the application of ICC norms. Article 32. 2 of the ICC 
Statute provides, “A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. 
A mistake of law may, however, be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates 
the mental element required by such a crime, or as provided by Article 33”.519 This regulation 
may be particularly important during operations such as in Afghanistan when Polish or British 
military forces may be under less strict (in terms of the applicable law) US command. It is not 
difficult to imagine such a hypothetical case where Polish or British troops call a close air 
strike support. It is executed by an American pilot. As result of the bombardment, civilians 
are killed. Polish or British forces may operate under different ROE. Who is responsible for 
the IHL violation? The party which called the CAS and provided the target or the party which 
executed the order according to its own ROE? Another similar, reverse situation may occur 
where a US officer gives the command to destroy an object and the fire mission is executed 
by Polish or British forces. Who is then responsible? 
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We also need to remember that modern military operations are executed in a 
multinational environment. The above-mentioned situations may be even more complex when 
Polish and French soldiers enter into the chain of command and Turkish and Scottish officers 
are under Italian command within US regional command. All of them speak English, 
however, very often they can hardly understand each other. 
 
3.5. ROE STATUS IN THE BRITISH LEGAL SYSTEM 
The situation of ROE under British law is only a slightly clearer. To address the 
problem of the status of Rules of Engagement in the British legal system (England and Wales 
only), I shall briefly describe some relevant legal regulations. Later, I shall outline basic 
information regarding the status of the British forces in Afghanistan. The following section 
will be devoted to the legal basis of ROE in the British legal system as well as the relation 
between ROE and British law.  
 
3.5. 1 BRITISH LEGAL SYSTEM –  RELEVANT REGULATIONS  
In order to comparatively discuss the nature of Rules of Engagement I will refer to the 
character of ROE in the British legal system. British law, contrary to continental law, is of a 
common law character. Compared to Poland, British law provides a broader spectrum of 
specialized legislation regulating military matters. The legal situation of a person joining the 
army is regulated by a system of military regulations - separate from general law - such as the 
Army Act 1955, Air Force Act 1955 or Naval Discipline Act 1957. It does not exclude military 
personnel from universally-binding law. It means that the status of military personnel is 
partially modified when compared with civilians. Their rights and obligations are limited. It is 
due to compliance with military readiness and disciplinary requirements. For example, a 
civilian employee who abandons his or her workplace may not be criminally prosecuted. In 
the same situation, when military personnel is concerned, prosecution may be initiated.
520
  
Interestingly, military personnel when faced with the charge of a serious offence may 
be tried by a court other than a martial court. Section 133 of the Army Act 1955 gives the 
civilian court the right to initiate and conduct proceedings.
521
 This is limited to the situation 
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when military courts do not take the case further.
522
 Such a situation took place in 2005 in the 
case of R v Trooper Williams. When the case was dropped by the military prosecution, it was 
brought before the court by the Crown Prosecution Service which is a civilian institution.
523
  
Additionally, it must be mentioned that some crimes are not codified. The legal system 
in England and Wales has no one unified criminal code. Work on the criminal code is 
ongoing.
524
 Currently, some crimes are considered common law crimes and some are 
regulated by written law such as the Homicide Act of 1957. 
What makes the ROE discussion even more complex is the concept of the Queen's 
Peace (or during a King’s ruling, the King’s Peace). This concept excludes from criminal 
responsibility a person killed during an armed conflict.
525
 As stated in R. v Clegg (Lee 
William) House of Lords, 19 January 1995, one does not commit a homicide that killed the 
enemy abroad.
526
 
 Supplementary to regulations related to ROE is the implementation of the Rome 
Statute to the British legal system. Before the implementation of the International Criminal 
Court Act, domestic law partially regulated those issues as it was during Pinochet extradition 
case.
527
 To avoid issuing an indictment, act only in reference to customary law, Great Britain 
incorporated an ICC statute. The fifth part of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 says 
that crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, as defined in the ICC, 
constitute crimes in the domestic system of law.
528
 Thanks to this, grave crimes of 
international law have become sanctioned by British law.
529
 The above-mentioned regulations 
apply to both civilians and military personnel. The ICC Statute incorporation to the British 
legal system was, in fact, better executed in comparison to the similar situation with the Polish 
legal system. The existence of the Polish Criminal Code creates an issue of interoperability 
whereas, in the UK, the lack of criminal code allowed the full, coherent implantation of the 
                                                          
522
K. Laue, A. Lang, UK Army in Iraq- Time to come clean on civilian torture report, p.11,  available at 
www.redress.org/downloads/publications/UK_ARMY_IN_IRAQ_-
_TIME_TO_COME_CLEAN_ON_CIVILIAN_TORTURE_Oct%2007.pdf (10.12.2012) 
523
 http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/120_05/ (10.12.2015) 
524
 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/newsletter_spring_2009.pdf (10.11.2014) 
525 
Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice,. Chapter 19 - Offences Against the Person Section I. – 
Homicide, Section A. – Murder. Sekcja 19-19, ed. 2010. 
526
 [1995] 1 All ER 334 
527
 Against Augusto Pinochet was brought case based on the Universal Jurisdiction 
528
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/17/part/5 (10.12.2014) 
529
 R. Cryer, Implementation of the International Criminal Court Statute in England and Wales, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 2002 p. 740. 
 139 
 
ICC Statute. Proper implementation of the Statute lead to the first conviction based on the 
International Criminal Court Act of Corporal Donald Payne.
530
 
 Another important factor which influences the position of ROE in the legal system is 
customary law. According to the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 and the Geneva Convention 
(Amendment) Act 1995, Conventions and Additional Protocols were incorporated to the 
British legal system. Additionally, humanitarian law development and judgments of 
international tribunals create questions related to the direct use of customary law before courts 
of England and Wales. As Lord Denning in the Trendex case 
531
 said, “seeing that the rules of 
international law have changed, and do change, and that the courts have given effect to the 
changes without any Act of Parliament, it follows to my mind inexorably that the rules of 
international law, as existing from time to time, do form part of our English law”.532 
 
3.5.2 ROE AND BRITISH LAW 
In order to define the position of ROE in a legal system it is easier to refer to existing 
case law. To begin with I will try to exclude ROE from the British legal system. As an 
example to support this statement, I shall refer to the engagement of British forces in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. During the operation in the early nineties, the UK participated in an 
international effort to stabilize the situation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. British 
forces were part of the United Nations operation. During this operation, there was no 
document which would have implemented ROE into the legal system of England and Wales, 
which was a consequence of the United Nations Act 1946.
533
 The Act did not provide a legal 
ground for issuing ROE which could have been considered a part of the British legal system. 
Even when ROE were reissued by the Ministry of Defence, they did not, thereby, became part 
of English law. According to Lord Lowry, “there was, of course, at the same time in existence 
what is called the yellow card; something the contents of which, it seems are largely dictated 
by policy and are intended to lay down guidelines for the security forces but which do not 
define the legal rights and obligations of members of the forces under statute or common 
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law”.534 As a consequence, in Bosnia, soldiers during open fire would have been liable only 
for a breach of British criminal or military law.
535
 
 Similarly, the situation is regulated in the US system of law. Violations of ROE 
directives do not give grounds for criminal liability. The only ground for criminal liability 
may be a violation of domestic regulations such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The 
Corporal McGhee case may be provided as an example. During his duty in Vietnam, he killed 
a civilian in a village. As a result, he was tried and sentenced under UCMJ but not under 
violation of the ROE.
536
 
 Confirmation that Rules of Engagement are not considered a source of law may also 
be found in the statement provided by the US Department of Defence.
537
  
 
3.5.3 ROE VIOLATION IN THE UK 
In the discussion regarding ROE, the responsibility for ROE violation is a problematic 
issue. The basic assumption is that a soldier will be responsible for his or her act according to 
the law of the country in which a crime is committed. However, such a situation is purely 
hypothetical. Foreign troops are always secured by the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). 
SOFA excludes troops from the possibility of being prosecuted in the host country. Such an 
agreement was concluded between the government of Bosnia and Great Britain on 15 May 
1993 before deployment of the British troops there.
538
  
The above-mentioned principle may be modified by external factors. Such a situation 
took place in Bosnia. Despite the fact that the UK government concluded SOFA with the 
Bosnian government, part of the country remained under the influence of other parties, 
namely the Serbs and the Croats. In such a situation, if a self-proclaimed state (for example 
the Serbian Republic in Bosnia) captures a UN soldier, they might have found themselves on 
trial under the criminal law of one of these entities.
539
 Hypothetically, in the case of 
Afghanistan by analogy, one might say that British soldiers, thanks to SOFA, are excluded 
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from responsibility under Afghan law but not under Taliban law.  
To summarize, UK soldiers will be held liable for violation not of ROE but of their 
respective military codes.  
 
3.5.4 ROE IMPLEMENTATION IN UK  
British ROE are introduced before each particular military operation. Initially, there is 
a reference to the so-called Political Policy Indicator which clarifies the trends regarding the 
foreseeable or expected development of the operation. In fact, there may be three types of 
conclusions such as: X ray – de-escalation, Zulu – escalation of the situation and Yankee – 
status quo. When structuring particular ROE there is also a reference to the right to self-
defense as stated in section 3 (1) of the 1967 Criminal Law Act which says that “A person 
may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in 
effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons 
unlawfully at large”.540 This rule, despite being part of the law of England and Wales, is 
similar to the law of other parts of UK i.e. Northern Ireland and Scotland.  
 As to the practical aspects of shaping ROE, usually they are created within the realm 
of cooperation of the following levels of command. At the top there is the Command Joint 
Task Force (CJTF), then below there are another four levels, i.e. the Land Component 
Commander, the Army Component Commander (ACC), the Maritime CC and Special Forces. 
Below this structure, for example for Maritime CC, there is the Commander Task Group 
(CTG) and then there are the particular Task Units. When there is a need for Rules of 
Engagement for a particular operation, a specific Task Unit sends a so-called ROEREQ (ROE 
Request) to the higher level, i.e. the Commander Task Group. As a result of the request, a so-
called ROEAUTH (ROE authorization) which contains the ROE for the anticipated operation 
is provided. Each level may apply to the higher level of command and, for example, CTG, 
may request to the Maritime CC for ROE. Before issuing, ROE are verified in terms of their 
coherence with other Component Commanders’ ROE and, if needed, also at the CJTF 
level.
541
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3.6. OTHER LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO ROE  
In order to examine a broader perspective of ROE I shall describe other regulations, 
which are relevant to ROE, such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Some of the 
military forces activities in Afghanistan are regulated not only by ROE but also by Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP). They provide information which support ROE. Similarly to 
ROE, access to them is limited. 
ROE are introduced in the operational plan of the mission, the so-called OPLAN. In 
case of the NATO operation, it is Appendix E to the OPLAN.
542
 OPLAN also provides other 
documents such as Standard Operating Procedures. These documents are less sensitive than 
ROE so their establishment is less complicated. Usually SOP do not reach the same level of 
secrecy as ROE. SOP provide procedures on several issues which help to unify cooperation 
between the operation’s components. They are of special value in a multinational 
environment. For example, SOP for claims was introduced by OPLAN Appendix AA Legal. 
It provided that NATO HQ Claim’s Office was located in Kabul and seen as an appellate 
instance. Whereas the primary subject for dealing with claims is the claims unit of TCN 
(Troops Contributing Nation).
543
  
SOP, in general, provide a set of information which helps to smoothly run a military 
operation. They may regulate the situation within a multinational operation i.e. claims, but 
also regulate basic activities such as the issue of unloading a weapon before entering a DFAC 
(dining facility).  
However, there are SOP of crucial importance in terms of the mission perception and 
its contribution to the rule of law in the country where the operation is taking place. Such was 
the case of the SOP on the transfer of detainees. 
SOP 362, which regulates the transfer of detainees, states that the detainees are 
eventually to be handed over to the authority of the Government of Afghanistan (GOA).
544
 
This straightforward SOP, in practice, raised several issues. The treatment of detainees 
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transferred to Afghan forces became especially questionable. The issue was brought to light in 
the case of R. (on the application of Evans) v Secretary of State for Defence
545
. The case was 
related to the practice of the British forces when transferring suspected detainees. The British 
forces were transferring detainees held in British custody in Afghanistan to a governmental 
intelligence organization called the National Directorate of Security (NDS). The claimant, 
who is a peace activist, brought the case to public interest by stating that there is a potential 
risk of mistreatment of the transferees in Afghanistan.
546
 The general British policy is that 
such detainees are to be transferred to the Afghan authorities within 96 hours or released, but 
are not to be transferred where there is a real risk at the time of transfer that they will suffer 
torture or serious mistreatment.
547
 The claimant contended that the assessment had been 
wrong and unfounded throughout and that transfers should not have been made and should 
not now be made.
548
  
 In order to regulate the situation of detainees, on 23 April 2006 the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) entered into force between the UK and the Government of 
Afghanistan.  
The MOU concerned the transfer of persons detained in Afghanistan to the Afghan 
authorities by UK armed forces.
549
 Based on this MOU, detainees were transferred to 
Kandahar, Kabul and Lashkar Gah.
550
 
 In addition, there was an Exchange of Letters (EoL) between the UK and other ISAF 
states on the one hand and the Government of Afghanistan on the other, outlining an 
additional provision about the access to the Afghan facilities by personnel of the transferring 
states and by non-governmental and international bodies.
551
  
As a result of the inspection of the detaining facilities conducted without prior 
notification, the British forces decided not to transfer detainees to NDS facilities in Kabul. 
Transfer of detainees to other locations such as Kandahar was restricted. 
552
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 This case brought an interesting issue of extraterritorial application of human rights
553
, 
and interoperability between SOP and the TCN legal system. It also shows the complexity of 
modern military operations. SOP are a natural and convenient mechanism to create a unified 
and compatible environment for military forces. However their application should be 
proceeded by meticulous analysis of the legal environment of the TCN similar to the one 
conducted in respect to ROE.  
  
3.7. THE ROLE OF MILITARY MANUALS  
Military manuals play a supplementary role toward understanding, interpreting and 
implementing IHL. They are to be divided into two categories: domestic manuals and 
international manuals. International manuals are the result of joint effort of experts working in 
their personal capacity and representing the collective and agreed view of participating 
experts, whereas national military manuals tend to be prepared to express the view of the state 
as to which rules bind this state and how these rules are to be interpreted.
554
   
An example of published international manuals are the Sanremo Manual in 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea published by the International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law and very much discussed Interpretive Guidance on the notion 
of Direct Participation in Hostilities published by the ICRC.
555
  
International Manuals, even in the early days of the development of treaty law when 
humanitarian law was far less codified, were never sources of binding law. For example, the 
famous Oxford Manual adopted in 1880 was never ratified.  
Nowadays, international humanitarian law is a system which rapidly develops. It is 
tempting to consider International Manuals or Interpretive Guidance as customary law. But 
they are not law now, just as they were not in the 19
th
 century. These manuals are not a source 
of international law; they simply reflect the opinion of experts engaged in their creation. 
556
 
Still, they are to be a kind of authoritative source of knowledge, a confirmation of existing 
law in an easy to use form from which the text of a law may be easily extracted when it’s 
needed for practical application. At the very least manuals are to be seen as a form of a 
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progressive development
557
 and lead to lege ferenda conclusions.
558
 What is most important is 
that international manuals have proved to be of valuable assistance to all those who deal with 
practical aspects of IHL observance such as legal advisers to military forces. They set forth a 
useful framework against which inadequacies in the law can be at least partially addressed.
559
 
In this respect, international manuals may be of great value during the process of preparing 
ROE and safeguarding national troops when operating within an international environment.  
 As to domestic manuals, such as the one published by the British MoD, their aim is to 
provide an interpretation of international law, the state practice of law as seen by the United 
Kingdom, and possibly opinio iuris which can be used in the development of the law.
560
 
Military IHL manuals are a very helpful set of interpretations of non-confidential directives to 
all kinds of armed forces. They play a supplementary role toward ROE. However, taking into 
consideration the role of judicial judgments in the British legal system, there is also a different 
perception of humanitarian law manuals. Published in 2004, the United Kingdom Manual of 
the Law of Armed Conflict is a continuation of the Manual on the Law of War on Land written 
in 1958 by Sir Hersch’a Lauterpacht. A current manual is published jointly by the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) and Oxford Press. The idea behind this publication is to present principles of 
ius in bello from the British perspective. It clearly indicates British opinio juris and the state 
practice.  
 The question is how a manual may affect both ROE for the British forces and IHL 
implementation in the UK in general. It is not binding but it is a statement of will made with 
some reservations.
561
 Additionally, in contrary to ROE, manuals are widely available. They 
may be subject to research. Nowadays, an increasing tendency can be observed to cite 
national manuals as evidence before international tribunals.
562
 As such, they may obtain the 
status of a customary law since they constitute state practice and influence opinio iuris. As a 
result, the UK’s MoD was cautious on controversial issues563 because manuals’ directives 
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may return to the British legal system as a binding principle of customary law.
564
 Of course 
the II Hague Convention of 1899 says that the Parties to the Convention should issue 
instructions to its armed forces which must conform to the law and customs of war.
565
 So it is 
challenging to strike the balance between the implementation and avoidance of creating too 
strict an interpretation of the law.  
The second issue result from the nature of modern operations i.e. internalization of 
military actions. Many countries issue their own manuals. The problem arises when allied 
countries take diametrically-opposed views of the law in their manuals.
566
 To avoid this 
situation, an unofficial “working group” was formed of legal officers from the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand who have been meeting on an 
irregular basis since the late 1970s.
567
 This may, at least in theory, iron out some of the 
frictions.
568
  
As to the British Manual, despite some criticism based on merits, for example the lack 
of reference to the “Global War on terror” concept or continuous support for reprisals, which 
is very debatable practice,
569
 it is of a great value. It plays a supportive role to ROE especially 
during peace time where there is enough time to analyse particular scenarios. Polish forces 
have no similar manual. The only attempt to fill the gap was made by the Military Centre of 
Civic Education in Warsaw. Two publications, the first designated to private soldiers and non-
commissioned officers and the second to officers, written in collaboration with academics and 
officers and former military prosecutors seem to play a similar role.  
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3.8 ROE IN BRITISH ARMY –  PRACTICAL ISSUES  
The above-mentioned aspects related to law observance on the battlefield have to be 
assessed against another issue which is soldiers’ ability to understand the basic text and 
command. Even the most accurate rules are not automatically understandable for a soldier. As 
research shows, it is estimated that some 42% of soldiers have literacy skills below Level 1 
(standard expected of 5-6 year olds)
 
.
570
 With such low literacy skills, following rules may not 
be an issue of conscious choice of what is good or wrong but an issue of not understanding 
basic commands.  
This research clearly shows that for ROE implementation two elements are necessary. 
The first is clarity of law. The second, equally important, is the issue of properly prepared 
educational programs orientated to soldiers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Rules of Engagement produce a legal challenge during modern military operations. On 
the one hand, they are of a great value. They contribute to the unification and compatibility of 
the mission. They are particularly important in a multinational environment. They help to 
create a more efficient military structure where each of the components may communicate 
using the same language and terms. On the other hand, their legal character is debatable. As I 
argued in this chapter, they may not be considered as a source of international law. Within a 
domestic legal system they also shouldn’t be considered legally binding. This means that 
ROE, as a whole, should not be considered as any form of law or order. They obtain a legal 
order character only when they are, or elements of it are, introduced into a particular 
commander’s order. However, even when properly introduced to the military order, they do 
not exclude the application of criminal law and other laws such as international criminal or 
humanitarian law. As a result, from the perspective of the possible legal responsibility before 
a court of law, the most important is following the law of the country of origin rather than 
Rules of Engagement. This conclusion is based on the comparative analysis of the Polish law 
and Law of England and Wales.  
 ROE may be, under some circumstances, a mitigating factor of criminal 
responsibility. As argued above, they may lead, under some circumstances, to the exclusion of 
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culpability. However, one must not forget that following orders is one of the major 
obligations of a soldier. A lack of following orders may result in disciplinary or criminal 
responsibility.  
 This places particular importance on the legal services of every army, especially 
operating in alliance with countries with lower legal standards, for example, Afghan or US 
forces. It is up to the legal service to provide a clear and consistent with national criminal law 
set of Rules of Engagement which help troops on the ground. It is also vital to introduce a 
system of education and implementation of IHL suitable to every level of the chain of 
command. Part of this system are and should be military manuals. However, it is equally 
important to train soldiers in the decision making process related to observance of IHL and 
ROE during peace time. As mentioned above, training should be properly tailored to every 
level of military structure from the basic programs and training designed for foot soldiers to 
more advanced and complex training for commanders.  
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CHAPTER 4 
MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 
 
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. 
Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it 
perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 
them, not to win it for them. 
Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of 
Arabia, your practical work will not be as good 
as, perhaps, you think it is." 
Lawrence of Arabia
571
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
My thesis addresses legal issues arising out of military operations in Afghanistan, 
focusing on ius in bello practical aspects of the NATO operation. The discussion about a new 
vision of counterinsurgency and its compliance with the International Humanitarian Law 
could raise important legal questions, which would have an effect on contemporary 
international law. This thesis will analyse the modern counterinsurgency approach brought by 
General Petraeus, arguing that in some cases this approach better fits the needs of civilian 
population than outdated treaty regulations.  
It is suggested that conclusions drawn and observations made with regard to 
Afghanistan could be of wider significance and application. It is because many politicians and 
scholars believe that insurgencies and asymmetric conflicts are likely to be the wars of the 
future
572. These ‘new wars', are anti governmental in nature. They are fought by different 
types of militias, paramilitaries, gangs and loosely organized rebel groups instead of 
organized militaries for whom military victory may be impracticable, inefficient or 
insufficient to achieve their aims. In these new wars, economic motivations and mindless 
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ethnic hatred had replaced national interests or ideological visions as the driving forces of 
these conflicts. In modern days conflicts the civilian population, are to be considered the 
centre of gravity. These wars are often conducted in aenvironment where the collapse of state 
structures and the disintegration of the social fabric take place.
573
 Justification of the future 
asymmetric character of the conflicts also lays in economy. According to Kuźniar, 16% of the 
world’s population spends 75% of global military expenses. As he argues, a power and 
military expenditures of rich countries will push poorer countries and entities into asymmetric 
warfare.
574
 This is why it is so important to face the challenge and try to analyse the law 
applicable during modern asymmetrical, non-international armed conflicts.  
The law of armed conflict is also known as the laws of war or international 
humanitarian law, was developed and codified in times of more traditional state to state 
conflicts.
575
 It was created to fit the type of conventional, symmetrical, international wars 
fought in the 19th and 20th centuries with an assumption that the conventional war strategy - 
kill or capture the enemy - was the route to victory. Symmetrical warfare is to be understood 
as an armed conflict between states of roughly equal military strength.
576
 Even when two 
countries represent different level of equipment and training vide Iraq vs US (2003), or 
Georgia vs Russia (2008), they refer to the traditional way of conducting the war. They 
operate under similar principles using similar means of warfare.
577
 In traditional conflicts, the 
need to destroy an enemy has traditionally been considered the centre of gravity, reflecting the 
concept of Frederick the Great of "entire destruction of your enemies” which can be 
accomplished by death, injury, or any other means.
578
 Only once common art. 3 of 1949 the 
Geneva Conventions was enacted, did humanitarian law become more orientated on non-
international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, non-international armed conflicts are still far less 
regulated than international ones. Both law and strategy are currently better developed in 
order to address classical, conventional international armed conflicts. 
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However, modern conflicts are - in most cases - non international in character. During 
non-international conflicts there is usually an asymmetrical balance of force resources. Non-
state actors employ asymmetric means and methods against state military forces.
579
 
Inequalities in arms and the significant disparity between belligerents have become a 
prominent feature of various contemporary armed conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan. 
The spread of innovations like portable hand-held missiles, difficult to detect or undetectable 
explosives, and communication tools offered loosely-organized insurgents affordable and 
effective means of confronting stronger opponents.
580
 Democratization or privatization of the 
means of warfare provided opportunities for non-state actors to challenge not only their own 
governments but also the international powers.
581
 The particular characteristics of modern day 
asymmetric conflicts result in certain repercussions for the application of the fundamental 
principles of international humanitarian law.
582
 In asymmetric conflicts, the principle of 
reciprocity which traditionally forces conflict parties to observe IHL, is betrayed and 
chivalrous values replaced by treachery.
583
 In an asymmetric conflict between governmental 
or pro-governmental forces and local insurgents, neither side has incentives to comply and 
obey the law of IHL. It is partially because the regulation of asymmetric warfare requires a 
different structure of incentives to have any effect on the parties.
584
 Consequently the 
asymmetric conflict possesses both normative and institutional challenges which affect 
strategy, tactics and politics issues. The normative challenges stem from the fact that the 
traditional ius in bello is not sensitive to the power relations between adversaries in 
asymmetric conflicts. This is due to the assumption of equality of arms which is unrealistic in 
most non-international asymmetric armed conflicts.
585
 The laws of war favour the stronger 
army because the weaker party is expected to play by the rules that predetermine its defeat.
586
 
The weaker side is likely to find such a law morally questionable and certainly not worthy of 
compliance.
587
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In conventional conflicts, the centre of gravity of the military operations was to kill or 
capture the enemy or its military forces. Current conflicts show a significant change in 
emphasis. The centre of gravity is a civilian population; the war is often conducted to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the population.588 What is more, the traditional doctrine to kill and 
capture is sometimes changed to a more holistic one. The new “win-the-population” doctrine 
imposes different types of obligation on military forces.
589
. The only effective way of 
“winning” a modern armed conflict is to bring stability, sound economy and rules of law. For 
that purpose, military means and methods have to be mixed with policing ones. Currently, as 
Pfanner argues, “it is debatable whether the challenges of asymmetrical war can be met with 
the contemporary law of war. If war between States is on the way out, perhaps the norms of 
international law that were devised for them are becoming obsolete as well.”590 It seems that 
the current situation may require the modification of rules of international humanitarian law. 
In terms of internal conflict, humanitarian law has little to offer in rebuilding the state. It also 
says little about the means and methods of conducting warfare. It does however forbid some 
means and methods. Those means and methods rightfully forbidden in international armed 
conflict may be useful and successfully implemented during non-international 
counterinsurgency operations. Finally, there are areas of counterinsurgency which are not 
governed by the humanitarian law but only by the human rights law.  
This chapter will evaluate the legal challenges arising out of modern 
counterinsurgency operations, arguing that general principles of international humanitarian 
law do not fully match modern counterinsurgency. This is because humanitarian law has 
become inadequate to meet challenges posed by modern conflicts. As some argue, law of 
armed conflicts (LOAC) is inapplicable or simply cannot work in the new warfare. Others 
contend that, while still relevant, LOAC needs new treaties or protocols to be effective.
591
 The 
most recent substantive amendments to the Geneva Law occurred with the adoption of the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. Since then, despite the rapid 
development of international law, little has been done to address the burning questions of 
modern humanitarian law, notwithstanding the adoption of instruments restricting or 
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prohibiting the use of certain types of weapon, including anti-personnel landmines. 
Customary Law Study published by the International Committee of the Red Cross often lacks 
convincing opinio iuris and state practice. To address the above issues, I will present not only 
the concept of counterinsurgency but also the notion of insurgency. It should help to better 
understand the dynamics related to the modern armed conflict.  
This chapter is also an opportunity to discuss the most important issues related to IHL 
from the perspective of modern counterinsurgency. The principle of distinction will be 
presented as a part of discussion on targeted killing and the role of military oriented 
humanitarian projects such as PRT. Further, the principle of proportionality will be discussed. 
In this chapter, I will also refer to the notion of the civilian loss compensation during the 
conduct of lawful and unlawful military operations under IHL. Additionally, this chapter will 
refer to another vital issue of humanitarian law, i.e. the validity of the law of occupation in the 
light of concepts such as ius post bellum from the perspective of modern counterinsurgency. 
The last part of this chapter will be dedicated to the use of non-lethal weapons in a non-
international asymmetric environment.  
 
4.1. MODERN INSURGENCY  
 An “insurgency” is an organized, popular movement aimed at overthrowing a 
constituted government through use of violence and armed conflict. It is a protracted political 
and military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power, or other authority.
592
 This non legally binding definition 
emphasises that all insurgencies have one feature in common, which is the fact that they are 
aiming at, or in the process of, taking over governing capabilities from the government; “a 
government that is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it is being out governed”.593 
Insurgency, being a manifestation of deeper, widespread issues in society, is premised on 
winning “heart and minds”.594 
There are different types of insurgency. They can be conspiratorial in nature 
(Bolsheviks scenario), military-focused (all types of military coup d'état), urban (Latin 
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America) or protracted popular war.
595
 The last one is especially interesting. Protracted 
popular war is usually asymmetric in nature and raises the most complex legal, economic and 
political challenges. This kind of insurgency is being fought in Iraq, and, what is most 
important from my perspective, in Afghanistan.  
 The protracted theory of war was shaped by Mao Zedong. His theory of protracted war 
outlines a three-phased, political-military approach. The first phase is a strategic defence 
when the government has a stronger correlation of forces and insurgents must concentrate on 
survival and building support. The second is a strategic stalemate, when force correlations 
approach equilibrium and guerrilla warfare becomes the most important activity. The third 
phase is a strategic counteroffensive, when insurgents have superior strength and their 
military forces move to conventional operations to destroy the government’s military 
capability.
596
 These three phases are conducted with one major principle in mind - the civilian 
population is the centre of gravity in an insurgency.
597
  
All these phases of insurgency are present in Afghanistan. There are areas such as the 
central and northern provinces where Taliban activity is limited, which corresponds with the 
first phase. There are provinces where strategic stalemate has taken place such as Ghazni, 
Wardak and Logar. There are provinces where Taliban forces have reached the level where 
they could conventionally destroy governmental forces (the third phase), as in southern and 
eastern provinces - especially Helmand and Kandahar. At the practical level, the presence of 
insurgents in Afghanistan is indicated by their control of security, law making and 
administration, licit and illicit goods trade and taxation.  
Governing any territory is not possible without a sustainable economy. This is why 
insurgents create a war economy. As a result, states lose their grip on the activities of the 
insurgents. Nowadays, an asymmetric conflict often evolves from an idealistic struggle into a 
self-propelled business. In failed states such as Afghanistan, the war is a chance for insurgents 
to obtain money and power. Accessibility of light arms creates the situation that being an 
insurgent is the way to provide food and security for the group or tribe. War in such a case is 
not as Clausewitz said “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” or an “extension 
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of national policy”, but rather an end in itself. A situation of endemic war creates space for 
warlords and for all those who gain from armed conflicts.
598
 The question of security is 
particularly important. By constantly challenging the governmental and ISAF forces, 
insurgents create an atmosphere of insecurity, especially to all whose activity is related to the 
government. On the other hand, insurgents provide some kind of security in territories where 
they are dominant. Consequently they are a cause of but also a remedy, for lack of security. 
However, even a complete victory of the insurgents does not provide security to the whole 
country, e.g. for the last twenty years Afghanistan’s security situation has deteriorated.599 Part 
of the insurgents’ dominance is shown by the creation of their own law and administration. In 
the territories where Taliban execute control, shadow district and provincial governors are in 
power.
600
 Additionally, to prevent abuse by local military commanders, the institution of 
ombudsman has also been established by the insurgents.
601
 A certain type of law has also been 
imposed by the insurgents. This is especially visible in the territories where informal systems 
of law such as Sharia are already dominant. These informal legal systems, although popular, 
are often under strong pressure from local warlords and strongmen.
602
  
In certain areas, drug production is another key issue of the conflict in Afghanistan, 
but it is also characteristic to most of the modern armed conflicts. For example: a farmer earns 
an estimated 13 000 USD from a hectare of poppy fields versus 400 USD from a hectare of 
wheat.
603
 The example shows what sort of incentive a drug production offers to both 
insurgents and farmers. Drug production is a part of the war economy in Afghanistan. The 
existence of a failed state or a state without control over its territory creates space for warlords 
to establish drug production. Profits from narcotics production corrupts local administration in 
every province. It is almost impossible to carry out the simplest development project unless 
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drug lords clear them first.
604
 According to the US government, an estimated 360 million 
dollars of its aid has ended up directly in Taliban hands.
605
 It completely corrupts the legal 
economy and as a result in 2006 drug production contributed 46% of Afghanistan GDP.
606
  
The next issue to be discussed is taxation. According to the international and Afghan 
law enforcement officials’ estimate, the insurgents need 600 – 800 million US dollars a year 
to conduct their operations.
607
 This money is gathered by insurgents in two ways. The first is 
the illicit production of goods and smuggling. The second is taxation. A non-state taxation 
levy is imposed by insurgents on almost every movement of goods both licit and illicit. This 
is not only damaging towards the local population but also to the state’s economy. 608 
Additionally, it removes from the state the possibility of having revenues to uphold the police 
and military forces.  
Taking into consideration the above mentioned insurgents’ activities, this thesis will 
go on to present the means and methods of modern counterinsurgency. The threat posed by an 
insurgency needs to be addressed by a particular approach of warfare. This type of warfare 
embraces dedicated military and police means and methods utilized by counterinsurgent. 
 
4.2. MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
In March and April 2003, the United States forces conquered Baghdad with breath 
taking speed and the word counterinsurgency was then odd and obscure. Senior US decision 
makers expected to leave Iraq quickly and victorious. However, an unexpected enemy 
equipped with AK 47 and planting IEDs disrupted their plans. Unconventional, asymmetric 
warfare attacks kept rising. Very soon, the US forces and its allies found themselves 
embroiled in counterinsurgency warfare with all that accompanies it; i.e. a new doctrine, a 
new type of enemies, a new approach toward the use of military power on land, in the air, but 
also training local forces, educating local administration. The "Mission Accomplished" 
speech delivered by the US President George W Bush on May 1, 2003 on the USS Abraham 
Lincoln was considered almost humorous. It was after that speech when the vast majority of 
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casualties during Iraq conflict occurred.
609
 Since then, insurgency has flooded Iraq. The 
coalition effort was adversely affected by the fact that the development of the modern 
counterinsurgency thinking was done while actually fighting counterinsurgency.
610
  
Counterinsurgency, in general, “are military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”.611 This non-
legally binding definition embraces a broad spectrum of activities.
612
 A counterinsurgent's 
task is different from a conventional warrior's one. He or she is supposed to work smarter 
rather than harder while planning and executing counterinsurgency strategy.
613
 Since 
insurgents are embedded in the local community, counterinsurgency can be defined as the 
"military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat insurgents, to rid them from the society. As insurgents derive their 
support from the local population, only when the local population turns against the insurgency 
can counterinsurgency be considered successful”. 614  This new approach requires a 
multidisciplinary approach both from scholars and practitioners. During modern 
counterinsurgency operations, it is necessary for military forces to melt into local environment 
by collecting tribal and demographical intelligence as well as threat intelligence.
615
 It is also 
vital to require knowledge on subjects such as governance, economic development, public 
administration and the rule of law.
616
 
 Modern counterinsurgency operations are not a new development, but they have never 
before seemed to be so essential to future conflicts.
 617
 Counterinsurgency embraces holistic 
activities orientated on civilian population. Killing the opponent is considered the last 
resort.
618
 This argument is supported by gen. David Petraeus in his Manual on 
Counterinsurgency where he presents some of the major principles of conducting anti 
insurgency operations. They are as follows: a) sometimes, the more you protect your force the 
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less secure you may be, b) some of the best weapon for counterinsurgent is do not shoot, c) 
sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is, and d) the more successful the 
counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.
619
 
During counterinsurgency operations civil security, essential services, governance, 
economic and infrastructure development are of a great importance.
620
 The balance of 
offensive and defensive operations is also essential to counterinsurgency (COIN). In that 
respect COIN differs from peacekeeping operations. In peacekeeping operations, an absence 
of violence is the goal. In COIN situations, the goal is much more compound, where the lack 
of violence may mask the insurgents’ preparation for combat.621 However, the cornerstone of 
any counterinsurgency is to establish security for the civilian population. Without a secure 
environment, no reforms can be implemented.
622
 Security is based not on a military presence 
in military bases and travelling in armoured vehicles from point A to B, but rather on 
proximity to the local population, foot patrolling.
623
 To be successful in counterinsurgency, 
troops have to engage with the populace. Close contact with the local population allows 
soldiers to learn to understand the social environment, to build trust and to have the 
opportunity to obtain intelligence.
624
 According to gen Petraeus, “kindness and compassion 
can often be as important as killing and capturing insurgents”.625 To obtain success, counter 
insurgents must rely heavily on the indigenous security and military forces. It embraces 
sponsoring, training and mentoring local forces.  
 An important element of granting security to the civilian population is to understand 
the local environment. An instrument which helps to do that has been introduced by the 
American forces in the form of Human Terrain Teams (HTT). They gather civilian and 
military experts on sociology, anthropology, language and religion and provide military 
commanders with information, which is called operational culture. Their activity helps 
commanders and foot soldiers to avoid typical mistakes based on a lack of knowledge of 
religion and social links. Political Advisors (POLAD) are engaged in a similar way. Their aim 
is to help to shape the political environment in which military commanders operate. This 
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helps the commanders to establish their presence in the political environment of the military 
area of operation.  
 One of the best known ISAF programmes, orientated on the civilian population, is the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) project. Such teams operate in each province under 
the control of the ISAF countries and coordinate, develop, and fund local projects. Their aim 
is to rebuild the country in cooperation with local population which is to determine what is 
needed to make society stable and secure from the insurgent ideology. These projects are also 
used to gain trust and support of the local population and in this way supporting the 
counterinsurgency efforts. The Provincial Reconstruction Team may be seen as the military’s 
answer to addressing the security sector reform, reconstruction, development and governance 
domains of counterinsurgency operations.
626
 Female Engagement Teams are another example 
of civilian population orientated activities. Their aim is to motivate local female communities 
into pro-development and education programs.  
As part of the counterinsurgency effort, many states operating in Afghanistan run Rule 
of Law and Good Governance programmes. They are orientated towards introducing the rule 
of law and on building a foundation for the state. These programs are often run in cooperation 
with civilian institutes such as the Max-Planck Institute in Heidelberg which has prepared 
several law educational projects in Afghanistan.
627
 
All the above mentioned projects and initiatives are involved – directly or indirectly - 
in state reconstruction and supporting the local population, calculated to turn the local 
population against insurgents. This modern approach to counterinsurgency equates military 
effort with nation building.
628
 However, none of these projects and programmes changes the 
character of the military presence. It is warfare and it remains as a violent clash of interests 
between organized groups characterized by the use of force.
629
 ISAF forces are entitled and 
sometimes obliged to use a deadly force.  
The main question which arises from these examples is how those military and civilian 
measures are seen in the light of international humanitarian law. All parties to the asymmetric 
conflict conduct both civilian and military actions. Insurgents are blended with the civilian 
                                                          
626
 J. Bebber, The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Counterinsurgency Operations: Khost 
Province, Afghanistan, Small Wars Journal, March 31, 2011. 
627
 More on projects conducted at the Max Planck Institute within the framework of the Afghan Team: 
www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/research/details/know_transfer/afghanistan_project/afghanistan_team.cfm (3.08.2011). 
628
 D. Kilcullen, Intelligence, op. cit., 148  
629
 COIN manual, op. cit., p.1-1.  
 160 
 
population as the enemy moves within and through the population, whereas the governmental 
and foreign armed forces carry out projects which are often not military in nature. 
Consequently, during counterinsurgency operations, it is difficult to define what military 
effort is and what is not. This issue has to be considered with one fundamental assumption in 
mind. The observance of humanitarian and human rights law in case of counterinsurgency is 
of utmost importance. Any human rights or humanitarian law abuse committed by intervening 
forces – apart from strictly moral dimension, has also a pragmatic one. Such events quickly 
become known throughout the local populace and eventually around the world. Illegitimate 
actions undermine counterinsurgency effort in both long and short term aspect.
630
  
 
4.3 PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
COUNTERINSURGENCY  
4.3.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION 
This sub-chapter addresses the issue of the principle of distinction during the conduct 
of counterinsurgency operations in a non-international armed conflict environment. Issues 
related to the principle of distinction are of great importance during contemporary armed 
conflicts. Without identifying who is an enemy and who could be targeted, it is impossible to 
conduct military operations, both in legal and practical ways. In conventional conflicts it was 
fairly easy to distinguish an enemy from civilians. Currently, insurgents intentionally avoid 
identification. They can be distinguished not by their uniform but rather by their participation 
in hostilities. In this sub-chapter, I discuss the notion of the principle of distinction during a 
non-international armed conflict. I will also try to address the notion of targeted killing. 
Finally, I will refer to the legal status of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) project run 
by NATO and its allies, which is a complicated matter and may be the subject of different 
interpretations closely related to the issue of principle of distinction.
631
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The principle of distinction holds that “parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives”.632 The principle is expanded to non-international armed conflict by article 13 of 
Additional Protocol II which provides that “the civilian population and individual civilians 
shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations”.633 The 
importance of the principle is highlighted by art 85 (3) (a) API, which states that violation of 
the principle of distinction is deemed a grave breach and under art 85 (5) a war crime. The 
principle was acknowledged by the International Court of Justice, as one of the 
“intransgressible principles of international customary law” that “must be observed by all 
States whether or not they have ratified the conventions”.634 Additionally, the principle of 
distinction attained customary nature for both international and non-international armed 
conflicts. Art 1 of the ICRC study on customary law formulates the following principle: “the 
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks 
may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians”.635 
Some persons during both international and non-international armed conflicts are indisputably 
protected against direct attack; namely civilians
636
, persons hors de combat
637
, medical
638
 and 
religious personnel.
639
 Members of armed forces may not be regarded as protected until they 
lay down their arms or are placed hors de combat, or unless they serve as medical or religious 
personnel.
640
 
 During unconventional asymmetrical operations, the counterinsurgent must separate the 
insurgents from the civilian population.
641
 However, in practice this principle raises several 
problems. On the one hand during operations such as that in Afghanistan, NATO and allied 
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troops are conducting military and civilian activities. Their actions blur the line between what 
is military activity and what is not. On the other hand, those who are fighting against the 
government; i.e. insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists, melt into the civilian population. Often 
persons who appear to be civilians periodically engage in hostilities; this makes determining 
who is a legitimate target nearly impossible. Commanders on the ground need to provide their 
troops, day after day, the following information: (1) who and when they can shoot, (2) who 
and when they can detain, and (3) who they have to protect.
642
 Nonetheless, providing the 
answers to these questions may not be enough.  
 
4.3.1.1 TARGETED KILLING  
Targeted killing is subject to the principle of distinction. Without a clear distinction 
who is and who is not a legitimate target, this method of warfare may not be implemented. It 
is also one of those issues which are the subject of passionate discussions amongst 
contemporary international lawyers. From the perspective of this thesis, it is necessary to 
address the legal challenges resulting from targeted killing. This method of warfare is popular 
and tempting for modern counterinsurgents.  
Since the issue of targeted killing is extremely broad, the focus here is restricted to 
targeted killing in non-international armed conflict. Reference will be made to domestic 
situations and to international armed conflicts only when it is necessary to understand the 
notion of targeted killing generally. The question of the legality of targeted killing is not only 
important from the perspective of modern counterinsurgency; it is also an important element 
of a general dispute on humanitarian law applicable during contemporary wars. 
Targeted killing is not a new phenomenon. In the 1960s and the 1970s, at the peak of 
“popularity” of organizations such as RAF, PLO, IRA643 and Black September, several states, 
such as Germany, Britain or Israel, were operating unlawful shoot-to-kill policies
644
, which in 
many respects may be considered identical to targeted killing. Nowadays the situation appears 
to have changed. Targeted killing is in the process of escaping the shadowy realm of half 
legality and non-accountability, and gradually gaining legitimacy as a lawful method of 
modern warfare.
645
 Undefined in a positive law in the past, targeted killing has become a 
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popular method during a protracted non-international armed conflict, particularly in a 
counterinsurgency environment. Targeted killing offers some advantages; for example, it may 
limit the possibility of collateral damage amongst the civilian population, especially during 
surgical special forces operations. At the same time, targeted killing may be affected by some 
institutional flaws. One of the major challenges is the identification of the legitimate target. 
Despite the development of precise military technologies, the lack of a clear identifiable 
battlefield and extensive involvement of civilians requires a level of accuracy almost 
impossible to reach. Targeted killing may be considered as a useful method during 
counterinsurgency operations, but it also raises questions regarding the character of those 
attacks.  
From various definitions of targeted killing
646
, the most comprehensive, for the 
purpose of this thesis, is provided by Melzer. According to him, targeted killing is a method 
of employing lethal force against human beings.
647
 It is done with the specific intent, 
premeditation (dolus directus) to kill, as opposed to unintentional, accidental, negligent or 
reckless use of lethal force.
648
 It is used to target individually selected persons rather than 
collective, unspecified or random targets.
649
 Targeted persons must not be in physical custody 
by those targeting them.
650
 Finally, targeted killing must be attributable to a subject of 
international law.
651
 A simplified definition is provided by Col. Peter Cullen which says that 
“targeted killing is the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals 
undertaken with explicit government approval”.652 
Positive IHL not only prohibits direct attacks against civilians, but also obliges parties 
to an armed conflict to choose means, methods and targets of attack with a view to avoiding, 
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and in any event minimizing, incidental harm to civilians.
653
 Targeted killing belongs to the 
methods of warfare which under some circumstances may limit civilian casualties. The 
question needs to be asked whether targeted killing should be allowed under human rights and 
humanitarian law in non-international armed conflict as a part of a counterinsurgency.  
The human rights standard in respect of targeted killing was established by the 
European Court of Human Rights in McCann v UK.
654
 As a result of this case, some 
fundamental principles were articulated and established: every individual benefits from the 
presumption of innocence; persons suspected of perpetrating or planning criminal acts should 
be arrested, detained and interrogated with due process of law; if there is a credible evidence 
that such persons were involved in planning or carrying out terrorist acts they should be 
afforded a fair trial before a court of law and, if convicted, sentenced by the court to a 
punishment provided by law.
655
 Following that line of argumentation, the targeting of 
suspected terrorists or insurgents under human rights law may be justified only when 
interpreted as protection of potential victims of terrorist acts or insurgent activity. Under non-
armed conflict circumstances, based on a law-enforcement model and due process, the use of 
lethal force to defend persons against unlawful violence is justified only when absolutely 
necessary
656
; for example, in the case of self-defence.  
This situation however is different in the case of armed conflict. Humanitarian law 
constitutes, as established by the International Court of Justice, lex specialis toward human 
rights.
657
 As a result, some principles of human rights are suppressed during armed conflict.
658
 
Precedence of the lex specialis of IHL does not exclude the applicability of human rights law. 
However, what is crucial is that the lawfulness of the deprivation of life occurring for reasons 
related to an armed conflict must be determined, first and foremost, by reference to the lex 
specialis of IHL. IHL as lex specialis provides a legal framework designed for the special 
situation of armed conflict. When rules of IHL are not sufficiently clear or precise to 
determine the lawfulness of the deprivation of life of a particular individual, these rules have 
                                                          
653
 Arts. 57 (2),a, ii; 57 (2), c; 57 (3) AP I. This rule is considered part of customary IHL by Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck,, Rule 15. 
654
 McCann v UK, 21 EHRR (1996) 97. 
655
 D. Kretzmer Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of 
Defence? The European Journal of International Law Vol. 16, 2005, p. 178 
656
 D. Kretzmer op.cit p. 202. 
657
 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (8 July 1996), paragraphs. 
24–25. 
658
 D. Kretzmer op.cit p. 185. 
 165 
 
to be clarified through the usual means of treaty interpretation, and by reference to the general 
principles of IHL. Human rights applicability during armed conflict is justified when IHL 
does not provide any rule at all, and where is no sufficient guidance which can be derived 
from the general principles of IHL.
659
 In terms of targeted killing in non-international armed 
conflict, there is no need to refer to human rights law since the relevant regulations could be 
found in IHL.  
During an armed conflict, humanitarian law allows targeting only of combatants.
660
 
Civilians lose their protected status when they actively take part in hostilities.
661
 However, 
during non-international armed conflict such as in Afghanistan, there is no such legitimate 
target category as combatants. The only two categories which could be considered as a 
legitimate target are: an insurgent which by direct participation in hostilities lost his or her 
protected status of civilian, or  an insurgent who lost his or her protected status because he or 
she belongs to an armed group or dissident forces.  
 
4.3.1.2 DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES  
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) uses a definition of 
“civilian” that reflects the standards of international humanitarian law. For the purposes of the 
conduct of hostilities “civilians” are understood, under international humanitarian law, to 
mean all persons who are not members of military/paramilitary forces or members of 
organized armed groups who have a continuous combat function, of a party to a conflict. 
Civilians may lose their protection against attacks for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities. A person who is a member of a military/paramilitary force or of an organized 
armed group and who is hors de combat (wounded, sick, shipwrecked, detained or 
surrendering) or who belongs to the medical or religious personnel of the armed forces must 
be protected from attack. 
662
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In an armed conflict such as in Afghanistan, insurgents deliberately do not distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population. It is clearly not a new phenomenon, but in 
contemporary non-international armed conflicts it is the rule rather than the exception. In 
modern war the line between civilians and combatants tends to become blurred. Insurgents 
who take up arms at night may be peaceful farmers during the day. When civilians participate 
directly in hostilities, humanitarian law suspends their protection. In particular, they may be 
attacked and they need not be considered when trying to minimize harm to civilians.
663
  
Firstly, what distinguishes a protected civilian from a lawfully targeted insurgent in 
non-international armed conflicts is a notion of direct participation in hostilities. 
Humanitarian law is clear in this respect; civilians are protected against attack “unless and for 
such time as they take direct part in hostilities.
664
 According to the ICRC commentaries, direct 
participation in hostilities is a “direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and 
the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where activity takes place”.665 This 
causal relationship exists when acts are “intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and 
equipment of the armed forces”.666 Some examples include taking up arms or otherwise trying 
to kill, injure or capture enemy personnel or destroy enemy property. Also, civilians serving 
as lookouts, guards or intelligence agents for military forces may be considered to be directly 
participating in hostilities.
667
 Nevertheless, even such obvious examples may raise doubts 
during a non-international asymmetric conflict. Is a 10- year-old villager observing NATO 
convoys and communicating that fact to Taliban cells a legitimate target? 
An interesting case-by-case approach was presented by the Israeli Supreme Court in 
the Targeted Killing case. The court found that, in each case certain cumulative requirements 
have to be fulfilled: “1) information regarding the identity and activity of a person providing a 
legal basis for his/her targeting must be thoroughly verified; 2) even legitimate military 
targets cannot be attacked if less harmful means, such as arrest can be employed; 3) after each 
targeted killing a retroactive, thorough and independent investigation must be conducted 
regarding the precision of identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack and 
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any collateral damage must withstand the proportionality test”. 668  Additionally, the court 
stated that “the following cases should also be included in the definition of taking “direct 
part” in hostilities: a person who collects intelligence on behalf of armed forces, whether on 
issues regarding the hostilities, or beyond those issues; a person who transports unlawful 
combatants to or from the place where the hostilities are taking place; a person who operates 
weapons which unlawful combatants use, or supervises their operation, or provides service to 
them, be the distance from the battlefield as it may. However, a person who sells food or 
medicine to an unlawful combatant is not taking a direct part, but rather an indirect part in the 
hostilities. The same is the case regarding a person who aids unlawful combatants by general 
strategic analysis, and grants them logistical, general support, including monetary aid.”669 
This also holds true for persons who distribute propaganda supporting those unlawful 
combatants.
670
 
In May 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross published its ‘Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law’.671 The ICRC proposed constitutive elements of direct participation. According to the 
guidance, the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations and capacity of a 
party to an armed conflict.
672
 There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm, 
that involves one causal step between the action and the harm, and the act must be specifically 
selected to directly cause the required threshold of harm to a party in the conflict.
673
 As a 
result of this kind of approach, those who build improvised explosive devices (IEDs) fail to 
meet the ICRC test, because unlike the insurgents who plant the device, they do not cause the 
harm within “one causal step”.674 This “one causal step” approach additionally excludes from 
targeting all individuals engaged in the general war effort, such as logistic, intelligence 
collecting and similar activities.  
This approach seems to be extremely strict and difficult to apply in practice and 
therefore could be seen as highly disputable. This is because the aim of the principle of 
distinction is to protect the civilian population. When the criteria of identifying protected 
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groups are unclear, those who need the protection may lose it. As Michael Schmitt says, 
“suggesting that civilians retain their immunity even when they are intricately involved in a 
conflict is to endanger disrespect for the law by combatants endangered by their activities. 
Moreover, a liberal approach creates an incentive for civilians to remain as distant from the 
conflict as possible - in doing so they can better avoid being charged with participation in the 
conflict and are less liable to being directly targeted. Although it might seem counter-intuitive 
to broadly interpret the activities that subject civilians to attack, in fact, doing so is likely to 
enhance the protection of the civilian population as a whole”. 675  This less restrictive 
interpretation of the targeting process would allow the targeting of objects that, indirectly but 
effectively, support and sustain the enemy’s war fighting capability. 676  In this scenario, 
targeting a person who produces IEDs would be legitimate.  
This understanding of the commentary seems to go beyond the ICRC’s intention. The 
ICRC position was presented by Cassese. He supports the view that the scope of direct 
participation in hostilities should be restricted to actual engagement of civilians in combat as 
well as open carrying of arms during military deployments. According to Cassese, civilians 
may not be targeted when planning or preparing an attack or after committing it.
677
 This 
seems to be along the lines of the Red Cross interpretation; however Cassese presents an 
interesting mixture of HRL and IHL. In regard to Palestinian suicide bombers “who are far 
from openly carrying weapons”, infiltrating Israel “with intent on concealing explosives on 
their body”, he states that “it would be preposterous to require that Israelis open fire against 
such Palestinians only if they carry their explosives openly”.678 In his discussion, Cassese 
turns to the human rights standards applied by the European Court of Human Rights and 
concludes that targeted killing may be justified when Israeli authorities, once seeing a 
suspected suicide bomber, call him to a summon and if not receiving any response, may open 
fire against him or her. Similarly, authorities may open fire when there is no time for such 
summons and accumulatively when it is manifested that a person is concealing explosives on 
his or her body.
679
 Cassese avoids referring to the notion of direct participation governed by 
the IHL. He refers to a notion of absolute necessity and proportionality under HRL. 
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Consequently, he finds a civilian who poses a threat not as an individual who directly 
participates in hostilities i.e. a legitimate target under IHL, but as a civilian who, by his 
actions comparable with military attack, is a target under human rights standards. This 
reasoning has one important flaw. In an armed conflict situation governed by IHL, Cassese 
brings human rights law type targeting principles. He excludes persons who directly 
participate in hostilities, though not openly, from military targeting. Such reasoning is 
contrary to the far more liberal approach supported by the IACiHR Report on Colombia 
which states “that civilians may become subject to direct attack when they prepare for, 
participate in, and return from combat.”680 Cassese’s position may lead to a lack of balance 
between the parties of engagement in Israel for example; i.e. one party of the conflict may be 
targeted all the time i.e. civilians and combatants
681
 whereas the other party may be targeted 
under strict regulations of both IHL and HRL.  
In the more liberal approach, direct participation in hostilities is understood as a 
conduct that functionally corresponds to the governmental armed forces. It includes planning, 
organizing, recruiting and logistics.
682
 A proposal to extend the notion of direct participation 
to the general war effort, without direct connection to the hostilities, seems to go beyond what 
conventions and custom in international law permits.
683
 This extensive approach allows for 
the targeting almost everyone in the asymmetric non-international armed conflict battlefield.  
Taking into consideration all of the above approaches, the most persuasive view is that 
civilians who take part directly in hostilities on a sporadic, unorganized basis may be subject 
to direct attack when they prepare for, participate in, and return from combat. However, they 
regain protection against attack in intervals between specific hostile acts during non-
international armed conflicts. Civilians may not be targeted when they are engaged in support 
activities, which do not directly harm the adversary.
684
 Consequently, a person may be a 
subject of targeted killing only when directly engaged in hostilities. Activities such as 
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planning, organizing, recruiting are excluded from the possibility of employing targeted 
killing toward individuals during non-international armed conflict.  
The situation looks different when speaking of insurgents, who are members of armed 
groups. In such situations, insurgents in a non-international armed conflict need to fulfil the 
criteria set out in Art 1 of AP II for being recognized as dissident armed forces or organized 
groups. This article states that insurgents need to be “(...) under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”. According to the ICRC 
commentary, “the existence of a responsible command implies some degree of organization of 
the insurgent armed group or dissident armed forces, but this does not necessarily mean that 
there is a hierarchical system of military organization similar to regular forces. It means an 
organization capable, on the one hand, of planning and carrying out sustained and concerted 
military operations, and on the other hand, of imposing discipline in the name of the facto 
authority”.685 This argumentation supports a broad interpretation of direct participation in 
hostilities and possibility of targeting individuals as long as they are members of armed 
groups. Members of armed groups (such as terrorists or insurgents) whose function is to 
commit a chain of hostile acts, being civilians, lose their protection for as long as they assume 
that function, and they may be attacked directly even in the intervals between hostilities.
686
 
This approach is supported by the ICRC commentary on Art 13 AP II.
687
 It provides: “those 
who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time”. It means that a 
particular individual, member of an armed group, is no longer protected by humanitarian law. 
States practice indicates that it is a common approach.
688
 Governmental forces do not hesitate 
to directly attack insurgents regardless of whether they are or they are not engaged in a 
military operation. These attacks are neither denied nor internationally condemned as long as 
they do not lead to excessive collateral damage.
689
 States’ practice and interpretation of the 
ICRC Commentary suggest that, in terms of the principle of distinction, members of 
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organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party are not protected as civilians.
690
 Their 
status is equivalent to organized state armed forces.
691
  
Additionally, Melzer presents a convincing list of criteria which needs to be 
cumulatively fulfilled during non-international armed to make targeted killing allowed under 
IHL. These are as follows: “a) it has to constitute an integral part of conducting hostilities, b) 
it has to contribute effectively to achievement of a concrete and direct military advantage 
without having an non-lethal alternative, c) it has to be directed against an individual not 
entitled to protection against direct attack, d) it has to not be expected to inflict incidental 
death, injury or destruction on person and objects protected against attack that would be 
excessive in relations to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, e) it has to be 
planned and conducted so to avoid erroneous targeting, as well as to avoid, and in any event 
minimize, the incidental infliction of civilian death, injury or destruction, f) it has to be 
suspended when targeted individual surrenders or otherwise falls hors de combat, g) it has not 
to be conducted by the undercover forces feigning non-combatant status or otherwise by 
resort to perfidy, h) it has not be conducted by resort to poison, expanding bullets or other 
prohibited weapon and must respect restriction imposed by IHL on booby-traps and other 
devices“.692 
In the Afghanistan conflict’s reality, it is allowed to come to the conclusion that the 
following categories of persons may be considered as legitimate targets. They are as follow; 
Taliban forces, Haquani network and Hekmatyar HiG.
693
 It may be considered problematic to 
target individuals who represent the political interests of these organizations. This is because 
political activity does not constitute an integral part of conducting hostilities. As far as it is 
known, only Hekmatyar’s organization has built its political wing, present inter alia in Kabul. 
Hekmatyar’s political wing differentiates itself from Taliban leaders from Queta in Pakistan 
by the fact that they do not play any military role. On the contrary, the Taliban leadership 
primarily plays a military role and as such may be targeted. Members of these groups are no 
longer considered to be civilians but rather are seen as members of organized groups of a 
party to the conflict in Afghanistan. 
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In Afghanistan, however, there is a group of individuals who are not members of 
armed or dissident forces. They participate in hostilities on a sporadic, irregular basis - so 
called part-time Taliban. They participate in hostilities when they are paid or when they are 
obliged to do so by family or tribal relations. In this case, what makes them a legitimate target 
is their direct participation in hostilities. So as long as they prepare for, participate in, and 
return from combat, they may be considered as legitimate targets. All individuals even 
sporadically engaged in the planning or production of IEDs are to be considered to be 
legitimate targets. It is so when the planting or production of IEDs constitutes a part of direct 
participation in hostilities. 
Targeted killing follows the idea of proportionality. Direct hitting of suspected 
insurgents allows for the limiting of possible collateral damages. It seems that despite 
mistakes that may occur, the policy of targeted killing remains an effective tactic during 
counterinsurgency operations.
694
 However, the modern counterinsurgency approach 
formulates an assumption that there is a necessity to strike a balance between lethal and non-
lethal methods. This approach suggests that lethal force should be used against insurgent 
leaders. In case of other persons who could otherwise be considered as lawful targets under 
IHL such as community leaders or moderate insurgents, a different approach should be 
applied such as negotiations and non-lethal means.
695
  
 
4.3.1.3 . PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT)  
 The establishment of PRTs by the Coalition forces in Afghanistan, as was mentioned 
previously, has blurred the lines between the role and objectives of political and military 
players on the one hand and humanitarian players on the other, creating serious problems for 
an organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
696
 On the other 
hand, PRTs are often the only possible way of rebuilding the country and bringing in money 
for development. NGOs are not able to operate in the most volatile districts in Afghanistan or 
even in Kabul due to security reasons.
 697
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PRTs are considered as a means to extend the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the 
central government. They usually consist of 50 to 300 troops and representatives of 
development and diplomatic agencies.
698
 In secure areas, PRTs maintain a low profile, 
whereas in more volatile areas, PRTs work closely with combat units and the local 
government.
699
 In every case, PRTs activities embrace security sector reform, building local 
governance, reconstruction and development.
700
  
The question of the legality of PRTs is important. PRTs focus their humanitarian 
activity on the civilian population. PRT effort is included in the military structure. Personnel 
engaged in these projects wear uniforms and are under a military chain of command and 
responsibility. These projects are orientated toward a military (politically motivated) gain. As 
such, their activities blur the line between what is and what is not military action and may 
affect the principle of distinction.  
As was established in Chapter II, the conflict in Afghanistan is not international. As a 
result, common Art. 3 and AP II are applicable.
701
 Customary humanitarian principles are 
applicable as well.  However it is difficult to establish a legal framework for PRT activities. 
This is because it is a new invention, not regulated by humanitarian law. To address the legal 
ramifications of PRT from the perspective of the principle of distinction, it is necessary to 
refer to the already existing humanitarian law norms. Common article 3 says little about the 
principle of distinction.
702
 However, it does state that “in the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character (…) each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provision; “Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, (…) shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely”. 703  The lengthy definition of expressions such as 
"humane treatment" or "to treat humanely" is unnecessary, as they have entered sufficiently 
into current parlance to be understood.
704
 So humanitarian projects run by military forces may 
be considered as being correspondent with the common Art. 3. Similarly, AP II also states the 
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principle of humanitarian treatment by Art 4.
705
 What is more, Art. 4.3 states that children 
shall be provided (...) (a) education. This corresponds to the PRTs’ activity in terms of 
building schools and providing relevant educational materials such as books. Treaty law do 
not forbid the PRT activities, consequently we may assume that their activities are legal. 
The analysis becomes more complicated if we try to look at the legal constraints of the 
PRT’s activity from the perspective of the principle of distinction. It is particularly important 
when there is a necessity for referring to the PRT’s major infrastructure works such as school 
or hospital, roads and similar projects.  
AP II has little to say about the principle of distinction in terms of military objectives. 
In this respect, customary law is more specific. Rule 8 says: “In so far as objects are 
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total 
destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage”.706 This definition of military objectives is currently widely accepted.707  
PRT’s effort is an intrinsic part of counterinsurgency and constitutes an effective 
contribution to the military effort, in the sense that it enhances the likelihood of success. 
Every school, every road and every hospital built by the PRT forms part of the military 
counterinsurgency measures. It is a part of a battle for “hearts and minds”. It is smart, it is 
pragmatic, but it is still warfare; especially that PRTs are responsible not only for the 
construction of civilian orientated buildings but also buildings which are police or military in 
nature such as a police academy in Nuristan Province.
708
 In some respects, it resembles the 
situation of Israel in occupied territories. Building an infrastructure of governance increases 
governmental control over the contested territory. Although the infrastructure is civilian, the 
results are military and they constitute a response toward insurgency.
709
 So the question is; 
whether military built objects are military objectives? 
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There are two possible ways of qualifying PRT projects in legal terms. The first option 
is that we will consider the status of schools, and other community orientated constructions, 
by analysing where the money comes from. As a result, every NATO PRT sponsored activity 
could be considered as a military one because, by winning hearts and minds, it achieves the 
aim of counterinsurgency and makes an effective contribution to military action. This 
approach may be supported by the gen. Petraeus position presented in COIN manual. 
According to him “all operations have an intelligence (military) component. All soldiers and 
marines collect information whenever they interact with the populace. Operations should 
therefore always include intelligence collection requirements.” 710  As a result, every PRT 
military member contributes to the general military effort of the governmental party.  
The second option is to accept PRT activity as civilian in character and exclude their 
projects from being considered as legitimate targets for insurgents. PRT staff are included in 
the military chain of command and responsibility. They wear uniforms and a distinctive sign. 
They are protected by a military escort. While performing their tasks, they are a legitimate 
target. But when their task is finished, a school or a road which was built by them becomes a 
civilian object which is protected by the humanitarian law.
711
  
Nowadays, there is no alternative to military-sponsored aid. Impartial NGOs are not 
able to rebuild the country. Their activity is often not coordinated and they lack proper 
funding. This constitutes a broader problem. In Afghanistan it is extremely difficult to find 
any institution or organizations which are non-governmental and impartial. Even the UN is 
not impartial. It is aligned with one set of belligerents and does not act as an honest broker in 
‘talking peace’ to the other side. They are an advocate for humanitarian principles and 
impartial humanitarian action and at the same time they act as the main interlocutor on 
reconstruction and development issues with the government and the Coalition forces.
712
 A 
similar situation applies to NGOs.  
PRTs are part of the counterinsurgency effort. Their actions may affect the principle of 
distinction but there is little choice. Only governments are able to provide the amount of 
money which significantly changes the situation in places like Afghanistan - and only 
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governments are able to provide some form of protection to PRT specialists. In asymmetric, 
non-international armed conflicts, PRTs are a necessary element.  
Of course, PRT projects need to be developed not only from the perspective of the 
legal qualification, but also from the perspective of practical functioning. In general, I praise 
the PRT idea but it is not free of flaws. PRTs often face the common constraints; for example, 
infrastructure projects may be executed only during warm months.
713
 Often appropriated 
financial sources are not transferable for the next year. Then the PRT’s activity becomes 
limited only to the small projects, even if sources for long-term projects such as schools, 
medical facilities, or routes would be more appropriate. Unfortunately, in Poland limitations 
of legal and procedural nature mean that a PRT project needs to be written, accepted, passed 
in due time to the public competitive bidding law, realized and delivered within a calendar 
year (budget year) – and we speak about projects realized often in distant localities, in the 
country torn apart by the armed conflict. Such obstacles exist unfortunately and not only 
within the Polish forces’ legislation. Additionally, the PRT staff are subjected to the same 
rotation as the regular troops (six months deployment), so it is difficult to keep continuity of 
the planned actions. Those constraints concern all ISAF troops. What is more disturbing is the 
lack of coordination of activities between different PRTs and between PRTs and NGOs. 
Additionally, local counter partners and contractors are not always able to perform their 
contracts for security and safety reasons, or are simply unreliable. On the other hand, 
investments channelled throughout PRTs are of the utmost importance, because they are 
orientated on state building in Afghanistan. One cannot forget that the main Taliban presence 
indicator is the creation of the parallel administrative system, with their own quasi governor, 
Shura, and social support.
714
 From that perspective, PRTs are a very important aspect of 
counterinsurgency and an element of the ius post bello approach.  
 
4.3.2  THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY  
The principle of proportionality requires that losses resulting from a military action 
should not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage.
715
 An undue focus on 
the military objective might lead to the ignoring of civilian casualties or regard them as an 
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unfortunate accident occurring in the course of legitimate military activities. The principle of 
proportionality counters this tendency by requiring a constant weighing of military and 
humanitarian values.
716
 It was set out by the Additional Protocol I in two different 
references.
717
 Art 51 (5) (b), that commanders should “refrain from deciding to launch any 
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.718 Additionally, “an attack shall be 
cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is 
subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.719 
The principle of proportionality was explained by the ICTY in Galić case where the court 
concluded that: “the practical application of the principle of distinction requires that those 
who plan or launch an attack take all feasible precautions to verify that the objectives attacked 
are neither civilians nor civilian objects, so as to spare civilians as much as possible. Once the 
military character of a target has been ascertained, commanders must consider whether 
striking this target is expected to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objectives or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. If such casualties are expected to result, 
the attack should not be pursued. The basic obligation to spare civilians and civilian objects as 
much as possible must guide the attacking party when considering the proportionality of an 
attack. In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether 
a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making 
reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive 
civilian casualties to result from the attack”.720  
There are two issues to be addressed. The first is whether the principle of 
proportionality is applicable during non-international armed conflict. The second how human 
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rights supplement the principle of proportionality during NIAC. As to the LOAC, there is no 
reference to the principle of proportionality in treaty law regulating non-international armed 
conflict i.e. common Artt. 3 and AP II. The ICRC study on customary law says that 
“launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited”721. However, 
state practice in fact seems to be contrary to the ICRC study
722
, while the opinio iuris is 
inconclusive. The excessive use of close air strikes supported during the initial stage of the 
operation in Afghanistan by the coalition forces led by the US, may be used as an example of 
an action contradictory to the ICRC customary principle 14. It could be argued that the 
principle of proportionality was not established as a state practice. It seems that wise 
counterinsurgency thinking is better for the protection of a civilian population than vague 
customary rules. When Gen. Stanley McCrystal was in command over ISAF and OFE forces, 
he changed the approach of foreign forces toward insurgents. In August 2009, he wrote about 
a need of “protecting the Afghan people, understanding their environment, and building 
relationships with them”.723 This way of thinking quickly brought results in limiting collateral 
damage amongst the civilian population. Limitation of collateral damage even beyond the 
requirements of the alleged principle of proportionality is of great value during a 
counterinsurgency operation. In conventional engagement, if military forces are facing a 
hundred opponents, and twenty are killed, then they can assume that eighty are left. In 
counterinsurgency, this logic does not hold: the 20 killed may have 40 relatives who are now 
in a blood feud with security forces and may feel obligated to take revenge. So the new 
number of the enemy is not 80 but 120.
724
  
Of course, collateral casualties to civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects 
can occur for a variety of reasons. Despite an obligation to avoid locating military objectives 
within or near densely populated areas, to remove civilians from the vicinity of military 
objectives, and to protect their civilians from the dangers of military operations, it is often not 
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feasible.
725
 Such a situation often occurs in Afghanistan. In most cases, insurgents operate in 
populated areas. As a result of governmental or NATO troops response, collateral damage is 
often unavoidable. When certain conditions are fulfilled, collateral damage is lawful during 
the war, yet there are ways to limit the damage. During the counterinsurgency operation in 
Afghanistan, some commanders have managed to provide a better standard of protection that 
the one granted by humanitarian law.  
As the COIN Manual states; “In conventional operations, proportionality is usually 
calculated in simple utilitarian terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed 
and military advantage gained. But in COIN operations, [military] advantage is best 
calculated not in terms of how many insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which 
enemies are killed or detained. In COIN environments, the number of civilian lives lost and 
property destroyed needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent could 
do if allowed to escape”.726 
Of course in modern armed conflicts, smart weaponry has increased the options 
available to the military commanders.
727
 There is a general expectation that NATO weaponry 
will be more precise than that used by insurgents. Some types of precise weaponry are simply 
not available to insurgents. As mentioned above the protection of the civilian population is 
central to the counterinsurgent's strategy. Attacks resulting in collateral damage are not likely 
to gain popular support for the counterinsurgent. Even attacks that kill only insurgents may 
have the effect of sparking protests, creating the desire for vengeance by family members or 
tribal relatives, and fuelling the insurgency further. The counterinsurgency approach modifies 
the notion of "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. 728  In the long term, a 
situation of concrete and direct military advantage is not the destruction of a particular object 
or killing insurgents but the provision of peace and stability. 
As a result, a counterinsurgent might interpret proportionality in a different manner. 
Not as the classical equation of military benefits versus humanitarian costs, but rather as a 
cost benefits analysis in which humanitarian and strategic interests operate on both sides of 
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the scale.
729
 In such a scenario, proportionality in counterinsurgency is likely to be more 
humanitarian in its orientation than proportionality in traditional, conventional warfare. 
As to the human rights application and its relation to the principle of proportionality, 
the counterinsurgency approach modifies LOAC interpretation of this principle. COIN seems 
to resemble human rights approach. The IHRL approach does not divide combatants and 
civilians or civilians who lost their protected status. It rather stresses the value of every human 
life and the extraordinary character of killing people in the course of action. But leaving aside 
the relevancy of combatants’ or participants’ lives in an armed conflict, it could be argued that 
the principle of proportionality under IHRL is stricter than under IHL regime, because it 
requires reducing casualties to minimum whereas humanitarian law sets up the prohibition of 
excessive incidental or collateral damage.
730
 But even the strict approach under IHRL does 
not imply that “incidental damages” are not acceptable. European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence confirms that the means necessary to fight insurrection are not the same as for 
the quelling of a riot.
731
 Interesting in terms of coexistence IHRL and IHL in 
counterinsurgency operations is understanding of principle of proportionality delivered in 
Ergi v Turkey.
732
 In this case, the court said that any anti terrorist operation planned by 
Turkish authorities should seek to avoid or minimise the loss of lives of villagers caused not 
only by the Turkish forces, but also by the fire power of the PKK members caught in the 
ambush. This approach modifies the classical IHL interpretation that each belligerent is 
responsible for the damage to civilians caused by its own forces.
733
  
 
4.4 ISSUE OF CIVILIAN COMPENSATION  
The issue of compensation constitutes another challenge to non-international 
asymmetric conflicts. Civilians are often harmed when, lawfully or unlawfully under IHL, 
military operations are conducted. They also get injured in typical incidents such as car 
accidents, incidental destruction of property or destruction of the local environment which 
constitutes a part of war’s reality. In a counterinsurgency, these losses are particularly difficult 
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to accept. Winning “hearts and minds” of the local population is one of the key strategies of 
successful counterinsurgency, which obliges parties to the conflict not only to conduct 
military operations according to the rules of law, but also to compensate losses which are a 
result of it. It may be argued that this obligation goes beyond the one put down by 
humanitarian law and follows Gen Petraeus’ statement that “money is my most important 
ammunition in this war”.734 
In this sub-chapter, I shall present the legal framework of a compensation policy 
during international and non-international armed conflict. Further, I will refer to two existing 
legal problems. The first one considers whether legal regulations governing compensation 
refer to non -international armed conflicts. The second problem is the question of whether 
compensation regulations apply to situations where there has been no violation of IHL.  
Finally, ISAF and the US regulations toward compensating the civilian population in 
Afghanistan as a part of counterinsurgency efforts will be presented. Civilians harmed during 
an armed conflict have a right to compensation or other remedies for their losses.
735
 Art. 57 of 
Additional Protocol I says that “in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be 
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects”. Additionally, Art. 57. 2 
says “with respect to attacks (...) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall (ii) take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, 
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage 
to civilian objects”. Similarly, Art. 58 API “the Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum 
extent feasible: (a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to 
remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control 
from the vicinity of military objectives; (b) avoid locating military objectives within or near 
densely populated areas; (c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers 
resulting from military operations.”  
These regulations oblige parties to the international armed conflict to do everything to 
limit unnecessary destruction. If a state fails to avoid destruction or injury then it is obliged to 
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pay compensation. It is a well-established rule in a treaty law
736
 and in the doctrine. This 
principle was confirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów 
Factory case in 1928. The Court stated that “it is a principle of international law, and even a 
general conception of the law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparation (…) Reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a 
convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself”.737 When 
any destruction or injury occurs during an international armed conflict, then according to the 
AP I art. 91, “a Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of 
this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible 
for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces”. The normative framework 
of these articles refers to the “general principle of international law”.738 Such compensation is 
due only when both violation of law and loss or damage have occurred.
739
 According to the 
ICRC commentary, the responsibility covers “all acts committed by members of the armed 
forces of a Party to the conflict, and not only unlawful acts (or omissions conflicting with a 
duty to act) in the sense of the Conventions and the Protocol.
740
 In this respect, states are 
responsible for all types of internationally wrongful acts
741
 as well as omissions of its 
organs.
742
  
The commentary also refers to the legal principle known as “no-fault” or “strict 
liability”; i.e., a concept of objective responsibility or liability which enters into play simply 
on the ground that an act or omission took place in the territory or under the jurisdiction of the 
State.
743
 As ICRC commentary argues, it seems possible that a party to the conflict could be 
liable to pay compensation even in the case where no particular violation of the rules of the 
Conventions and the Protocol, or of another rule of the law of armed conflict, has occurred. 
Such a liability could arise when the act or omission took place in the territory or under the 
jurisdiction of the State. However, such a liability could not be based on the Art. 91 AP I.
744
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To summarize, in situations governed by the Conventions and the API there is an 
obligation to compensate a victim of the wrongful act. Whereas, when IHL regulations and 
particularly the principle of proportionality in targeting are applied, the attacking army has no 
further responsibilities to civilians.
745
  
The situation is different in a conflict regulated by common Art. 3 and AP II. Neither 
of these regulations addresses the issue of compensation. The only source of law may be 
found in customary rules. However, it could be questioned whether ICRC study provides a 
convincing argumentation. In this respect, particularly rule 149 states that “A State is 
responsible for violations of international humanitarian law attributable to it, including: (a) 
violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces; (b) violations committed by 
persons or entities it empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority; (c) 
violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its 
direction or control; and (d) violations committed by private persons or groups which it 
acknowledges and adopts as its own conduct”746. It means that according to ICRC, state 
practice establishes this rule to violations committed in both international and non-
international armed conflicts. States’ practice is based on military manuals.747 It is a confusing 
argumentation since it seems that regulations in most manuals are clearly copied from Art. 91 
of API. Additionally, these manuals do not provide information as to when they should be 
applied, i.e. in an international or a non-international armed conflict. It seems that Art. 91 of 
AP I was literally copied to the most of military manuals without necessary division on 
situations govern by the law of NIAC and IAC. As such, it is difficult to argue that principle 
of compensation is established as customary rule in non-international armed conflict.
748
 
To summarize, in situations governed by the common Art. 3 and AP II, there is no 
legal obligation upon states to compensate victims of wrongful act under a treaty and 
customary law. An additional issue is the question of compensation resulting out of lawful 
operations under IHL. The problem is that treaty law and customs regulate the situation of 
compensation based, under some circumstances, on the violation of IHL. It does not regulate 
situations of damage or loss which are the result of lawfully conducted military operations – 
“strict liability” or “no-fault approach”. In such situations, victims of collateral damage have 
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no remedy against governmental forces. In this respect, following IHL may be argued as 
contrary to the principle of “wining hearts and minds”. For an average villager it does not 
matter whether his crops were destroyed in the course of a legitimate action or not. For him, 
what is crucial is that his crops were destroyed at all.  
In contrast, counterinsurgency strategy suggests that compensating civilians who are 
harmed, injured, or killed during legitimate military operations would actually be a wise 
tactic.
749
 To address this problem, countries contributing to the military operation in 
Afghanistan decided to pay relevant compensations but they approach this issue in a twofold 
way. 
In Afghanistan, ISAF has introduced regulations which provide the civilian population 
compensation for damage It is a quick and efficient system. It is based on the annex to the 
NATO regulation called OPLAN – ROE.750 It provides a legal basis for the Compensation 
Office at ISAF HQ in Kabul. The Compensation Office is the appellate organ toward Troops 
Contributing Nations relevant compensation authorities. This compensation policy is 
particularly important in everyday situations such as car accidents, destruction of property of 
small value and similar. This creates a better perception of the ISAF forces and constitutes an 
example of providing a better standard than the one foreseen by IHL.  
US forces have introduced a separate, from ISAF, system of condolence payment - 
called “solatia”. It is a nominal payment made directly to a victim or the victim’s family to 
express sympathy, especially when it is compatible with existing local customs.
751
 “Solatia” is 
not considered as compensation or payment based on claims of responsibility. These 
payments in US forces structure are paid out of the Commanders Emergency Response 
Program (CERP)
752
 through personal and operational appropriations.
753
 As the “solatia” 
payment process is discretionary and decentralized to the level of a particular commander, the 
procedure is inconsistent and ad hoc.
754
 Both systems are examples of compensation 
regulations which provide better standards to the civilian population than IHL. 
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Before summarizing, one aspect of the compensation should not be forgotten. As 
Ganesh Sitaraman says “it seems that compensation policy is aligned with counterinsurgency 
strategy”. Nonetheless, one must remember that institutionalizing the "responsibility to pay" 
via direct compensation, may not always be a wise choice. Compensating a family during the 
conflict may make them an easy target for insurgents who discover their wealth. 
Compensation policy therefore must be of in-kind, communal or other form which does not 
turn victims into targets.
755
 Realities of the modern conflict are, however, far from ideal. 
There are areas where paying compensation in-kind will be a plausible solution. Yet there are 
areas where it is difficult or impossible, for example to buy live stock. In such cases, one 
needs to have experience and a vet on board, otherwise there is a risk of buying ill animals 
and procuring more problems than those encountered by simply providing financial 
compensation. 
The above mentioned observations lead to two de lege ferenda conclusions. First of 
all, it is necessary to unify compensation policy within ISAF and OEF operations. This 
unification should also take into consideration the idea of responsible policy payments. The 
choice between in-kind and financial payment needs to be done under careful examination of 
what may better serve the local community.  
Secondly, it is necessary to consider substantive changes in humanitarian law 
addressing non-international armed conflict. The idea of introducing compensation 
regulations in case of IHL violations should be taken into account. It may also be arguable to 
introduce relevant regulation in case of damages resulting out of lawfully conducted 
operations based on “strict liability” approach. This kind of approach may be seen from two 
different angles. An argument may be raised that responsibility for lawful military operations 
may confuse soldiers when they execute ordered operations. Paying compensation based on a 
“strict liability” principle may limit the operational capabilities of military forces. The counter 
opinion may be that compensating damages occurring in the course of a legitimate military 
operation addresses the most humanitarian values. These values are of utmost importance 
during non-international armed conflicts because these conflicts are internal and usually their 
aims are different from the international ones. In NIAC stability, state building and peace are 
the aims. In such cases, compensation based on strict liability may be considered, under some 
circumstances, as a healing factor desirable from the military perspective.  
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Referring to the human rights standards could be particularly interesting. As 
previously argued, humanitarian law constitutes lex specialis toward human rights. In case of 
a lack of regulations provided by humanitarian law, when it is not contrary to the nature of 
armed conflict, human rights may be applicable. In situations governed by human rights such 
as when the police destroy someone’s house by mistake or as a result of a lawfully conducted 
operation, then they are obliged to pay compensation - compensation based on “strict 
liability” approach. 
 
4.5 LAW OF OCCUPATION VS. IUS POST BELLUM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY  
 One of the many problems relating to modern counterinsurgency is that it tends to 
operate in a grey area of international law. Counterinsurgency is often fought on the borders 
of the law of armed conflict, the law of occupation and the law of peace. It is often conducted 
within the framework of the nation building or quasi occupation.  
To describe this phenomenon of terra nulla of international law, the concept of ius 
post bellum was created. It is not a legal concept but derives its name from two existing 
bodies of law: ius ad bellum and ius in bello. These bodies of law have been well codified. 
Yet with the exception of the law of belligerent occupation, neither ius ad bellum nor ius in 
bello provide much guidance on temporary interventions after war and before peace.
756
 As 
Boon says “the illusion that war and peace are absolute, constituting a binary system, has 
stymied the growth of legal principles in this transitional stage.
757
 It could be questioned 
whether those who are exercising temporary power have a right or an obligation to reform 
national laws and institutions. For example, how should ethnic, religious or economic tensions 
be handled and how would natural resources be dealt with; should they be nationalized or 
subject to an international scheme?
758
 These questions need to be addressed from two 
perspectives: From the perspective of an international armed conflict, where occupation takes 
place, and from the perspective of a non-international armed conflict where a foreign power 
intervenes on behalf of the government. 
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In the case of Afghanistan, both elements are present. At the beginning, the military 
operation constituted an international armed conflict where parties or a party to the conflict 
was obliged to fulfil its obligations under the law of occupation.
759
 After the Karzai’s 
government was established, the operation turned into a non-international armed conflict.  
In such a situation, the question of occupation is clearly more complex. On the one 
hand, there is a question of continuity; how long will the occupation last? What if state X 
enters into the internal conflict of another country directly, without an international phase? 
Does the international community then have any state building obligations toward that state? 
These questions are important because there is a striking resemblance between the successful 
outcomes of modern counterinsurgency, nation building and ius post bellum. To be successful 
in a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, one has to establish a state as an independent, self-
sufficient body. In this respect, nation building and ius post bellum are similar to the aim of 
modern counterinsurgency.
760
  
The legal status of the occupier is regulated by the 1907 Hague Regulation (articles 42 
– 56). The most relevant Article 43 states: “the authority of the legitimate power having in 
fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to 
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”.761 This regulation (already in existence 
for more than a hundred years) reflects the position at that time. The final status of the 
occupied territory was a matter to be resolved by the parties in a peace treaty. In the 
meantime, the task of international law was to preserve status quo.
762
  
Complementary to the Hague Regulation was the IV Geneva Convention relating to 
the protection of civilian persons in time of war
763
 - particularly Articles 27-34 and 47- 48 
which refer to the legal obligations of the occupier. These Articles establish a minimum 
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standard of governance.
764
 IV GC introduces also a cessation of the applicability of 
Convention. It states in Art. 6 “that the application of the present Convention shall cease on 
the general closure of military operations. In the case of occupied territory, the application of 
the present Convention shall cease one year after the general closure of military operations”. 
Additional Protocol I develops these standards. As a supplementary to treaty law, several 
customary rules were also recorded in the ICRC study. For example, rule 41 states that “the 
occupying power must prevent the illicit export of cultural property from the occupied 
territory and must return illicitly exported property to the competent authorities of the 
occupied territory”.765 Rule 51 states that “in occupied territory: (a) movable public property 
that can be used for military operations may be confiscated; (b) immovable public property 
must be administered according to the rule of usufruct; and (c) private property must be 
respected and may not be confiscated; except where destruction or seizure of such property is 
required by imperative military necessity”.766  
To summarize the treaty law and ICRC study guidance, the occupying power should 
make three assumptions: occupation is temporary, non-transformative, and limited in scope.
767
 
As a result, any attempt to permanently reform or change an occupied state would be 
unlawful.
768
 But the promise that occupiers will preserve status quo ante, as Kirsten Bonn 
writes, was demonstrated to be a fiction.
769
  
The major issue relating to the applicability of the law of occupation is that the 
consistent and almost universal disuse of it calls into question to what extent this branch of 
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humanitarian law retains legal authority.
770
 State practice indicates almost no compliance with 
the law of occupation; this is sometimes illustrated by the general lack of meaningful 
international condemnation when it is disregarded.
771
 As Harris states, “the law of occupation 
long been in a state of innocuous desuetude”.772 What makes this law even less relevant to 
modern challenges is that the main body of treaty and customary regulations are applicable 
only during an occupation resulting out of international armed conflict. This means that the 
law of occupation is inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts.
773
  
The above mentioned argument clearly highlights the challenges arising from current 
military operations. Since Afghanistan forms the main focus of this case study, the situation 
needs to be examined in more detail. The international phase of the conflict in Afghanistan 
took place at the end of 2001 and beginning of 2002. After concluding the Bonn agreement, 
the Karzai’s government was established.774 With the initiation of the Operation Enduring 
Freedom and ISAF, allied troops conducted military operations with the Afghan 
government’s consent. The international phase put an obligation on foreign forces to uphold 
the law of occupation. Once this phase was concluded, the conflict turned into a non-
international phase, at which point the law of occupation would not be applied.  
 This may raise a question whether the international community is responsible for 
Afghanistan or other post-conflict areas? It seems that the answer is yes. The international 
community has changed its approach toward an armed conflict. It has been a long way from 
the concept of ‘splendid isolation’ to a human rights based interventionism. For example, the 
New NATO strategy says that “NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military 
capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts”.775 The 
same approach is being presented by the EU countries during operations in Chad, Kosovo and 
Congo.  
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Ius post bellum is something more than just responsibility for post conflict countries. 
Nowadays this notion is commonly used
776
, although it is not new. The concept was already 
recognized by the German philosopher and just war theorist, Immanuel Kant, at the end of 
eighteenth century.
777
 The question however, is whether nowadays it has any legal 
meaning.
778
 In this sub-chapter, I will try to present a contemporary meaning of the post ius 
bellum in the context of modern counterinsurgency expectations.  
Ius post bellum seems to be a broad concept embracing both conflict and post conflict 
societies.
779
 It is perceived as a framework for dealing with the challenges of post conflict 
transformation and state building. It has also been associated with the conduct of legislative 
reforms in post conflict areas and the consolidation of the rule of law.
780
 As argued 
previously, the law of occupation is increasingly perceived as an insufficient answer to the 
legal challenges of peace building
781
 or modern counterinsurgency. So the fundamental 
question is whether ius post bellum can be understood in a normative sense, as a concept 
which regulates the relationship between participants of an armed conflict in situations of 
transition, rather than a moral principle or a legal catchword.
782
 
The regulation which may indicate the in statu nascendi character of ius post bellum is 
UN SC Resolution 1483.
783
 The Security Council created a framework where the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General acting in collaboration with CPA
784
 was given a 
specific task to undertake changes in the Iraqi infrastructure which went far beyond what 
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might be permitted under a conservative approach toward the law of occupation.
785
 
Accordingly, the CPA adopted over 100 measures designed to remove the legal and 
institutional instruments of the Husain regime.
786
 The Security Council resolutions played 
similar role in other “quasi-occupation” situations, such as Kosovo787 and East Timor.788 This 
raises questions about the relationship between the UN regulations and international 
humanitarian law. To what extent may UN Security Council Resolutions supplement and 
override the provisions of humanitarian law?
 789
 This is particularly worth looking at in the 
light of Art. 103 of the UN Charter which states: “in the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail”.790 This argument should be particularly relevant with respect to the in 
statu nascendi character of the ius post bellum. 
The concept of ius post bellum was also used by the UN SG Boutros Boutros Ghali in 
his proposal for post conflict peace building in An Agenda for Peace (1992).
791
 Although such 
a document cannot be seen as equal to the SC Resolutions it may constitute a part of the in 
statu nascendi process. Doctrine and scholars also support the concept of ius post bellum. For 
example, Michael Pugh indicates the role of the rule of law as a part of ius post bellum 
process. In this respect he refers to the statement made by Lord Ashdown who, in his seven 
principles of post bellum operations, emphasizes the requirement to establish the rule of law 
as quickly as possible.
792
  
A different perspective is presented by Freeman and Djukic. As they argue; “it is 
unclear whether proponents of ius post bellum envisage an entirely new set of rules and 
principles for ensuring post conflict peace or whether they instead envisage the transportation, 
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modification, or expansion of existing legal norms”.793 It is also unclear whether ius post 
bellum standards vary for international or non-international armed conflicts. It is also difficult 
to determine when ius post bellum would commence, due to the fact that conflicts, such as in 
Afghanistan, could easily continue for years.
794
  
Such a conservative perspective sees nation building or modern counterinsurgency as 
technically unlawful under the traditional law of occupation.
795
 Some scholars even say that 
the international law of state building in failed or post conflict states does not exist.
796
 It is 
debatable that modern counterinsurgency and humanitarian interventions have brought a new 
model of occupation for which nation-building is the primary goal. It seems that this approach 
constitutes a creation of a new law of occupation. The disuse of GC IV leads countries to refer 
mostly or entirely to the UN resolutions which govern multilateral peace or peace 
enforcement operations. Taking into consideration the asymmetrical character of modern 
conflicts, nation building and counterinsurgency under the UN umbrella seem to be not only 
an interesting but a necessary option. The development of the concept of human rights obliges 
the international community not only to intervene, but also to create an environment where 
mass atrocities/war crimes/genocide are much less likely to take place in the future. To 
prevent this, state building, implementation of good governance and the support of a sound 
economy has to take place. All these activities constitute a broad interpretation of ius post 
bellum. In some cases, modern counterinsurgency and ius post bellum share the same 
principles and methods (Afghanistan). In terms of principles, both are orientated towards 
bringing and sustaining peace to the civilian population as the centre of gravity. As to the 
methods, they are orientated toward nation building, rule of law and development of the 
country’s infrastructure and economy. But the environment in which this is applicable differs; 
counterinsurgency is only relevant in situations where insurgency exists, whereas ius post 
bellum is relevant both where insurgency exists and situations where it does not exist. 
Counterinsurgency is considered as a method of warfare. Ius post bellum is considered as an 
in statu nascendi legal concept.  
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It also has to be remembered that concept ius post bellum according to some scholars 
is applicable during NIAC. As I indicated before, the distinction between NIC and IAC in the 
light of modern development of IHL fades. According to Boon, this supports the idea of the 
creation of a unified set of ius post bellum that applies regardless of whether it is NIAC or 
IAC. As she argues, the ius post bellum principles are applicable to NIAC where they 
coincide with those applicable in IAC.
797
 I concur with this position.  
  
4.6 NON- LETHAL WEAPON 
The use of non-lethal weapons (NLW) could positively contribute to 
counterinsurgency operations. In some circumstances, military aims may be achieved without 
lethal means and methods of warfare. The use of non-lethal weapons may cause fewer 
casualties amongst insurgents, especially in urban warfare scenarios. Additionally, the use of 
non-lethal weapons could lower the possibility of collateral damage.
798
 This is especially 
important during operations like the one in Afghanistan where the main task for the NATO 
allied troops is to bring security and stabilization. Giving a commander the option not to use 
deadly force is very tempting. The question is whether it is allowed under international 
humanitarian law to use such means of warfare..  
 According to the US Department of Defence, non-lethal weapons “are explicitly 
designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while 
minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and 
the environment”.799 Another definition states that it is a device which incapacitates 98% of 
the targets, has no effect on 1% and causes permanent damage to another 1%, half of which 
will die.
800
 As Haberland states, the notion of non-lethal weapons seems to be a label for the 
guiding principle behind their intended use.
801
 According to NATO and US officials, it is 
simply a short form to express a concept of less lethal weapons designed to limit casualties
802
. 
The major difference between lethal and non-lethal weapons is that the latter are intended not 
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to kill opponents. Of course, even lethal weapons do not result in 100% lethality. According 
to the ICRC, the estimated lethality rate for wounds from lethal weapons such as rifles and 
fragmentation weapons is approximately 20-25%.
803
 
Non-lethal weapons comprise the following technologies: electromagnetic (laser and 
microwaves), electric, chemical, biological and biochemical technologies (eg. tear gas, toxic 
incapacitating agents), mechanical technologies (nets, barriers), acoustic technologies (e.g. 
infra and ultrasonic generators), kinetic technologies (e.g. rubber and plastic bullets, water 
cannons etc.).
804
 
As with any other weapons, treaty and customary prohibitions are applicable. Non-
lethal weapons should not be indiscriminative in nature or be used indiscriminately against 
combatants or non-combatants. Even though NLWs do not cause unnecessary suffering and 
superfluous injury, they should be used in according to the principle of proportionality
805
 and 
distinction. However, it needs to be remembered that even the indiscriminate use of non-lethal 
weapons causes less lethal damage to civilians than traditional weapons. This is because 
civilians are not usually seriously harmed as non-lethal weapons are designed to 
incapacitate.
806
  
Significant controversy exists with regard to the use of chemical agents, especially 
those referred to as Riot Control Agents (RCAs). Those chemical agents used commonly as 
RCAs are a type of less lethal weapon that include tear gas, pepper spray, and other irritants. 
They are intended to cause pain to any individual with uncovered or unprotected eyes, skin 
and respiratory areas and are used mainly to control crowds or individuals.
807
 In general 
RCAs are considered as chemical weapons, which is why legal regulations are provided for 
their use during armed conflicts.  
The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons during international armed conflicts 
was provided for the first time in 1899 by the Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating 
Gases.
808
 It was confirmed by Article 22 and 23 of the Hague Convention which forbids the 
employment of “poison or poisoned weapon” and “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to 
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cause unnecessary suffering”.809 Prohibition of the use of poisonous gases was developed by 
the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
810
 Among other things, this Protocol 
prohibited "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases" where tear gas could be 
considered both as an “other gas”, or as an asphyxiating, poisonous one.811 Extensive use of 
tear gas in Vietnam by the USA lead to the issuing of a statement by the Secretary General U 
Thant that tear gas as a method of warfare is prohibited by the Protocol 1925.
812
 Fully 
comprehensive in respect to the tear gas prohibition is Art. 1 (5) of the 1993 Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
(CWC) which states: “Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method 
of warfare”. 813  According to the Convention, RCA means “any chemical not listed in a 
Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans a sensory irritation or disabling physical 
effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure”.814 The only 
relevant exception to Article I (5)'s is found in Article II (9) (d), which says that (...) “law 
enforcement including domestic riot control purposes” 815  allows to use RCAs”. This 
exception applies only when a law enforcement intention is clearly made by the state 
deploying the RCAs. In other words, if a chemical agent is deployed and does not fit within 
the law-enforcement exception of Article 1 (9), then it is a banned chemical weapon.
816
 The 
problem is that the Convention does not provide a definition of either law enforcement or 
method of warfare.
817
 Lack of definitions of law enforcement and method of warfare raise an 
issue about the legitimate use of RCAs during peace keeping, humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations, hostage rescue missions and similar.
818
 During such operations, it is difficult to 
differentiate between what is a permissible law enforcement action and what is a forbidden 
method of warfare. In practice, tear gas was used on several occasions by the UN or UN 
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authorized forces in Korea, Kosovo, Rwanda, Haiti, Congo, East Timor and others.
819
 
Additionally some countries, for example the USA, allow the use of RCAs during armed 
conflict. It was confirmed by the US president that American military forces may use RCAs 
in international and non-international armed conflicts defensively to save lives.
820
  
What may additionally complicate the use of RCAs is a dual character of missions 
such as the one in Afghanistan. NATO forces were obliged to conduct not only combat, 
military operations but also stabilization, police type one. Should in such situation the actions 
                                                          
819
 J. Fry, op. cit. p. 472-495. 
820
 The US Field Manual (1956) states: It is the position of the United States that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 
1925 does not prohibit the use in war of … riot control agents; The US Rules of Engagement for Vietnam (1971) 
stated: Riot control agents will be used to the maximum extent possible. CS agents can be effectively employed 
in inhabited and urban area operations to flush enemy personnel from buildings and fortified positions, thus 
increasing the enemy’s vulnerability to allied firepower while reducing the unnecessary danger to civilians and 
the likelihood of destruction of civilian property.  
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) restates Executive Order No. 11850 of 8 April 1975 and specifies: The legal 
effect of this Executive Order is to reflect national policy. It is not intended to interpret the Geneva [Gas] 
Protocol of 1925 or change the interpretation of the United States that the Protocol does not restrain the use of 
riot control agents as such.  
The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) states: The United States does not regard the Geneva [Gas] 
Protocol as forbidding use of riot control agents … in armed conflict. However, the United States has, as a 
matter of national policy, renounced the first use of riot control agents … with certain limited exceptions 
specified in Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975. Using … riot control agents … in armed conflict requires 
Presidential approval.  
The US Operational Law Handbook (1993) states: The following measures are expressly prohibited by the law 
of war and are not excusable on the basis of military necessity: (…) Using weapons which cause unnecessary 
suffering, prolonged damage to the natural environment, or poison weapons. This prohibition does not preclude 
the use of herbicides or riot control agents by US forces in wartime when authorized by the President of the US 
or his delegate.  
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states: The United States considers that use of riot control agents in armed 
conflict was not prohibited by the 1925 [Geneva] Gas Protocol. However, the United States formally renounced 
first use of riot control agents in armed conflict except in defensive military modes to save lives. Uses of riot 
control agents in time of armed conflict which the United States considers not to be volatile of the 1925 
[Geneva] Gas Protocol include: 
1. Riot control situations in areas under effective U.S. military control, to include control of rioting prisoners of 
war. 
2. Situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or 
avoided. 
3. Rescue missions involving downed aircrews or escaping prisoners of war. 
4. Protection of military supply depots, military convoys, and other military activities in rear echelon areas from 
civil disturbances, terrorist activities, or paramilitary operations. 
Such employment of riot control agents by U.S. forces in armed conflict requires NCA approval. 
Use of riot control agents as a “method of warfare” is prohibited by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
However, that term is not defined by the Convention. The United States considers that this prohibition applies in 
international as well as internal armed conflict but that it does not apply in normal peacekeeping operations, law 
enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue 
operations, and non-combatant rescue operations conducted outside of such conflicts. 
The United States also considers that it is permissible to use riot control agents against other than combatants in 
areas under direct U.S. military control, including to control rioting prisoners of war and to protect convoys from 
civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations in rear areas outside the zone of immediate combat. 
Documents available http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule75 
 197 
 
of NATO forces be considered as law enforcement under the UN resolutions? If the answer is 
yes, then RCAs should be allowed. If the answer is no, then the use of RCAs is illegal. 
Several UN resolutions relate to the law enforcing character of the operation in Afghanistan. 
For example, SC Resolution 1386 (2001) “authorizes, (...) an International Security 
Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in 
Kabul and its surrounding areas”821. Further, the resolution not only confirms that the UN 
recognize “that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the 
country resides with the Afghans themselves, welcoming in this respect the cooperation of the 
Afghan Interim Authority with the International Security Assistance Force”, but this 
resolution also states that the UN Security Council “authorizes the Member States 
participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to 
fulfil the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force.
822
 The authorization of ISAF 
forces provided by the the UN Security Council is in many respects similar to the 
authorization of the UN run or the UN approved operations. For instance, RCAs were used in 
Haiti by UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti) forces.
823
 According to the resolution 
867
824
, the main aim of the UNMIH was to maintain security and stability, and help the 
country to return to constitutional rule and give assistance in holding elections.
825
 Similar UN 
interventions took place in Congo Western and Central Africa.
826
  
 The above mentioned examples are based on the following interpretation of Art 1.5 
CWC: “(...) State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare”. It is 
forbidden to use RCAs as a method of warfare during either international or non-international 
armed conflicts. It is lawful, however, to use RCAs as methods of policing or crowd control. 
It is of particular importance when we take into consideration the character of the operation in 
Afghanistan, where several different operations are being conducted (for example the EUPOL 
mission
827
 and NATO led ISAF missions). 
  Each of these operations has its own agenda. EUPOL is the European Union police 
operation. The aim of this mission is to “contribute to the establishment of sustainable and 
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effective civil policing arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider 
criminal justice system under Afghan ownership”.828 In such a case, the use of RCAs within 
the training or mentoring process is justified and lawful. In the case of ISAF the situation is 
more complicated. As mentioned above, the aim of ISAF is “providing security and law and 
order”. The dynamics of the current situation puts ISAF forces within the framework of armed 
conflict. This means that ISAF forces conduct regular military operations of both a defensive 
and offensive character. However, they also conduct policing operations such as securing 
national elections
829
 or training local police. Similar policing operations take place at military 
run check points. According to the Gen Petraeus COIN manual, the key to the success in 
counterinsurgency is not only an active participation in the fight with insurgents, but also the 
creation of security forces
830
 and participation in security type operations with local 
counterparts.
831
 This is because the primary frontline of counterinsurgency is often one of the 
police character - not military.
832
 This creates a situation where military forces execute police 
activity and therefore should be allowed to use RCAs. On the other hand, the same military 
forces should not be allowed to use RCAs during a combat situation. This situation is even 
more complex when an escalation of force is taking place. For example, if NATO troops are 
engaged in crowd control – a police type situation can easily evolve into a combat situation. 
NLWs offer precision, accuracy and effectiveness that can help to save military and 
civilian lives. In some respects, their use may break the circle of violence.
833
 This feature is 
particularly desirable during a counterinsurgency operation. However, there is a danger that 
NLWs may precede the use of lethal weapons which may subsequently lead to possible 
violation of humanitarian law. 
The dual character – military and police - of counterinsurgency is a fact. One day, 
soldiers may be engaged in a combat operation where they cannot resort to RCAs, whereas 
the next day in a police operation, where they would be allowed to use a non-lethal RCAs. 
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This not only follows Sun Tzu’s premise “those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army 
without battle”, but also fulfils humanitarian law expectations.834  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
Modern counterinsurgency rejects a kill-capture strategy. Instead, counterinsurgents 
follow a win-the-population strategy, which is directed on building a stable and legitimate 
political order.
835
 Such an approach was brought against the ideology of a global war on terror 
(GWOT) introduced by the George W. Bush administration, which retained a very 
conventional strategy: to win against your opponent you need to kill or capture the terrorists. 
This strategy failed both on practical and legal level.  
By using asymmetrical means and methods of warfare, insurgents violate the basic 
principles of IHL. However, the use of conventional ways of combat would be of a suicidal 
character for them. On the other hand, NATO forces have to be “more papal than the pope” 
and they are obliged to follow humanitarian standards, since military intervention has a 
stabilization agenda. As such, ISAF’s aim is not to physically eliminate the opponent, but to 
bring peace and stability. As long as NATO forces will be engaged in such operations, they 
have to follow humanitarian principles. It is not because of reciprocity or belief in 
humanitarian values by foot soldiers, but because of strategic pragmatism and historical 
experience. The one who loses moral legitimacy, loses the war.
836
  
Modern conflicts pose a challenge toward treaty law. Treaty law was created to fit 
conventional wars. Such wars are no longer dominant. A brief analysis of the last 60 years of 
global history indicates clearly that international wars constitute a minority. But the last 60 
years of world’s history also bring unprecedented developments in human rights and its 
observance, which impose a different type of obligation on military forces. The new standards 
require that not only a military intervention with humanitarian agenda takes place, but when 
an armed conflict is completed, human rights need to be observed as well. This approach is 
confirmed not only by strategists but also by the international community. For example, the 
UN Res 1674 on the importance of preventing conflicts through development emphasized the 
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significance of preventing an armed conflict through the promotion of economic growth, 
poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, 
democracy, the rule of law, as well as respect for, and protection of, human rights.
837
 The 
transformations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or East Timor are good examples of such 
an approach. At the same time, the lack of engagement of Americans in state building in 
Afghanistan in 1988 after the Russian’s withdrawal is an example how things may go wrong. 
The same type of international failure at the beginning of 1990’s led to the genocide in 
Rwanda.  
Another issue is how the principles of IHL work in an asymmetric environment of a 
non-international armed conflict. What is often allowed under conventional IHL may not be 
acceptable in a modern counterinsurgency policy.
838
 Killing a member of a particular 
community instead of arresting him may fuel insurgency rather than limit it.
839
 For example, 
the bombing of the only hospital in a 100 km radius may be lawful under IHL (if utilized by 
the insurgents for the military purposes), but it is not acceptable under counterinsurgency 
policy.
840
 This is because protecting the population is a centre of gravity to the 
counterinsurgent’s strategy. 841  Particularly with the rise of instant communication and 
publicity, any kill-capture operation could easily be found unreasonable by domestic and 
international opinion and reduce the legitimacy of the intervening counterinsurgent forces and 
their ability to win “hearts and minds”.842 
Modern counterinsurgency, ius post bellum, addresses challenges presented in this 
chapter. Some major humanitarian law principles are better protected by a wise commander 
than by treaty law. Some other branches of humanitarian law such as law of occupation have 
lost legal significance. The problem is that protection during an armed conflict should not 
depend on the discretion of a military commander.  
Most of the issues discussed above share one common feature – uncertainty of law 
applicability. It is difficult to convince a soldier on the ground that a person who sporadically 
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attacks him may not be a target. Similarly, it is difficult to convince a local population that 
heavy armoured vehicles, full of soldiers are much needed humanitarian help provided by 
PRT. It is difficult for a military commander to understand why the interpretation of the 
principle of proportionality so much depends on armed conflict qualification – international or 
non-international armed conflict. It is not easy for an Afghan farmer to understand that the 
destruction of his crops was legal collateral damage under international humanitarian law. It is 
also complicated to convince members of the national Shura that the laws and types of 
government which NATO forces support are better than their own, hundreds- years-old 
system. Finally, it is a challenge to convince anyone that the use of tear gas during an armed 
conflict to control a crowd is a worse crime than using bullets.  
New wars where counterinsurgency is fought do not pose a strategic threat to nuclear 
superpowers such as the USA, the UE or China. However, these low intensity conflicts may 
not be left alone. These wars modify traditional, conventional laws of war. Humanitarian law 
created for a Eurocentric wars needs to be revised because is primarily applicable in distant 
lands were not conventional armed conflicts are fought. It means that maybe it is time to think 
how to change the law in order to meet the challenges of the modern conflict.  
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THESIS SUMMARY  
 
A modern asymmetric conflict locates the civilian population at its centre of gravity. 
The conflict in Afghanistan marks NATO’s largest military involvement in history and is also 
a good example of a modern armed conflict.  
For years, the conflict in Afghanistan was considered a ‘task or test’ for NATO and 
the international community. In December 2014, the mission was brought to a “responsible 
end”, according the White House.843 It is debateable whether the mission was a political and 
military success. From my perspective, the most important issues were the legal challenges 
resulting from military operation there. 
In my thesis, I mainly addressed ius in bello the practical aspects of NATO’s 
operation. I tried to refer not to just one or two issues, but to all those I found to be important 
during my service in Afghanistan.  
At the beginning of this thesis, I gave a brief analysis of the situation in Afghanistan. 
To offer a further-structured consideration, I also provided the legal framework of the 
operation in Afghanistan, from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This 
presentation constitutes a point of departure for further consideration. The above-mentioned 
introduction does not by any means cover all issues related to the military operation in 
Afghanistan; however it discusses some important conclusions.  
Firstly, it indicates the nature of the conflict. At a glance, the situation on the ground 
shows how complex and difficult a modern military operation can be. Mass illicit substances 
production, black market goods, lack of taxation, lack of state control is in fact a modus 
operandi of a modern armed conflict. It places a particular obligation on intervening states 
such as state rebuilding, improving the host state legal system, banking and taxation. These 
are actions that transcend classic military operation aims and goals.  
In the introductory chapter I also provided a sound ground for considering the initial 
stage of the US–Taliban conflict as an international armed conflict. As a result, I find a 
possible committing of war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention by the 
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United States and other pro-central government coalition members such as General Dostum 
Uzbek’s.  
This initial consideration brings me to the first substantive and crucial issue in chapter 
two which is the treatment of detainees during a modern military operation.  
Contrary to international conflicts, during a non-international armed conflict detainees 
do not gain protected status. To structure this chapter I provided a full definition of prisoners 
of war during an international armed conflict. The main reason for this was to provide an in-
depth analysis of the relevant law. Further, I analysed the notion of the unlawful combatant.  
This concept in particularly debatable since, although strongly supported by US legislature 
and jurisprudence, it is not accepted as legally-binding by other states. In fact, bringing 
another concept into an already legally complicated world of shades in asymmetric conflicts is 
particularly harmful. Especially taking into consideration the long history of systematic 
abuses of detainee’s by the US forces.  
 Detainees of a non-international armed conflict are protected by both regimes i.e. 
human rights and humanitarian law. Firstly, I analysed the scope of the detainee’s protection 
under humanitarian law. This is particularly problematic because many participants of the 
conflict in Afghanistan are not party to Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. For example, the US are not, neither is Afghanistan, only since 2009, where it 
became a state party. Of course, highly debatable is the observance of AP II by the armed 
opposition such as the Taliban despite issuing their own ROE called Layeh for Mujahidin 
which follows basic humanitarian principles.  
The issue of protection of detainees under humanitarian law in NIAC is also one of the 
vital topics of my thesis. Since detainees are afforded little protection under humanitarian law 
in non-international armed conflicts, I had to analyse the scope of human rights’ applicability 
in NIAC not only territorially, but also extraterritorially. The issue of human rights 
application brings important challenges. Firstly, it is important for NATO state parties. Often, 
human rights standards are different in NATO countries which are obliged to follow ECHR 
judgements and they are different in the USA. This means that when insurgents are detained 
by military forces from Europe they are, under some circumstances, protected by regional 
human rights instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. To secure the 
provision of the desired human rights standards, European Forces should follow a different set 
of rules. It is, however, difficult to find common ground even for all European forces. A 
classic example of this are the so-called national caveats where several states, particularly 
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European, adopted many of them. There were, according General James Jones, more than 
eighty caveats in Afghanistan significantly affecting the performance of many countries in 
Afghanistan
844
. These national caveats were mostly European in origin. This could have, and 
in fact it did had, a rather immense effect on the interoperability of NATO forces in 
Afghanistan. This part of my thesis brings following conclusion: firstly, there should be a 
joint training matrix for all European NATO member states. This should follow a detailed 
analysis of existing jurisprudence of ECHR and its relation to military operations. There is no 
doubt that European states and the USA depends on each other during military operations. 
However, it has to be done accordingly. A potential solution could be the specialization of 
European states during territory operations out of Article 5. For example, German forces have 
several constraints and caveats, and Polish and British forces are more willing to operate 
combat missions. This could lead to specialization based on particular tasks. For example, 
Czech and German forces could be responsible for development and humanitarian aid. French 
forces for air support, whereas British, Dutch and Polish forces could be responsible for 
combat ground operations. Another recommendation would be signing a joint so-called 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding detainees in the host country. Such agreement 
allows, for example, control of the status of detainees while obliging the signatory’s 
adherence to ECHR’s rules. The question of applicability of humanitarian law and human 
rights continuously brings the issue of interoperability of the western armed forces in a 
multinational environment.    
In the third chapter I attempt to deal with the legal concept I find the most challenging: 
Rules of Engagement and their debatable legal status. Rules of Engagement constitute an 
important element during modern military operations, contributing to the unification and 
compatibility of the mission and helping to create an efficient military structure where each 
component can communicate using the same language and terms. However, I found their legal 
status to be unclear. In the third chapter I argue that despite the legal nature of ROE, they may 
not be considered as law at least in Poland and England and Wales. What constituted a 
challenge in the third chapter was the lack of similar legal analysis conducted on the status of 
ROE. Due to this lack of reference point, I had to conduct a full-screen type of research 
regarding all aspects of ROE.  
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Firstly, I was trying to set a legal framework for my research. Often during military 
missions, relevant agreements regarding the status of forces are concluded such as Status of 
Forces Agreement or Military Technical Agreement. Their aim is to regulate the status of 
deployed forces.  
Secondly, to provide a full spectrum of applicable law, I presented the legal 
regulations applicable to Polish armed forces which affect our understanding of ROE.  
Thirdly, I presented the definition of ROE. Since their foundation comes from military 
manuals which are not legally binding sources, I try to provide as many definitions as possible 
to give to the reader a chance to shape their own vision of ROE.  
The most challenging was the section where I position ROE within an existing system 
of law i.e. in Poland and England and Wales. The point of departure was a debate whether 
ROE constitute a source of international law. After presenting argument that ROE doesn’t 
constitute a source of international law, I try to position ROE within a domestic legal system. 
Thorough analysis indicates that ROE may not be considered as a legally binding act such as 
regulations or military orders. As such, ROE should be excluded as a source of domestic law. 
Particularly interesting was the Nangar Khel case study, when eventually a Military Court in 
Poland referred in its judgment to the concept of ROE, sentencing soldiers on the ground of 
misinterpretation of ROE and military order jointly
845
. This judgment is very peculiar in this 
respect as it introduces a complementary legal character of ROE without any actual legal 
grounds for it. From my perspective, the Court misinterpreted the law and the notion of ROE.  
This case is still pending before the Appellate Court.  
The situation is only slightly clearer under the law of England and Wales. As 
presented, there is no evidence which may indicate the legal character of ROE under the law 
of England and Wales. In fact, ROE should be treated only as technical measures whereas 
soldier’s responsibility may be derived only from the relevant law.  
My conclusion supports the view that ROE only obtain the character of a legal order 
when they are implemented according to a particular commander’s order. Apart from the 
implementation of ROE, they do not exclude the application of criminal and other laws, such 
as international criminal or humanitarian law. As a result, from the perspective of the possible 
legal responsibility before a court, the most important point is following the law of the 
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country of origin, rather than Rules of Engagement. I base this conclusion on a comparative 
analysis of Polish law and the law of England and Wales. This conclusion does not exclude 
other legal solutions in other countries. In consideration of ROE, I also express the necessity 
for proper implementation and dissemination of IHL and ROE, especially in a multinational 
environment. Particularly, I point to a linguistic barrier and refer to Peter’s Rowe intellectual 
barrier as well.  
Another interesting element of this chapter is the role of military manuals. Since 
Britain has a long history of publishing influential military manuals, I took the opportunity to 
take a closer look on their status. Despite the lack of legal meaning, they are of high 
importance. It is due to the quality of the contributing authors and public availability. Their 
analysis contributes to a unified European approach toward challenges of modern conflicts.  
 Next issue of great interest to me was the new approach taken toward insurgency in 
Afghanistan. The General David H. Petraeus Manual on Counterinsurgency reshaped the 
US’s and the International Security Assistance Force’s approach towards insurgents. This 
brought about change not only on the part of the leadership, but foremost with a new vision of 
counterinsurgency and a new strategy for fighting the enemy. This is currently the most 
commonly applied doctrine of modern warfare which affects the applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law. Both IHL and COIN locate civilians at their centre of gravity, placing 
emphasis on the limitation of collateral damage by constraining the use of indiscriminate 
methods of warfare such as aerial bombardment. Both IHL and COIN have difficulties with 
positive identification of the enemy. By using asymmetrical means and methods of warfare, 
insurgents often violate the basic principles of IHL. On the other hand, NATO forces have to 
maintain a spotless record at all times, and are obliged to follow humanitarian standards, since 
military intervention usually has a stabilization agenda. As such, the ISAF’s aim is not to 
physically eliminate the opponent, but to bring peace and stability. As long as NATO forces 
are engaged in such operations, they must be more Catholic than the Pope.  
This chapter brings an interesting observation about the coexistence of human rights 
and humanitarian law. It also brings the almost unsolvable issue of interoperability of US and 
European forces. It is also one of the most important parts of my thesis especially since COIN 
apparently requires a thorough analysis from the IHL perspective. 
When writing this chapter I faced all possible challenges resulting from modern 
multinational operations. To set the scene, I provide a definition of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. These two, closely correlated phenomena, reshaped a vision of 
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understanding of modern armed conflicts and applicable humanitarian law.  What attracted 
me first was the answer the question of how principles of IHL apply to COIN strategy. The 
first principle was the principle of distinction. It is intrinsically a matter of humanitarian law 
to decide who should be a legitimate target. What is challenging is that insurgents or terrorists 
in a modern conflict try to blend in with the local population as much as possible. What is 
problematic is what type of legal regime also applies that, in some respects, human rights may 
affect the use of lethal means and methods in the situation of a non-international armed 
conflict. This is where these two regimes meet i.e. targeted killing. I demonstrate in this 
section, due to the exclusive character of IHL in this respect, that only humanitarian principles 
are applicable. The most interesting aspect of targeted killing comes with the identification of 
the legitimate target. Prolonged discussion on direct participation in hostilities was of great 
help. In chapter four, I presented a debate on direct participation in hostilities resulting from 
the publication of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Particularly interesting are 
views presented by Nils Melzer and Professor Cassese. I discuss the views presented by 
Professor Cassese indicating that his approach of mixing human rights with humanitarian law 
in regard to targeting is highly debatable both in NIAC and IAC. I agree, in this respect, with 
targeting principles interpreted by Nils Melzer. I also concur with Melzer’s view on targeting 
individuals members of organized groups. I present, in this respect, arguments indicating the 
lack of possibility of targeting members of political wings of some groups such as Gulbudin 
Hekmatyar’s in Kabul. As for a recommendation, it would plausible to establish a joint 
pattern of targeting among allied forces or at least forces on a European level. This is 
challenging in a multinational environment where one operation may be executed by soliders 
from several countries often with a different approach to understanding targeting and the 
notion of direct participation in hostilities.  
Another example of blurred lines between what is civilian and what is military I 
discussed in point 4.1.4 of this thesis. The concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
brought a lot of military-structured humanism to the modern battlefield. Soldiers rebuilding 
schools, travel routes, helping to channel a significant amount of governmental money to local 
people sounds like a wonderful solution. Is it?  In this section, I indicate the challenges 
resulting from PRT operation. Firstly, I present argumentation indicating that action in terms 
of humanitarian support are within a legal framework of IHL treaty law. The situation is more 
complicated when it comes to principle of distinction. Firstly PRTs act in a similar way to the 
Taliban. They pretend to be civilian although they are not. Secondly, PRTs constitute an 
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important aspect of military effort during the counterinsurgency. My main question is how to 
consider PRTs’ actions and their results i.e. buildings, travel routes and such similar aspects. 
PRTs’ actions, I consider, are military, despite the civilian-orientated agenda. In terms of 
results, I suggest a classical interpretation of military objectives and civilian objects.  This is 
so even though I strongly feel that it is European-centric interpretation. For the western world 
where humanitarian law was coined, schools are clearly a civilian object. For the Taliban, for 
whom educated girls constitute a direct threat toward their political agenda, this is not the 
case. Such an approach finds support in experts’ opinion on Israel’s action on occupied 
territory where civilian actions and objects in some respect obtain a military character.  
Another aspect of modern counterinsurgency lies in the principle of proportionality. 
This principle allows collateral damages in armed conflicts which are not acceptable under the 
human rights regime. In this part, I discuss that the COIN strategy adapts a less lethal 
approach due to the civilian population orientated agenda. What I also discuss is the question 
of coexistence of HR and IHL from the perspective of the principle of proportionality. The 
ECHR position presented in Ergi v Turkey introduces harsh HR requirements into a 
humanitarian law governed operation.  
In the next part, I referred to the issue of ius post bellum. This recently reinvigorated 
concept by the Grotius Centre and Professor Carsten Stahn brings a lot of international law 
scholarly attention. Elements of this discussion I found in practical terms during my work in 
Afghanistan. I indicate that the traditional understanding of occupation in modern conflict is 
no longer applicable. Simply, traditional law of occupation has become less and less relevant 
in our times where nearly every military operation leads to substantive change in government 
or the existing legal, political or economic order.  
As I argue in this section, I consider ius post bellum as an in statu nascendi legal 
concept. I hope that I provide credible arguments on behalf of the existence of both 
international organizations practice and opinio iuris indicating the existence of the ius post 
bellum concept in contemporary international law related to both NIAC and IAC respectively. 
I strongly believe that it would be interesting to follow Professor Christopher Greenwood’s 
article on the relation between ius ad bellum, ius in bello and add to this to ius ad bellum, 
however, this task is beyond this thesis.   
In the last substantive part of my thesis I refer to the use of non-lethal weapons (NLW) 
during NIAC.  This small piece brings, yet again, all challenges related to modern conflicts. In 
this part I provide definitions of NLW. I also divide them into several subgroups of NLW. 
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What I found in this part most fascinating was the issue of the use of tear gas. This is because 
this rather common use of means of quelling riots during peace time, according to a literal 
interpretation of IHL, is not legal during an armed conflict. So this small piece brings solid 
arguments against Tadic ruling and, in general, a significant blow against increasing 
customization of IHL and the role of jurisprudence in this respect. As I suggest in this part, 
humanitarian law forbids the use of chemical weapons, which includes tear gas. During peace 
time, when IHL is not applicable, the same tear gas is allowed. Is it possible that on the 
territory of one country this regime may be applicable separately? For example, in the south 
of Afghanistan where fierce fighting occurred between government forces and the Taliban, 
should the law of armed conflict rules be applicable, whereas should the northern parts only 
be governed by human rights? Or maybe we should apply humanitarian law even more 
flexibly? For example, during a combat situation in place x, we should apply IHL, whereas in 
non-combat situations in the same place only HR? When, for example, do soldiers need to 
disperse rioters, not insurgents? This approach is, in my opinion, necessary to avoid casualties 
during an escalation of a situation involving force or the potential for force. This approach is 
logical. Why refer to warning shots when we can use a less-escalating method i.e. tear gas. 
However, this approach overrules the interpretation of law provided by the International Court 
for the Former Yugoslavia, in the famous Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction in the case of Dusko Tadić, wherein the court declared that the 
geographical scope of armed conflict applies to the entire territory of the parties to the 
conflict, and not only to the narrow context of combat operations.846 In fact, in Afghanistan, 
as well as in other places, in the same location could be executed a military action and then, 
twelve hours later, a law enforcement action. This indicates the necessity of tailoring a new 
approach which takes into consideration the aim of the operation, the reality of the theatre of 
combat, the civilian population, and the law. In this respect, the international humanitarian 
law of armed conflicts is particularly ripe for change.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
846 
Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal,  IT-94-1-
A - ICTY http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm, par. 69 
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
1) A successful military operation in a non-international armed conflict environment has 
to be conducted with a state rebuilding agenda 
2) Joint training matrix for all European NATO member states 
3) Joint MOU for all European NATO member states related to the status and treatment 
of detainees  
4) Specialization of European forces  
5) Joint European Manual on law of armed forces  
6) Joint European Manual on targeting principles particularly on direct participation in 
hostilities 
7) Discussion on the nature of customary law and the role of tribunals in a multinational 
military environment  
8) Discussion on interoperability of US and European forces in terms targeting and 
distinction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 211 
 
BIBLIGRAPHY  
 
Monographies  
 Abi Saab R., Humanitarian law and internal conflicts: the evolution of legal concern, in: 
Humanitarian law of armed conflict: Challenges ahead – essays in honour of Frits 
Kalshoven, red. A.J.M. Delissen, G.J. Tanja, Dodrecht–Boston–London 1991 
 Adamec L. W., Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century, The University 
of Arizona Press, 1974, 
 Ambos K., Nulla poena sine lege in international criminal law, [in:] Sentencing and 
sanctioning in supranational criminal law, red. R. Haveman, O. Olusanya, Antwerp–Oxford 
2006, 
 Bantekas I., Nash S., International Criminal Law, Routledge–Cavendish 2007. 
 Barcik J., Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne – International Public Law, Beck, Warszawa, 
2007, 
 Bebber J., The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Counterinsurgency 
Operations: Khost Province, Afghanistan, Small Wars Journal, March 31, 2011, 
 Bianchi A., Naqvi Y., International Humanitarian law and terrorism, Studies in 
International Law, 2011, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
 Bierzanek R., Wojna a prawo międzynarodowe, War and international law, Warszawa 1982. 
 Boothby W., CONFLICT LAW - The Influence of New Weapons Technology, Human 
Rights and Emerging Actors, Asser, 2014, 
 Cassese A., Gaeta P., Johnes J., The Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, Oxford 2002, 
 Cassese A., International Criminal Law, Oxford 2003, 
 Cryer R., Friman H., Robinson D., Wilmshurst E., An Introduction to International Criminal 
Law, Cambridge 2008, 
 Cyprian T., Sawicki J., For Nuremberg principles, Walka o zasady norymberskie 1945-
1955, Warszawa 1956, 
 Czapliński W., Wyrozumska A., International Public Law - Prawo międzynarodowe 
publiczne, Warszawa 2004, 
 Fleck D., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford Press 1999, 
 212 
 
 Flemming M., Jeńcy wojenni. Studium prawno-historyczne, Prisoners of war. Historic and 
Legal Study, Warszawa 2000, 
 Grau L. W. /Frunze Academic Press, The Bear went over the mountain – Soviet Combat 
tactics in Afghanistan, Frank Cass Publishers, 1998, 
 Green L., The contemporary law of armed conflict, Manchester 2008, 
 Gunaratana R., Inside Al Qaida – Global Network of terror, Berkley Books, New York, 
2003, 
 Henckaerts J-M., Doswald-Beck L., Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005, 
 Jagielski W., Modlitwa o deszcz, Prayer for a rain, W.A.B., Warszawa 2002, 
 Jones S., Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Vol. 4, 
 Kaczorowska A., International Public Law, 4’th Ed. Routledge, 2010, 
 Kiernan B., Cambodia: The Eastern Zone massacres, Yale 1986, 
 Kilcullen D., Counterinsurgency, Hurst and Company, London, 2010, 
 Kittichaisaree K., International Criminal Law, Oxford 2001, 
 Królikowski M., Wiliński P., Izydorczyk J., Introduction to International Criminal Law 
Podstawy prawa karnego międzynarodowego, Warszawa 2008, 
 Kuźniar R., Polityka i siła, Policy and Power, Scholar, Foundation of International Studies, 
Warsaw, 2005, 
 McCormack T.H., From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Commitee: The evolution on an International 
Criminal Law Regime, [w:] The Law of War Crimes, The Hague 1997, 
 Melzer N., Targeted killing in international law (Oxford Monographs in international law), 
2008, 
 Neamatollah N., The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, mass mobilization, civil war and the 
future of the region, Palgrave, New York , 2002, 
 Othman M., Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of 
Rwanda and East Timor, New York 2005, 
 Pictet J.S., Commentary, III Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, first reprint, ICRC, Geneva 1994, 
 Rashid A., Descent into chaos - how the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Allen Lane, 2008, 
 213 
 
 Rashid A., Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven, 
Conn, Yale University Press, 2000, 
 Rid T., Keaney T., Understanding counterinsurgency; doctrine, operations, and challenges, 
Routledge, London, 2010,  
 Rubin B. R., The fragmentation of Afghanistan- State formation and collapse in the 
international system, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002, 
 Schabas W.A., An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge 2004.  
 Shaw M., International Law, 5th ed., Cambridge 2003, 
 Skaine R., The women of the Afghanistan under the Taliban, McFarland & Company, North 
Carolina, 2002, 
 Stahn C., Kleffner J.K., Jus post bellum, towards a law of transition, from conflict to peace, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
 T.Cyprian, J.Sawicki, Law of Nuremberg - Prawo norymberskie, Warszawa–Kraków 1948. 
 Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor, London 1991, 
 U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Manual, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, MCWP, 2006 
 UK Ministry of Defence (ed.), The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, 
 Williams C., The Tokyo war crimes trial before the international military tribunal for the 
Far East, [in:] IHL: Challenges, ed. J. Carey, W.V. Dunkap, R.J. Pritchard, New York 2004, 
 Wojciechowski J., Crimnal code. Case law and commentary, Kodeks Karny. Komentarz i 
orzecznictwo, Warszawa 1998, 
 Zahar A., Sluiter G., International Criminal Law a critical introduction, Oxford 2008. 
 
Articles 
 Ahlund Ch., Major obstacles to building the rule of law in a post-conflict environment, New 
England Law Review vol. 39, Fall 2004, 
 Ahmed A.R., The shame of Hwang v. Japan: How the international community has failed 
Asia’s comfort women, Texas Journal of Women and the Law , vol. 14, 2004, 
 Aldrich G.H., Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, American Journal of International Law , vol. 90, 1996, 
 Aolain F. Ni, The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 
Michigan Journal Of International Law , vol. 19, 1998, 
 214 
 
 Arsanjani M.H., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, American Journal of 
International Law , vol. 93, 1999, 
 Barber R., The proportionality equation: balancing military objectives with civilian lives in 
the armed conflict in Afghanistan, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 2010, 
 Benvenisti E., The legal battle to define the law on transnational asymmetric warfare, Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 20, 2010, p. 340, 
 Borelli S., Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad 
in the “War on Terror”, International Review of the Red Cross , vol. 87 (2005),  
 Brahmimi L., Law and Ethics, Afghanistan prospects for the future, Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 75, 2003, 
 Brannagan C., The Copenhagen process on the handling of detainees in international 
military operations: a Canadian perspective on the challenges and goals of humane warfare, 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 2010, 
 Cherif Bassiouni M., International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, Law 
and Contemporary Problems , vol. 59, 1996,  
 Chuck Mason R., Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been 
Utilized? March 15, 2012, Congressional Research Service, RL34531, 
 Cohen D., Intended to Fail, The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta, 
International Center for Transitional Justice, Prosecutions case studies series, August 2003, 
 Cryer R., Implementation of the International Criminal Court Statute in England and Wales, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 2002,  
 Cullen A., Key development’s affecting the scope of internal armed conflict, Military Law 
Review , vol. 183, 2005, 
 Danner A.M., Beyond, the Geneva Conventions: lessons from Tokyo tribunal in prosecuting 
war and terrorism, Virginia Journal of International Law , vol. 46, 2005, 
 DiMeglio R.P., The evolution of Just war tradition: defining jus post bellum, Military Law 
Review, vol. 186, 2005, 
 Fenrick J., Attacking the enemy civilian as a punishable offense, Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, vol. 7, 1997, 
 Fidler D. P., The international legal implications of 'non-lethal' weapons”, Michigan Journal 
of. International Law, vol. 21, 1999, 
 215 
 
 Fordham M.., Legal opinion on detainee handovers by UK forces: in the matter of the all-
party parliamentary group on extraordinary rendition and in the matter of the human rights 
responsibility arising from military detainee handovers in Iraq [and Afghanistan] (all party 
parliamentary group on extraordinary rendition 2008), 
 Fournier S., Nato military interventions abroad: how RoE are adopted and jurisdictional 
rights negotiated Paper presented at the XVth International Congress of Social Defence 
Criminal Law between War and Peace: Justice and Cooperation in Criminal Matters in 
International Military Interventions, Toledo, Spain, September 2007,  
 Geiß R., Asymmetric conflict structures, ICRC Review, Vol. 88, No. 864, 2006, 
 Gierach E, Polish Constitutional Law, Chancellery of the Sejm, Warsaw 2009, 
 Gioia A., The role of the European human rights in monitoring compliance with 
humanitarian law in armed conflict, (in:) International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law, ed. Orna Ben-Naftali, Oxford University Press, 2011, 
 Goodman R., The detention of civilians in armed conflict, American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 103, January, 2009, 
 Greenwood Ch., International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic case, European Journal of 
International Law , vol. 7, 1996, 
 Greig M., Detention operations in a counterinsurgency: pitfalls and the inevitable 
transition, Army Lawyer, December, 2009, 
 Haberland B., Certain Controversies concerning non-lethal weapons, New Zealand Armed 
Forces Law Review, vol. 6, 2006, 
 Harper E., Delivering justice in the wake of mass violence: new approaches to transitional 
justice, Journal of Conflict & Security Law , vol. 10, 2005,  
 Harris G. T., The Era of Multilateral Occupation, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 24, 2006, 
 Hauner M., The Soviet War in Afghanistan – Patterns of Russian imperialism, University 
Press of America – Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1991, 
 HendinS,E, Detainees in Afghanistan: The Balance between Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian law for Foreign Military Forces, Tilburg Law Review, vol. 14. 
2007-2008, 
 Hynes C., Weber A., National Security, International Lawyer, vol. 41 no 2, 2007. 
 216 
 
 Junod S., Additional Protocol II: History and scope, American University Law Review , 
vol. 33, 1983, 
Katzman K., Afghan security forces have made tremendous strides, but continued success 
turns on U.S. military support, Afghanistan: Post - Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. 
Policy, Congressional Research Service, October 2015 
 Kaymar Stafford N., A model war crimes court: Sierra Leone, ILSA Journal of International 
and Comparative Law , vol. 10, 2003, 
 Kretzmer D., Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or 
Legitimate Means of Defence? The European Journal of International Law Vol. 16, 2005, 
 Lamp N., Conceptions of war and paradigms of compliance: the ‘new war’ challenge to 
international humanitarian law, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 16, 2011, 
 Levie H., Prisoners of war in international armed conflict, Naval War College, Newport, 
Rhode Island, 1978, 
 Ling Ch.W., Forgiveness and punishment in post-conflict Timor, UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs , vol. 10, 2005, 
 Lippman M., Aerial attacks on civilians and the humanitarian law of war: technology and 
terror from world war I to Afghanistan, California Western International Law Journal , vol. 
33, 2002, 
 Lippman M., Humanitarian Law: The uncertain contours of command responsibility, Tulsa 
Journal of Comparative and International Law , vol. 7, 2001, 
 Lt Col Anthony Wolusky, Combat Crime: Rules of Engagement in Military courts-martial, 
United States Air Force, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Military Law. & Law of War 
Review,  
 Lt Col W. A. Stafford, How to Keep Military Personnel from Going to Jail for Doing the 
Right Thing:Jurisdiction, ROE & the Rules of Deadly Force, The Army Lawyer, 2000, 
 Lysaght Ch., Scope fo Protocol II and Its Relation to Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, American University Law 
Review , vol. 30, 1983-1984, 
 Maxwel M., M. Watts, Unlawful Enemy Combatant’: Status, Theory of Culpability, or 
Neither?, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Oxford, vol. 5 (2007), 
 McGurk, Revisiting the law of nation building: Iraq in transition, Virginia Journal of 
International Law, vol. 45, 2005, 
 217 
 
 Meron T., From Nuremberg to the Hague, Military Law Review , vol. 149, 1995, 
 Meron T., Geneva Conventions as customary law, American Journal of International Law , 
vol. 81, 1987, 
 Meron T., International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, American Journal of 
International Law , vol. 89, 1995, 
 Meron T., War crimes in Yugoslavia and development of international law, American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 88, 1994, 
 Moeckli D., The US Supreme Court's 'enemy combatant' decisions: a 'major victory for the 
rule of law'?, Journal of Conflict and Security law, vol. 10 no 1, 2005. 
 Murphy R., United Nations peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the use of force, 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2002, vol. 8(1), 
 Nahlik S. A Brief Outline of International Humanitarian Law, International Review of the 
Red Cross , vol. 24, 1984, 
 Noone G.P, The history and evolution of the law of war prior to world war II, Naval Law 
Review , vol. 47, 2000, 
 Odom J. G., Beyond arm bands and arms banned; chaplains, armed conflict, and the law, 
Naval Law Review”, 1/2002, 
 Pacek B. Gen, Polish new rules of engagement – soldiers’ legal security (in:) B. Janusz-
Pawletta Rules of Engagement – selected legal issues, Warsaw 2011, ISSN 0209-0031, 
 Pejic J., “Unlawful/enemy combatant”: Interpretations and consequences, (in:) International 
Law and armed conflict: exploring the faultiness, Essays in Honour Yoram Dinstein, ed. 
M.Schmitt and J.Pejic, Martinus Nijhoff,  
 Peterson E., Two sides of the same coin: the link between illicit opium production and 
security in Afghanistan, vol. 37, Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 2007, 
 Pfanner T., Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and 
Humanitarian Action, 87 International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 87, 2005, 
 Powles S., Command responsibility - a new basis of criminal liability in English law?, 
Criminal Law Review, 2002 , 
 Rakowsky K. L., Military contractors and civil liability: use of the government contractor 
defense to escape allegations of misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, Stanford Journal of 
Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, vol.2, 2006, 
 Roach J. A., Rules of Engagement, Naval War College Review 1983, 
 218 
 
 Rowe P., Military misconduct during international armed operations: bad apples or 
systemic failure?, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2008, p. 175, 
 Rowe P., The United Nations rules of engagement and the British soldier in Bosnia, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly Publication, 1994 
 Schabas W.A., Conjoined twins of transitional justice?, The Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, Journal of International Criminal Justice , 
vol. 4, 2004.  
 Schabas W.A., The Relationship between Truth Commissions and International Courts: The 
Case of Sierra Leone, Human Rights Quarterly , vol. 25, 2003.  
 Schindler D., The different types of armed conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions 
and protocols, vol. 163, Recueil des cours (1979) 
 Schmitt M., Deconstructing direct participation in hostilities: the constitutive elements, New 
York Journal of International law and Politics, 2010 
 Sitaraman G., Counterinsurgency, the war on terror, and the laws of war, Virginia Law 
Review, vol. 95, 2009 
 Sonnefeld R., Uchwały Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ. Zagadnienia prawne, UNSC 
Resolutions- legal issues, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa, 1979, p. 13 i 
31. 
 Stewart J., Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: 
A critique of internationalized armed conflict, IRRC, Vol. 85/850/2003 
 Szuniewicz M., Legal aspects of NATO RoE — MC 362/1 (with special regard to the 
maritime component), International Humanitarian Law vol. III Rules of Engagement, Polish 
Naval Academy Command & Naval Operations Faculty Gdynia 2012, 
 Tasikas V. LC., Developing the rule of law in Afghanistan, the need for a new strategic 
paradigm, Army Lawyer, July 2007, 
 van Voorden M., Rozkaz jako szczególna instytucja wojskowego prawa karnego- Superior 
order as specific component of military criminal law, (in;) Międzynarodowe Prawo 
Huamanitarne- International Humanitarian Law, vol. 4 Targeted Killing and Superior Order, 
Gdynia 2013, 
 Wanhong Z., From Nuremberg to Tokyo: some reflections on the Tokyo trial, Cardozo Law 
Review , vol. 27, 2006, 
 219 
 
 Watkin K., Controlling the use of force; a role for human rights norm in contemporary 
armed conflict, American Journal of International Law , vol. 98, 2004, 
 Wolfrum R.,. Philipp Ch. E, The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights under 
International law, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations, Volume 6, 2002, 
 Wronkowska S., Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii państwa i prawa, Theory of the law and the 
state, Poznań 2001, 
 Zays A., Human rights and indefinite detention, ICRC Review, vol. 87 no. 857, 2005, 
 
 
Documents 
 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force Oct. 21, 
1950 
 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs ... 29 July 1899, entered into 
force 4 September 1900) (1899) 187 CTS 429 available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/150?OpenDocument 
 Hague Convention (IV) on respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 / 
[1980] ATS 23 / 6 ILM 368 (1967) 
 Law on Miltary Courts 21 September 1997 (Ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. Prawo o 
ustroju sądów wojskowych (Dz.U. z 2012 poz. 952)  
 Law on the Proscutor’s Office 20 June 1985 (Ustawa z dnia 20 czerwca 1985 r. o 
prokuraturze Dz. U. z 1985 r. Nr 31, poz. 138) 
 Organic law n° 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 setting up Gacaca jurisdictions and organizing 
prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity 
committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.), http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Law.pdf (02.05.2011).  
 Polish Criminal Code, as Published in Official Journal of 2 August 1997 no 88 item 553 
available at http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19970880553 
 Protocol 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, May 3, 2002, Europe. T.S. No. 187 
 220 
 
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 
3 
 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Rome, 17 July 1998 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Kampala,11 june 2010, 
available http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/AMENDMENTS/CN.651.2010-
ENG-CoA.pdf Law on rules of use and of Military forces abroad 17’ December 1998, Ustawa 
z dnia 17 grudnia 1998 o zasadach użycia lub pobytu Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
poza granicami państwa (Dz. U. z dnia 21 grudnia 2010 r.)  
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
 Standard Operating Procedure – Detention on Non-ISAF Personnel (SOP 362) NATO/ISAF 
UNCLASSIFIED REL GCTF NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GCTF, available at 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/ISAF-DetaineeSOP.pdf 
 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 nd April 1997. As published in Journal of 
Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 1997, No. 78, item 483 and as amended by Dziennik Ustaw of 
2006, No. 200, item 1471 
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI  
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155 
 
 
Judgements and opinions 
 Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2008] 1 A.C. 153 (U.K.H.L 2007) 
 Coard et Al. v. United States, Report N. 109/99 - Case 10.951, Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR), 29 September 1999, 
 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (8 July 
1996), paragraphs. 24–25. 
 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, 2004-VII ECtHR Judgment  
 Issa and others v. Turkey, (no. 31821/96) ECtHR, Judgment of 16 November 2004. 
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ 
Advisory opinion of 9 July 2004,  
 221 
 
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996 
 Pad and Others v. Turkey (no. 60167/00) ECtHR Judgment 
 Prosecutor v Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, par. 58 available 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/ en/gal-tj031205e.pdf 
 Prosecutor v. Oie Hee Koi, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (U.K.), 4 December 
1967 [1968 
 Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, case No. IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008 
  Prosecutor v. Tadić (IT-94-1) Judgment of 15 July 1999 
 R v Payne, General Court Martial Charge Sheet, Case number: H DEP 2007/411, 30 April 
2007, available at http://www.army. mod.uk/apa/courts_martial_trials  
 Soering v. the United Kingdom, (Application no. 14038/88), 07 July 1998, 
 The Queen (on the application of Maya Evans) v Secretary of State for Defence, High Court 
of Justice Queen's Bench Division Divisional Court 25 June 2010 [2010] EWHC 1445 
(Admin) 2010 
 
Internet sources  
 Bissett J., War on terrorism skipped the KLA, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BIS111A.html  
 George W. Bush, Memorandum on „Humane treatment of Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees”, 
7 February 2002, para. 2(b); available at <http://pegc.no-
ip.info/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf>  
 International Centre for Transitional Justice, Accountablility and peace for a DRC, 
http://www.ictj.org/static/Factsheets/ICTJ_DRC_fs2008.pdf  
 International Centre for Transitional Justice, The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: Reviewing the First Year, Case Study Series, 2004. 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-SierraLeone-Justice-Review-2004-English.pdf. 
 International Committee of the Red Cross, International Criminal Court: State consent 
regime v. universal jurisdiction, www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/ 
iwpList320/F4607C74CA18E5F5C1256B66005C27D5  
 International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance, 
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/sierra-leone/067-sierra-leone-the-state-of-
security-and governance.aspx  
 222 
 
 International Crisis Group, The insurgency in Afghanistan’s heartland, Asia Report, nr 207, 
27 June 2011, 
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southsia/afghanistan/207%20The%20Insurgency%20
in%20Afghanistans%20Heartland.pdf 
 Lampell Z., Handbook on Establishing an International War Crimes Tribunal, PILPG, 
http://www.pilpg.org/EstablishingWarCrimesTribunal.pdf  
 Marin B., The dualist and monist theories. International law’s comprehension..., Curentul 
Juridic, http://revcurentjur.ro/arhiva/attachments_200712/recjurid071_22F.pdf, 
 Mazurana N., Stities D., Afghanistan’s Systems of Justice: Formal, Traditional and 
Customary, [in:] S. Sharma, P.K. Sen, Institutionalization of the Justice System, Reflections 
on a survey on the Afghan people, http://www.gmu.edu/depts/crdc/neamat1.pdf. 
 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
Concerning Transfer by the United Kingdom Armed Forces to Afghan Authorities of Persons 
Detained in Afghanistan, U.K.-Afg., Apr. 23, 2005, available at http:// 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/44/4412.htm. 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27925-205-b3.pdf Netherlands  
 Raport Afghanistan in 2008. A Survey of the Afghan People, Raport Asia Foundation, 
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2008.pdf  
 Roth K., Des Forges A., Justice or Therapy, Boston Review, July 2002, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/07/31/justice-or-therapy. 
 The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can Pursue Human Rights Criminals Abroad, 
Human Rights Watch, 2000, www.hrw.org  
 Ticehurst R., The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, International Review of 
the Red Cross, No. 317, 1997, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNHY  
 
